Houston Rockets stats in “seven seconds or less”

By durvasa | December 10, 2009 at 11:31 pm

Update: I updated the stats in this entry to discard end of quarter events. It occurred to me that previously observed low 3-point shooting% was explainable by the frequently occurring “3-point heaves” at the end of quarters.

One of the points of emphasis for the Houston Rockets this season has been to increase the pace and get more of their offense early. The reasons are straightforward.  Without the dominant low post option in Yao Ming that they’ve relied on for these many years, and with the availability of their premier playmaker, Tracy McGrady, in question, the Rockets could no longer depend on their half-court offense for 48 minutes.  Last season, the Houston Rockets ranked 19th in pace and 30th (that would be dead last) in fast break points. That needed to change, and it has. They are currently ranked 9th in pace and as recently as a week ago were 5th in fast break points.

But let’s dig a little deeper. We know that the gold standard for up-tempo play in the modern era was Mike D’Antoni’s “7 seconds or less” offense under Steve Nash. With that in mind, and using the fantastic play-by-play spreadsheets provided by Ryan Parker over at Basketball Geek, I’ve gone through all the Rockets possessions this season and recorded what they’ve done within the first 7 seconds. I didn’t filter out half-court possessions after a timeout, but for the most part this should give a good representation of what the Rockets have done in their “early offense”. Here are the results for the 9 primary rotation players:

                 MIN    PTS  FGM  FGA  3PM  3PA fouled FTM  FTA  AST  3PAST  TOV OFOUL
Aaron Brooks     696    73   21   42   8    17   17    23   27   22     1    16   3
Trevor Ariza     822    96   37   55   8    19   13    14   17   13     3    8    1
Shane Battier    681    10   2    6    1    4    7     5    6    6      3    3    0
Luis Scola       605    45   17   20   0    0    18    11   12   6      2    6    0
Chuck Hayes      504    3    1    2    0    0    3     1    2    8      1    1    1
Kyle Lowry       502    41   8    17   0    0    24    25   29   31     7    9    2
Carl Landry      547    41   16   19   0    0    12    9    10   0      0    6    3
Chase Budinger   375    42   19   36   3    9    5     1    6    4      0    2    0
David Andersen   287    7    2    3    0    0    9     3    4    1      0    1    1
total            1013   363  124  202  20   49   111   95   118  91     17   54   12

The MIN column is just the total number of minutes each of the players have played this season. All the other columns show what each player has done in the first 7 seconds of Rockets possessions.  The fouled column refers to fouls the player has drawn, 3PAST is number of assists for 3-pointers, and OFOUL is number of offensive fouls the player has committed. The final row shows totals for the entire team.

Next, let’s look at that same data per 48 minutes. For this table, I’ve added a TS% column to the end indicating each player’s scoring efficiency:

                 MIN    PTS  FGM  FGA  3PM  3PA fouled FTM  FTA  AST  3PAST  TOV OFOUL  TS%
Aaron Brooks     696    5.0  1.4  2.9  0.6  1.2  1.2   1.6  1.9  1.5   0.1   1.1  0.2  67.7%
Trevor Ariza     822    5.6  2.2  3.2  0.5  1.1  0.8   0.8  1.0  0.8   0.2   0.5  0.1  76.8%
Shane Battier    681    0.7  0.1  0.4  0.1  0.3  0.5   0.4  0.4  0.4   0.2   0.2  0.0  57.9%
Luis Scola       605    3.6  1.3  1.6  0.0  0.0  1.4   0.9  1.0  0.5   0.2   0.5  0.0  89.0%
Chuck Hayes      504    0.3  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.3   0.1  0.2  0.8   0.1   0.1  0.1  52.1%
Kyle Lowry       502    3.9  0.8  1.6  0.0  0.0  2.3   2.4  2.8  3.0   0.7   0.9  0.2  68.9%
Carl Landry      547    3.6  1.4  1.7  0.0  0.0  1.1   0.8  0.9  0.0   0.0   0.5  0.3  87.6%
Chase Budinger   375    5.4  2.4  4.6  0.4  1.2  0.6   0.1  0.8  0.5   0.0   0.3  0.0  54.3%
David Andersen   287    1.2  0.3  0.5  0.0  0.0  1.5   0.5  0.7  0.2   0.0   0.2  0.2  73.5%
total            1013   17.2 5.9  9.6  0.9  2.3  5.3   4.5  5.6  4.3   0.8   2.6  0.6  71.5%

A few comments:

  • This confirms how good Lowry is on the break — 31 “early” assists, including 7 to 3-pointers, lead the team by far.  He also draws a ton of fouls.
  • Brooks, in contrast, shows great promise as a scorer in transition, but his playmaking for others leaves a lot to be desired. He’s very turnover-prone and has a terrible assist to turnover ratio for a PG.
  • Ariza’s got nearly twice as many field goals in early offense as anyone else. He leads the team in points scored per minute in the first 7 seconds.
  • How about Chase Budinger? He’s definitely been active running out in transition. He’s struggled efficiency-wise pretty much across the board, but you have to like the energy he’s brought.
  • Earlier in the year, there was an article in the Houston Chronicle on how Carl Landry needed to improve in running the floor in the transition. Looks like he’s got it. He and Luis have both been great on the break.
  • Shane and Chuck … not a big part of the early offense attack.
  • Only 20 for 60 on early offense 3-pointers. That’s 33%, lower than I would have expected. Keep in mind that the percentages shown here could be tainted to a degree by quarter ending possessions where a contested shot against a set defense is required. Update: After filtering out end of quarter possessions, the team is now 20-49 on 3s for a healthy 41%.

So that’s interesting, but how does this compare to what the Houston Rockets did a year ago? Basketball Geek has provided 72 of the 82 Rockets games for the 08/09 season in its data section. Following the same procedure as above, here are the stats for last year:

                 MIN    PTS  FGM  FGA  3PM  3PA fouled FTM  FTA  AST  3PAST  TOV OFOUL
Yao Ming         2217   49   11   16   0    0    31    27   37   0      0    16   3
Ron Artest       2090   99   33   59   5    18   29    28   38   22     2    14   1
Luis Scola       2182   115  40   59   0    0    43    35   51   5      1    8    3
Aaron Brooks     1696   132  39   71   7    13   41    47   51   26     4    18   4
Carl Landry      1328   46   15   19   0    0    23    16   20   0      0    13   4
Von Wafer        1154   123  45   79   8    17   27    25   32   11     0    8    3
Rafer Alston     1308   61   20   48   1    7    20    20   24   35     7    17   4
Tracy McGrady    958    39   13   26   5    14   12    8    9    5      0    4    0
Shane Battier    1816   30   6    10   3    6    17    15   15   2      0    8    2
Kyle Lowry       538    52   17   28   0    0    27    18   26   25     7    11   2
Brent Barry      706    27   9    22   2    10   8     7    7    6      1    4    0
Luther Head      243    9    3    6    0    1    2     3    3    2      0    3    0
Chuck Hayes      705    0    0    1    0    0    1     0    0    3      0    4    0
total            3456   787  253  448  31   86   281   250  315  142    22   129  26

And, again, here are the stats per 48 minutes:

                 MIN    PTS  FGM  FGA  3PM  3PA fouled FTM  FTA  AST  3PAST  TOV OFOUL  TS%
Yao Ming         2217   1.1  0.2  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.7   0.6  0.8  0.0   0.0   0.3  0.1  75.9%
Ron Artest       2090   2.3  0.8  1.4  0.1  0.4  0.7   0.6  0.9  0.5   0.0   0.3  0.0  65.4%
Luis Scola       2182   2.5  0.9  1.3  0.0  0.0  0.9   0.8  1.1  0.1   0.0   0.2  0.1  70.6%
Aaron Brooks     1696   3.7  1.1  2.0  0.2  0.4  1.2   1.3  1.4  0.7   0.1   0.5  0.1  70.6%
Carl Landry      1328   1.7  0.5  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.8   0.6  0.7  0.0   0.0   0.5  0.1  82.7%
Von Wafer        1154   5.1  1.9  3.3  0.3  0.7  1.1   1.0  1.3  0.5   0.0   0.3  0.1  66.1%
Rafer Alston     1308   2.2  0.7  1.8  0.0  0.3  0.7   0.7  0.9  1.3   0.3   0.6  0.1  52.1%
Tracy McGrady    958    2.0  0.7  1.3  0.3  0.7  0.6   0.4  0.5  0.3   0.0   0.2  0.0  65.1%
Shane Battier    1816   0.8  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.4   0.4  0.4  0.1   0.0   0.2  0.1  90.4%
Kyle Lowry       538    4.6  1.5  2.5  0.0  0.0  2.4   1.6  2.3  2.2   0.6   1.0  0.2  65.9%
Brent Barry      706    1.8  0.6  1.5  0.1  0.7  0.5   0.5  0.5  0.4   0.1   0.3  0.0  53.8%
Luther Head      243    1.8  0.6  1.2  0.0  0.2  0.4   0.6  0.6  0.4   0.0   0.6  0.0  61.5%
Chuck Hayes      705    0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1   0.0  0.0  0.2   0.0   0.3  0.0  0.0%
total            3456   10.9 3.5  6.2  0.4  1.2  3.9   3.5  4.4  2.0   0.3   1.8  0.4  67.1%

For last season, we see that Von Wafer and Kyle Lowry were by far the most active scoring in transition.  Tracy McGrady, as we know all too well, wasn’t particularly interested in taking part in an early offense attack and over half his shots in this situation were 3-pointers (you know, the ‘trot down the floor and shoot a 3 on the break’ variety). We also can observe the marked improvement from Carl Landry in running the floor hard in transition this year compared to last, scoring over twice as many points per minute. Its also interesting to compare Ron Artest last year to Trevor Ariza this year. Both like to gamble on defense and are active as a disruptive force on that end. But its evident here how much more effective Ariza has been at turning those forced turnovers into offense.

                 MIN    PTS  FGM  FGA  3PM  3PA fouled FTM  FTA  AST  3PAST  TOV OFOUL  TS%
Ron Artest       2090   2.3  0.8  1.4  0.1  0.4  0.7   0.6  0.9  0.5   0.0   0.3  0.0  65.4%
Trevor Ariza     822    5.6  2.2  3.2  0.5  1.1  0.8   0.8  1.0  0.8   0.2   0.5  0.1  76.8%

And finally, let’s take a closer look at the team totals for last year and this year:

                 MIN    PTS  FGM  FGA  3PM  3PA fouled FTM  FTA  AST  3PAST  TOV OFOUL  TS%
total (08-09)    3456   10.9 3.5  6.2  0.4  1.2  3.9   3.5  4.4  2.0   0.3   1.8  0.4  67.1%
total (09-10)    1013   17.2 5.9  9.6  0.9  2.3  5.3   4.5  5.6  4.3   0.8   2.6  0.6  71.5%

The results speak for themselves. Not only are the Houston Rockets getting significantly more in transition this year, the efficiency has also gone up. If people are wondering how the Rockets have managed to be in the top half in offensive efficiency facing the hardest schedule thus far, this should tell part of the story. The other part, offensive rebounding, is a topic for another post.

MIN FGM FGA 3PM 3PA fouled FTM FTA AST 3P-AST TOV off foul 
Trevor Ariza     777     2.3    3.8    0.5   1.3     0.8      0.9    1.1     0.8    0.2      0.6    0.1

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Red94 Adds Durvasa as Regular Contributor

By rahat huq | December 10, 2009 at 11:25 pm

I am extremely excited to announce a new addition to the blog.  Durvasa is an avid Houston Rockets fan with an affinity to the numbers side of basketball analysis.  He will now be regularly contributing his thoughts and providing Red94 with a very insightful perspective.  We are extremely fortunate to have him on board.

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First Edition of ‘Rockets Retro’

By rahat huq | December 9, 2009 at 3:41 pm

It’s important to periodically break from the monotony of present. In that spirit, now would be appropriate to present the first ever edition of ‘Rockets Retro.’ Every now and then, I will be highlighting a famous/infamous play/moment/game in Houston Rockets history and offering some thoughts and recollections.

With the present drama surrounding Tracy McGrady, I think it is only fitting that the first edition of ‘Rockets Retro’ feature the pinnacle of the Yao/McGrady era.

Quick side note to start off: A lot of what raised this dunk to the level at which it is revered has to do with the broadcast call of the play. This is probably topic for a longer post, but I have argued at length in the past that much of what goes into our perception of what is perceived as a ‘great play’ is influenced by the strength of the call. Case in point: I don’t really feel that Michael Jordan’s ‘unnecessarily switch hands in mid-air to avoid a nonexisting defender’ sequence against the Lakers in the ’91 Finals was anything particularly special. You see shots made with a much higher degree of difficulty in almost every NBA game. But when that moment is captured in package with Marv Albert’s iconic delivery, it truly becomes “a spectacular move by Michael Jordan.” Similarly, with all due respect, if the above play is dictated as “Tracy with a facey!” by Bill Worrell as opposed to Kevin Harlan’s ‘sucking of gravity’, it’s probably not on every list as one of the greatest dunks in NBA history. Still an amazing dunk, but probably robbed of its true historical potential. As presented, McGrady’s slam on Bradley simply had every necessary element for greatness.

The play itself need not require any additional description. Essentially, if you may not have known, Tracy McGrady was this really athletic guard that played for the Houston Rockets in 2005. He goes baseline and posterizes the poster-boy for posterization, the infamous Shawn Bradley. The crowd oohs and aahs. Rockets fall from NBA relevance for the next four years.

But let’s talk of the significance of this play. Other than the opening sequence of ‘Yao-Shaq 1′, this dunk was probably the defining moment in P.C. (post championship) Houston Rockets history. This dunk at the time meant so much more than simply its viewer value. It was the most significant moment in the game that really captured the imaginations of Rockets fans.

I will never forget the TNT post-game discussion after that Game 2 win. It’s really unfortunate that there aren’t any clips online of the conversation. Magic Johnson remarked that “they [Tracy and Yao Ming] remind me a lot of myself and Kareem” and Kenny Smith elaborated upon a potential prolonged dominance of the West. Not sure what Charles said. Not meant as a slight to Charles. (Seriously, I just don’t remember what he said, I’m sure it was insightful.)

The dunk was just the symbol. The game was merely a win. It was the ramifications of that brilliance captured in the ensuing discussions that enlivened Rockets fans. It was the possibilities and that first sudden realization of unthinkable potential. Here were the Rockets, McGrady and Yao, 25 and 24 years of age, each amongst the tops at his position, with a shared decade ahead. Here was the moment, the game, when it seemed to all at last be coming together. A 2-0 lead heading home. It was never about the series itself. It was the mind blowing thought that these two 20-something superstars, (who seemed to get along with each other), were possibly en route to the conference finals (a favorable matchup in the Phoenix Suns lay waiting in the wings in the semis) with merely a band of rag-tag aging journeymen at their aid. Indeed, the future was bright.

The reminiscence is agonizing; the cruelty that that first glimpse of greatness is now remembered as the last hurrah. This clip is really all we have in remembrance of an era of unrealized potential.

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Discerning Morey’s Philosophy

By rahat huq | December 8, 2009 at 6:22 pm

Daryl Morey’s has been an “experiment” unprecedented thus far in this league.  Never before has a team predicated transactional decision-making primarily upon advanced statistical analysis.  With the Houston Rockets exceeding all expectations, to some extent, Morey’s methods have been validated.

Due to the novelty of his approach, and the immediacy of his success, oft forgotten is it that we still lay merely in the earliest of stages in the shaping of this team.  Only precious little is known of Daryl Morey’s managerial philosophy.  The forethought with which he has guided the transformation of this roster would indicate some grander scheme yet to unfold.  This is the subject of my intrigue.

What is Known

The signature transaction thus far of the Morey regime was the infamous draft night swapping of Rudy Gay and Stromile Swift in return for Shane Battier.  Up until that point in time, while it was known that the assistant general manager placed emphasis on statistical analysis, this bombshell was really the first indication that with the changing of the guard, conventional wisdom had completely been thrown out the window.  In my opinion, even moreso than relinquishing the rights to Gay, most fascinating about this deal were the implications regarding Stromile Swift.  His inclusion in a trade that already appeared lopsided in favor of Memphis was quite bewildering.  That a 6’9, 26 year old physical marvel was actually deemed to hold negative value signaled that whatever they exactly were, there were now new considerations being given weight in personnel analysis.

It has since been established that Daryl Morey is employing some combination of proprietary metrics in his player evaluations.  So much is known.  From there, things get a bit more unclear.

What We Think We Know

  • In 2007, entering Daryl Morey’s first draft as general manager, the Houston Rockets had a gaping hole at the power forward position.  With viable power forward options still remaining on the board, the drafting of point guard Aaron Brooks shed some light upon Daryl Morey’s drafting philosophy.  At that point, I still held deep reservations regarding his guidance of the team – I had not been a proponent of the Battier trade.  However, I loved the selection of Brooks.  It seemed to indicate a primacy of talent over need, at least in the later selections.
  • In taking back  Jackie Butler, the Scola trade demonstrated the willingness to absorb unfavorable contracts.  However, relatively speaking, Butler’s, and the one year albatross later taken on in the form of Brian Cook, were menial in burden.
  • The Bonzi Wells – Bobby Jackson trade not only showed prudence, but was our first glimpse of real asset creation.  While Bobby Jackson had value as a veteran reserve, the real significance of this acquisition was that his expiring contracted created an asset of future value (later to be used for Artest.)  As Rockets fans, such maneuvering was a foreign experience as for the previous decade, every move was only made with present concern.
  • I believe that the contract negotiations with Carl Landry proved that Morey will not hastily pay above the market rate to retain his own players.  Morey could have moved quickly to resign Landry at the price of his (agent’s) demands, but instead, he opted to wait until Charlotte set the market rate.  This patience is in stark contrast to the practice of Morey’s predecessor (see: Norris, Moochie; Maloney, Matt etc.)
  • The Ron Artest acquisition taught us that Morey isn’t completely averse to risks.  There was an assumption that ‘Moreyball’ meant playing it safe, but this episode debunked that notion.  This would seem to serve as proof that Daryl Morey will make a dangerous investment if the potential return (i.e.: proximity to a title) is deemed worthy.  On the other hand, one could easily argue that in giving up just two late first rounders, the Artest trade actually wasn’t a risk.
  • As Morey’s philosophy began to seem clearer, the Trevor Ariza signing came as a surprise.  Before, my assumption was that Morey unwavered in his inclination towards bargains.  The acquisition of Ariza indicates that Daryl will also pay the market rate to acquire talent.  Simply put, it’s not just about compiling a roster of cheap bargains as many had assumed.  He will pay full value for players.  (Of course, this assertion is prone to the counter-argument that perhaps Trevor Ariza was determined to hold more worth than the MLE.)
  • As seen each year, we know that Daryl Morey will maneuver in drafts, using his intel to accumulate future considerations.
  • We also know there is a propensity to draft foreign talent and stash it overseas, allowing it to develop for later use.  However, we are still so early into Morey’s reign that we have not yet seen the fruits of this exercise.  Does Daryl Morey hope to play these players or are these simply assets to be used in trades?
  • Finally, many conclusions can be drawn from the decision to start Chuck Hayes this season at the center position.  Most importantly, I think it shows a resolve against the pressures of conformity.  Daryl Morey didn’t just follow the existing model and sign a veteran stopgap to fill a hole.  He was convinced that his team could win in a different way (i.e.: starting a 6’5 center and running) and thus he implemented his vision.

Looking Ahead

Daryl Morey has only been general manager of the Houston Rockets since May of 2007.  When he joined, the roster was bereft of talent and thus, he was relegated to the task of cleaning up previous mistakes and expunging toxic assets (i.e.: Juwan Howard).  Concurrently, starting with the draft class of 2007, he slowly began accumulating his own collection of talent.

What becomes interesting is that, with the roster having been cleansed of dead weight, and the emergence of players like Lowry, Brooks, and Landry, this is the first season that Daryl Morey actually has valued assets at his disposal.  So what does he do with them?

Does he simply retain them or is the philosophy to buy low, develop, and sell high?

Take Aaron Brooks for example.  I think his trade value might actually be higher than that of his actual player value.  Sell high?

Then there are the imminent free agency decisions on Luis Scola, Kyle Lowry, and (the next summer) Shane Battier.  The former two are probably due big raises.  Would Morey be willing to pay the market rate to retain them?  Or was their value to him simply the fact that they were underpaid?

How will Morey handle the issue of Carl Landry’s emergence?  He too will be due a big pay raise at some point and I would imagine this would impact the decision on Scola.  Conventional wisdom would dictate simply moving Scola in a trade to open up more room for Landry, but this is Daryl Morey of whom we are speaking.  Perhaps the equation isn’t really as simple as assuming a direct correlation between increased playing time and production for a young, emerging talent?  It is completely conceivable that to Morey, the two players hold more real value in tandem as a platoon.

And of course, of what importance is chemistry?  This is the distinction with Billy Beane’s ‘Moneyball’ model of management.  Baseball is essentially a game of one on one matchups where independent parts can be interchanged with little effect to their relations to the whole.  In our case, cohesion is critical, and of greater relevance, we already know that these players play well together (one could argue that the Rockets have the best chemistry in the league).  What value is placed upon that in personnel considerations?  This reality of ‘synthesis of the whole’ makes it increasingly difficult to assess independent assets for their true value.

What about the salary cap?  Billy Beane had to keep selling his assets because he had ownership-imposed financial restrictions.  Morey doesn’t but at the same time, he has to deal with a fixed cap and the menace of the luxury tax.  So while Morey doesn’t have that suffocating imposition that would force his hand, he still has a finite amount of resources which would influence its allocation.  To date, Les Alexander has not shown a willingness to exceed the tax.  Does this make it more important to land a true star or is it actually more important that resources be put to good use?

What about ‘stars’?  Does Morey even buy into the concept of ‘star players’?  He has spoken of wanting to acquire a premiere talent, but we really have no idea what he might have in mind.  It is plausible that Daryl Morey might just think that ‘team-oriented’ basketball is more conducive to success.  If he does believe in ‘stars’, at what cost is their acquisition justified?

The conclusion of the McGrady saga will also be very revealing.    As aforementioned, the Scola trade proved a willingness to absorb bad contracts required for facilitation of a trade.  However, Jackie Butler’s and (later Brian Cook’s) were still relatively small deals.  Would Morey be willing to take back some long term albatross to acquire the player of his desire?  My hunch is that he seems to prefer flexibility over the conventional ‘star at all costs’ ideology, but I have no basis for this hypothesis.

Final Thoughts

Daryl Morey has finally begun to receive the praise he is due.  With this team’s surprising success, his methods are no longer dismissed as mere novelty.  Because of the brilliance in his approach, it has been easy to forget that still, many questions remain unanswered.  Still, much is yet to be revealed.  Still are we only in the earliest stages of the construction of this team.

It will be fascinating to observe as Daryl Morey’s managerial philosophy further comes to light.

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On Oden and Yao

By rahat huq | December 7, 2009 at 6:52 pm

“Point being, we are now bound together by a common hope: that our two talented and beloved big men can come back to fill the void their absence has left behind; that we can watch them go head-to-head once more, unburdened by the pain of the past and instead enjoying the sight of two of the game’s premiere big men battling each other at the height of their powers.

Their cities deserve such a sight. So, too, do their teams. But more than anyone, this Promethean pair deserves it. Thus, it is for them, and for all of us, that I hold out hope. I know they won’t give up. Neither, then, will I.”

As Jason Friedman so eloquently put it, “we are now bound together by a common hope.”

The Houston Rockets and Portland Trail Blazers seek solace in the comfort of company.  From an unspoken rivalry in management and their 6 game battle upon the hardwood floors, to their newfound common consternation, it truly can be said that misery acquaints strange bedfellows.

With that said, I can’t empathize at the level which has been assumed of our fanbase.  Frankly, when Yao Ming was ruled out for the year, I only felt a calm numbness; his injury was the realization of a foregone conclusion.  Luck had simply run out, the odds merely validated.

In my eyes, Yao’s 77 game ’09 campaign was house money; a suspension of inevitability.  The 21 year old Oden seemed past his problems, finally displaying the defensive prowess for which he was so widely heralded.  For Greg, only greener pastures had lay ahead.  Greg had a future.  Yao, to me, was already nearing the end.

This apparent belittlement of my own grief may come as odd.  It is true that Yao’s injury abruptly thwarted an outside hope for the title.  This is clearly significant.  But it did not carry the long term ramifications that make this blow so crippling for Blazer Nation.  It did not plant angst of the unraveling of a dynasty foretold.

Time will tell how Oden recovers from this latest setback.  He has youth at his aid and by all accounts, an unyielding resolve.  But I can’t feel the pain of the Rose Garden for lack of similitude; I can only sympathize and offer condolence.  I wasn’t there when Houstonians wondered if Ralph would ever again be the same.  I was only there when for Yao, the writing on the wall became legible.  To me, the latter cannot compare to the case of Greg Oden.

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