Discerning Morey’s Philosophy – Part 3

This post is a continuation of a series entitled ‘Discerning Morey’s Philosophy.’

In Part 2, I mused on the value of lottery picks, theorizing that perhaps they aren’t worth their opportunity cost if procured through contrived means.

But what if rebuilding itself isn’t worthwhile?

While etymologically a euphemism, rebuilding carries a romantic connotation in our lexicon. I’m not just referring to the process of tearing a team down – that’s necessary in many cases.  By rebuilding, I’m speaking of the glorious fantasy to amass young talent, establish a so-called foundation, and then recline while enjoying a ten-year window of maturation.

I’m not so sure our attraction to this is rooted in practical considerations.  It’s more likely that our conditioning dictates a desire for long-term affinity to and identification with a static group of players.  Moreover, youth affords the vehicle to envision the group’s successful evolution.

Granted, I do concede that in theory, when successful, this process is the absolute ideal scenario – think Portland getting healthy and realizing their potential en route to four titles.

With that said, I don’t think it is wise to chase the utopian when recent history shows such a high rate of failure.  Too often, teams force the process, trading quality vets for unknown commodities, or even worse, locking up young players to underserved contracts, simply for the sake of establishing a foundation.

The fall-out can be catastrophic.  Perhaps it’s time to rethink the model.

**

This brings us to a discussion of present relevance:  the rumors pertaining to a possible acquisition of Andre Iguodala or Caron Butler.

Iguodala is not really much better than Butler.  He’s a better defender and better in the open court, but Butler has the more refined offensive skillset – Caron is far superior at creating off the dribble.

Yet our collective consciousness prefers Iguodala.  He fits neatly into that rebuilding vision.  He’s just 26.  Acquiring Andre Iguodala is a subconscious enabler: we now have a young nucleus; a young nucleus that can grow together.

On the other hand, Butler is a letdown.  A 30 year old.  Merely another mercenary.  This is not a guy you can build something with for an era.  Does it not seem myopic?  Does Daryl Morey have no foresight?

Our definition of foresight is flawed.

Foresight is not exclusive to the construction of a set foundation.  Foresight pertains to the health of a franchise and is inclusive of all future considerations, most importantly, the flexibility to escape from unsuccessful situations.

Caron Butler does not contribute to a foundation.  But getting Caron Butler would vastly improve this team, ensure competitiveness for the next two years, but also provide an escape route.

Butler has just one year remaining on his contract, owed a very reasonable $11million in 2010-2011; Iguodala will be due $16million in 2013-2014.

(This is not even mentioning that the poison pill that is Sam Dalembert’s contract would likely be attached to any Iguodala deal, pushing the Rockets into luxury tax hell for next season, likely prohibiting them from resigning their own free agents or addressing other needs.)

**

In the modern CBA era, perhaps the most pragmatic approach to personnel oversight entails, rather than the construction of one static team for the long haul, the planning and creation of separate teams in succession, wherein management continuously reloads, retaining flexibility and allowing the franchise to stay competitive in perpetuum.

Now, naturally, youth is preferred.  Young players possess certain desirable attributes and are less likely to become injured.

However, the distinction is between preference and outright discrimination.

In the new model, you prefer youth, but you don’t place a premium upon it.  Rather, you simply acquire talent, old or young, keeping assets in play, and maintaining competitiveness.

Each separate team would have a three-year half-life before the ushering of the next retooling.

This would eliminate the need for painful rebuilding, when gate receipts suffer as teams struggle both on the hardwood and in the market to unload undesirable long-term contracts.

The rebuilding vision is really a self-fulfilling cycle.  Each group is torn down in lieu of the next crop until things go awry for them too and hopes fade into reality.

Just look at the Sixers: they moved Iverson to usher in the Iguodala era but are back once more in the same rut, shackled by exorbitant contracts.    Does the vision ever bear fruit?

The new model would signal a radical departure from philosophical norms.  We’re  accustomed to the ten-year-windowAssemble them, give them time, it will come together.

Too many GM’s have lost their jobs putting all their eggs into one basket.

**

There are two dilemmas:

1. Chemistry – there is merit to the argument that a revolving-door philosophy isn’t conducive to chemistry development; that chemistry is a factor of longevity.

I would present this current Houston Rockets team as my counter.  They have arguably the best chemistry in the league yet have not been together for very long.  I think that if a robust team philosophy is firmly entrenched, as is the case with Houston, and a premium is placed upon high IQ athletes, as the Rockets have done, this potential pitfall is avoided.

2. The greater dilemma would be confronting the throes of the fan base.  The masses would never sign off; they’re stuck on primordial affinities and emotional attachments.

This would certainly be a concern.  But in the end, winning heals all, and as the adage goes, if you win, they will come.

If any consolation, through even fleeting success in any odd year, teams would collect the revenue they would not have earned had the “all-in” approach failed and they were mired in mediocrity with no escape.

**

On a different note, in Part 2, I touched briefly on the issue of stars. I still feel they are necessary to win at the highest level.  But they’re difficult to acquire.  Is it wise to force it?  There really are very few stars in this league and most of them were acquired through the draft.

Is Andre Iguodala worth his price-tag when he’s not really a true star?  Is his acquisition worth taking on the chaff that is Sam Dalembert’s contract?

Rather than forcing through a bad trade for a pseudo-star, perhaps the ‘snowball’ approach is more advantageous: placing managerial emphasis on smaller moves, collecting small assets, while rolling along in competitiveness, until you can make a clean trade.

Case in point: While fans were upset, in want of immediate help, the Bonzi Wells – Bobby Jackson trade was what enabled the clean swap for Ron Artest.

Morey dealt off Wells and Jackson, taking back no chaff, rolled along, and did his diligence in the draft, maneuvering to acquire a prospect in Donte Greene whom other teams would find attractive.

Had Morey blown off the draft – like his predecessor – or forced through a bad deal for immediate help, the clean swap for Artest would not have been possible.  Take back a little good without taking back any bad, and keep rolling.

While a team’s record might end up slightly worse, it probably stands the same chance at winning a title with no stars as it would with a pseudo-star; but it retains flexibility for future improvement.

Taking back Iguodala and Dalembert would push the team far into the red for next season.  But imagine a more low-key McGrady trade – one where the team takes back only expiring contracts and a much less glamorous player than Iguodala.  The team would retain financial flexibility and go into the summer with a shopping cart of assets to put to bid in a sign and trade deal for a real star like Chris Bosh; a real star worth his market rate.

Overpaying for a pseudo-star really makes little sense.

There’s a common criticism in existence that Daryl Morey “overvalues his players.”  I’m not quite sure I understand the sentiment.  I think it’s a lot more accurate to say that he simply properly values other teams’ players.

**

Everyone is on edge in anticipation of The Trade.  The Big Splash.  Daryl Morey’s signature moment; the acquisition of the latest franchise corner-stone.  Caron Butler would certainly not fit that bill – he’s nothing but just a very good role player at this point.

We don’t know what will happen at the deadline.  Morey could very well surprise us and take back Dalembert.  Or, he could trade away McGrady for just expirings, taking back a young low-key asset in return.  Another asset to put away in the pocket.

Whatever the Rockets decide to do this deadline, it most likely won’t be flashy; it won’t appeal to what fans had been hoping for since last summer.  It most likely won’t activate the glorious vision of rebuilding or adding to a foundation.

On the surface, whatever the Houston Rockets do may not make sense, but we can rest assured, it will be part of some plan.

It’s anyone’s guess what Daryl Morey will do but, big or small, whatever he has in mind, it will tell us more about his managerial philosophy than any transaction to date.

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