Process over results

The Royce White saga ended mercifully this July with that player’s departure to Philadelphia by way of trade.  White was an outright disaster, creating headlines for his obstinance rather than his play.  Morey’s critics saw their chance and leaped, relishing the opportunity to pile on what was a wasted pick.  And indeed, White was a wasted pick, and probably Morey’s biggest mistake.  But if you asked Morey, there’s a strong chance he’d tell you he could live with the decision and if he could go back, he probably would do the same thing again.

In his introductory press conference with the Philadelphia 76ers, Sam Hinkie mentioned the importance of “process over results” in the evaluation of decision-making.  This isn’t exactly a novel concept in the corporate world as most smart organizations reflect back similarly.  But it’s foreign to a sports news cycle consumed with second-guessing and keeping score.  In fact, given the ineptitude of most NBA front offices, I’m not even sure most lead-men are properly auditing their past decisions.

White was taken because where the Rockets were, in June, last summer, before James Harden, was in a state of little hope, with a roster bereft of game-changing talent.  The Rockets considered White to be among the five best talents in that draft and at #16, deemed him worth the risk, despite the red flags.  At that time, to get out of the hole they were in, the Rockets needed to hit a home-run.  They had to take a risk.

When Morey looks back on the White pick, he won’t just chalk it up as a mistake because of its failure.  He’ll assess the data he received and the channels through which it was gathered.  Did they get bad intel as to White’s character?  Did they properly measure the risk?  If those areas both check out, Morey won’t consider the pick to have been a bad decision just because it didn’t work out.  He knew there were difficult odds going in.

Similarly, it’s popular now to slam the Marcus Morris pick, at #14, from two summers ago, especially given the emergence of Kawhi Leonard into a frontline defensive star.  But again, while Leonard now is clearly the far superior player, I can’t say Marcus Morris was a bad pick because the rationale used was sound.  At that time, like last summer, the Rockets did not have a star player on their roster nor anyone who could consistently create shots for himself.  Players like Leonard were more surer bets.  But the Rockets felt that as a small forward—a position different from his native power forward slot—Morris had star potential.  They had to swing for the fences given their situation and like with White, they whiffed.

In assessing the Morris pick, the Rockets will need to evaluate their scouting and the breakdown in forecasting Morris as a ‘3’, just like how they’ll need to reconsider the hearsay testimony they received giving White a clean emotional bill of health.  But Morris wasn’t a bad pick just because he failed.  He can be considered a bad pick only if, like White, pitted against the situation the team was in, the risk was not properly assessed.  Were the odds of Morris becoming an impact player as a small forward high enough to warrant using a #14 given the low odds of success, in general, for players picked at that spot?  If so, it was a good pick.  The Rockets didn’t need a sure thing – they needed a home-run.

Bad decisions are those lacking sound rationale.  Signing Kelvin Cato to a $42million contract on the basis of a 1-game sample size is a bad decision.  Signing Matt Maloney after four playoff games of good shooting is a bad decision.  Signing Moochie Norris for $20million for the maintenance of fraternity is a bad decision.  The Royce White and Marcus Morris picks were not bad decisions.  They were failures, but they were rationally informed, calculated decisions.

Shift to conventional model

When you have star players, life becomes easier, from the top on downward.  The despair out of which the Marcus Morris and Royce White picks were borne is now gone.  The team no longer has to swing for the fences.  They likely won’t ever again be picking that high, but if the Rockets ever happen to stumble upon a late lottery pick through trade, they’ll likely use it on someone they know can immediately step in and help them, not someone they think has hope of becoming a star.  That was how things played out when they had Tracy McGrady and Yao Ming and traded Rudy Gay—a player with upside—for Shane Battier, a player whose ceiling had been reached but who could help the team immediately.

They’ll save some roster spots for veterans, like Marcus Camby, that can play now, rather than carrying projects down to the twelfth man.  But what will be interesting to see is how they maintain the balance needed to keep from robbing Peter to pay Paul.  While the team will need vets, they’ll need at least some prospects to keep the pipeline fresh and prevent what happened under Carrol Dawson from ever happening again, (when the team had to sign aging ex-Knicks just to have warm bodies.)  That’s why Terrence Jones and Donatas Motiejunas are safe, for now, even if there are probably more productive options to be had.

On Chemistry

I hear it most often on the radio, but it pops up a lot sometimes on the ‘web as well: “Daryl Morey doesn’t value chemistry.”  Forgive me for my bluntness, but it’s really an asinine opinion with no logical basis.

Chemistry is a luxury to be procured upon the securement of a sound foundation.  To use an analogy, you don’t put leather interior on an ’86 Pinto – the car is garbage anyway.  Time after time, I hear fans call in to the radio, positing the narrative that “if Daryl would just stop making so many trades and let these guys grow, they could get better.”  “How’s the team supposed to get better if he just keeps trading everyone away?”

What is missed is that if the upside of a group isn’t adequately high, chemistry isn’t a priority – it’s a waste of time.  Another example: take me and four writers from my staff and put us on an NBA court.  If we play together long enough, we’ll get better just by developing chemistry.  But that’s really irrelevant because our upside doesn’t suffice – we’ll never be good enough to contend regardless.

The asset arbitrage of the past few years seems odd to the casual fan.  It’s not normal to keep flipping players.  But the goal was to accumulate value until ultimately cashing in on elite talent.  Now it’s happened, in the persons of James Harden and Dwight Howard, and now, the chemistry building will begin.  From 2007 through 2009, Morey kept together the quintet of Tracy McGrady, Yao Ming, Shane Battier, Rafer Alston, and Chuck Hayes, adding pieces around them.  Similarly, he’ll likely look to keep Chandler Parsons—alongside James Harden and Dwight Howard–when the small forward’s contract is up, even if Parsons’ expected market rate diminishes his value.

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Saturday’s acquisition of Thunder guard James Harden was an unexpected boon for Houston Rockets general manager Daryl Morey.  Only time will tell how good they’ll be, but with the trade, Morey’s team now has a distinct shape.  Harden, guard Jeremy Lin, center Omer Asik, and forward Chandler Parsons are all—or in Harden’s case expected to be soon—locked in long term.  To fill the hole at power forward, many expect Morey to make use of the money his team has available below the cap.

But most everyone will remember that in the past year, the Rockets came close to striking two other franchise altering deals, each of which would have left the team looking very different than it currently appears, and setting it on a path distinct from the current track.

Last December, David Stern struck down a deal which would have landed Lakers forward Pau Gasol in Houston.  Via uncontroverted sources, then-Nuggets forward Nene would have been next in line to put on red.  Had it all happened, the team’s lineup would look something like this:

PF Gasol/White

SF Parsons/Budinger

C   Nene/Hayes

SG Lee

PG Lowry/Lin

Reports were at the time that the team had requested the agent for forward Chuck Hayes to hold off on signing with Sacramento until they could complete the trade; Lin was only waived to make room later for Samuel Dalembert.

As for Budinger and Lee, it’s anyone’s guess whether the latter would have been re-signed this offseason or if the former would still have been dealt.  But from the desire for continuity, we’ll assume they’d have stayed.  Royce White was selected with the New York Knicks’ #16.

This August, the Rockets were again heavily in talks with the Orlando Magic—discussions which had been ongoing over the past year—about a trade for center Dwight Howard.  That deal would have sent out the two draft picks used in the Harden trade, two players from among the group of Patrick Patterson, Marcus Morris, Donatas Motiejunas, Jeremy Lamb, Royce White, and Terrence Jones, and would have required the Rockets to take back two of Jason Richardson, Chris Duhon, and Hedo Turkoglu.

Rob Hennigan chose instead to bank on “the potential” of 27-year-old guard Arron Afflalo.”  It’s easy to point to deals that don’t go through and cite them as examples of what might have been – 99% of trades discussed in the NBA do not come to fruition.  But in this case, that Howard didn’t become a Rocket should be seen as an anomaly.  Almost all objective observers were in agreement that Houston was offering the far superior package.  In a normal market, where both buyers and sellers were equally informed and competent, Howard would now be wearing red.

Lin would’ve been at point, Parsons at the ‘3’, Howard at center, and Patterson or one of the rookies at the ‘4’.  Jason Richardson probably would have been at the ‘2’.

Which of the three teams would you have preferred?  With Howard, Houston would have still had money left over—after amnestying Luis Scola—for another big signing next summer.    But there was the huge risk that Howard might have bolted.

The Gasol Rockets would’ve contended.  They would’ve had a three-headed monster in Lowry/Gasol/Nene that could’ve taken them deep into the playoffs.  But their window was smaller and they didn’t have the ball-handling wing/guard usually needed to win big, nor did they have the avenue/assets left to acquire one.  At the time, it was thought Terrence Williams could become that player but we know how that ended.

The Harden Rockets probably don’t have the upside of the Howard version but they also are spared of the uncertainty.  As mentioned, all major pieces are locked in and young and there is a clear route to obtain a second star.  They also have clean hands: despite his dominance, it would’ve been tough to root for Dwight Howard.

But unlike the Gasol version, the Harden Rockets will take time.  They might not be ready for another few years.  The Gasol/Nene Rockets would’ve been vying today for the #1 seed.  But again, they’d have a smaller window.  Will fans stay patient to watch this current team grow or would they have preferred immediate success?

After two botched deals, killed off by unlikely events out of his control (evil/dishonesty – Stern; incompetence – Hennigan), things ended up working out quite well for Daryl Morey.  We saw from the Gasol deal that he would’ve been willing to go old and from the Howard trade that he wasn’t averse to huge risks.  And now we see from the Harden trade the fruits of staying ready.

And that’s the lesson.  If one thing’s been learned, there has all along only been one philosophy: staying ready and staying flexible.  It’s what Morey himself said, each time after each and every failure, when a star was snatched away by unforeseen events.  Most scoffed and mocked the notion.  Finally, for Morey, it paid off.

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As I’ve explained in all of my evaluations, of just about everyone from Kevin McHale to Tracy McGrady over the years, context and circumstances are what matter.

Oklahoma City Thunder general manager Sam Presti is widely regarded as one of the best, if not the best, GM’s in all of basketball.  And in truth, he’s done a great job, hitting on all of his high picks in drafting Kevin Durant, Russell Westbrook, and James Harden.  But look at the circumstances under which he took over that team.

In 2007, when Presti was handed the reins, the team owned the rights to the 2^nd overall pick in the draft.  Ownership, while involved in some controversial dealings, also held no false impressions about the team – they allowed Presti to trade resident All-Stars Ray Allen (for the #5 pick) and Rashard Lewis (for a $9million trade exception and 2^nd round draft pick) and start fresh with a clean slate both financially and with respect to personnel.

The importance of this initial chain of events cannot be understated.  The sequence allowed the Thunder to get bad and acquire successive high-end picks.

This above isn’t mentioned to make light of Presti’s accomplishments.  He still had to select the right guys, as he did.  But it illustrates the importance of considering circumstances in assessment.  Success isn’t borne in a vacuum and shouldn’t just be weighed from results.  What were things like when the man in charge first took over?

Now, let’s look at Morey.  When he took over the Rockets, in that same year, 2007, in retrospect, it was possibly the worst possible circumstances for a general manager.  Why?  Because the existing personnel directly induced stagnation.  The Rockets had two superstars, both on their last legs.  Because McGrady and Yao took turns going in and out of the lineup, the team could never be great, but the mere presence of one at all times was prohibitive of a high draft pick.  Had they just had neither player, they at least would have gone in some direction.

In addition, while Morey inherited those prohibitive stars from Carrol Dawson, the latter’s estate left nothing else holding any more value than a steaming pile of crap.  Look at that 2006-2007 roster: after Battier—Morey’s signature acquisition from the year before as assistant GM—the next best players were Juwon Howard, Rafer Alston, and Luther Head.  Luther Head.

So in essence, like OKC, the 2007 Houston roster was complete trash void of any young talent, yet rather than inheriting the #2 and #5 picks in the draft, Morey got two stars who were never enough but whose very presence assured against getting picks of that aforementioned kind.

But he made the best of what he had.  Within just one year, by the end of the season, Morey had acquired Aaron Brooks, Kyle Lowry, Von Wafer, Ron Artest, Carl Landry, and Luis Scola, building a full-fledged supporting cast around Yao Ming out of basically nothing.

Fast forward to today and Goran Dragic, Courtney Lee, Chandler Parsons, and Chase Budinger are in the place of the others and were acquired through similarly frugal means.  The team hasn’t progressed but I’ve made clear exactly why.  The greater point is that Morey started off with an awful hand and is in a similarly rotten lot with ownership’s current mandate.  To those holding criticisms, what exactly would you have done differently?

**

I talked a bit about agency cost in corporations when discussing Kevin McHale’s divergent incentives from management.  Let’s shift our discussion now to an example in political science.  Scholars have theorized that in developing nations, democracy is incompatible with the initial stages of economic reform.  Why?  Because if leaders are fearful they’ll be replaced by vote, they won’t institute the painful changes consistent with free market transitions.  To put it simply, men in charge can’t do what needs to be done if it immediately hurts those with power to remove them.

I’ve written enough explaining why the Rockets need to start over.  But if ownership insists on “winning,” there’s nothing any general manager can do.  Result: stagnation.

Morey surely knows he’s running out of time to accomplish the unrealistic task he’s been assigned.  I believe he’ll head first to the June 28^th draft with plans of pursuing Dwight Howard.  He’ll put forth all of his chips in hopes of landing the one superstar in the field.  But if that fails, I don’t think they’ll blow it up as they should.  I think, if the Lakers are willing, it’s almost inevitable for the Rockets to acquire Pau Gasol.

**

In Part 2, I talked about revolving door rosters.  In essence, fans want “foundations” like OKC; fans want young players who they can watch grow up, identify with and cheer for for close to a decade.  But fans don’t have jobs at stake with respect to the matter.  It’s rare that a manager has the job security to oversee a complete overhaul as is the ideal.  In most cases, I think leading men just want to show enough return, enough tangible growth to stay alive and keep building.  Without trust, less risks can be taken.

I believe that after three straight lottery finishes, Daryl Morey knows he might probably need to make the playoffs to save his job.  This is why I think he will pursue the bird-in-hand.

Pau Gasol is the classic market gem.  A sure-fire star, his value has diminished to 25 cents on the dollar due to public perceptions.  If the name of the game is finding value on the cheap, getting Gasol makes too much sense.

The Lakers would need to play ball.  But if Lowry and Scola are dealt for Gasol, and Dragic and Lee are resigned, along with Parsons, Camby, and the expected contributions of just one of the #14, #16, and Donatas Motiejunas (you know at least one rookie will pan out), you’d have to pencil in the Rockets for a trip to the postseason and 50 wins if not very close to it.  Ownership would be happy and Morey would get more time.

This isn’t how I would do it, but I fear Rockets management no longer has the capitol to bide its time and wait for the right move.  Still, the main hope and main pursuit will remain Howard.  That would fulfill every goal in one swoop.

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Awaiting verdict: Marcus Morris

Most people following this team would define Marcus Morris as a bust and one of Morey’s biggest blunders.  I don’t quite understand how that conclusion is reached regarding a guy who played a total of like seven minutes the entire season.

First, as just stated, it’s silly to form conclusions off such a limited sample size.  Marcus Morris could be a bust.  But it’s just too early to tell.

Second, let’s stop pointing to Kawhi Leonard—whom the Rockets took a white version of in the second round—as evidence of some blunder.  Leonard’s been fantastic for the Spurs.  But he’s also gotten a chance, unlike Morris.

The Spurs start slowly each year because they sacrifice games in taking time to integrate new pieces.  In the Kevin McHale assessment, I discussed ‘agency cost’ whereby agents of a corporation may not necessarily have motives in line with the best interests of the corporation itself.  Poppovich enjoys lifetime tenure with the Spurs; McHale must scrap for every win to prove his worth.  Consequently, the latter decided not to take the risk of playing Morris.  That Morris did not get playing time is not some indictment upon Morris’ abilities.

Furthermore, to contest the above point, critics of the Morris pick point to Chandler Parsons.  “If Parsons as a rookie was able to get playing time, then the theory that McHale didn’t play young players has holes,” went the argument.

What the critics fail to understand is that Parsons and even Patrick Patterson don’t have those weaknesses that require most young players years to overcome.  In that sense they’re anomalies – there was no reason for McHale to not play them.  They are both mentally strong and smart, like veterans.  Their weaknesses are physical limitations.

Morris, on the other hand, has physical gifts.  It’s in the mental adjustment where he’s lacking, as is customarily the case.  Coaches under fire can tolerate players being too short or slow; it’s missing defensive assignments that really grinds their gears.

Lastly, the Rockets began the season as one of the worst defensive teams in the league, coming off a season when they boasted one of the best offenses.  McHale needed defense and Parsons provided it.

When assessing a pick, one needs to consider the thinking that went into the selection.  The same critics that dismiss Morey as overly conservative fail to realize the thought process used last June.  The Rockets know they need impact players, having a team of role players.  They could have taken a cookie-cutter positional type, like Leonard (whom the critics retrospectively pine for), and gotten nowhere.  Instead, they took a gamble.  There isn’t impact talent available at 14.  But the thinking went that envisioning Morris as a future ‘3’—identifying a potential market inefficiency—was the best bang for the buck; it was the best chance at ‘impact’ that low in the draft.  It could have been a complete waste – we don’t know.  Time will tell.  But the point is that it was a calculated risk and that it’s too early to reach a verdict.

Outstanding: Chandler Parsons

Based on the early returns, Chandler Parsons might be the best draft selection Daryl Morey has ever made.  With plus-size, ball-handling ability, and elite defensive instincts (both team and individually), one can see Parsons developing into a fringe All-Star type in his prime.  His biggest, or maybe only, weakness is an undependable shot which sees his elbow jut out like a hanger.  This is saying a lot considering he boasted a +50% shooting average during one stretch of the year using this same form.

The Parsons pick demonstrates Morey’s drafting methodology: You take players with warts you can fix and talents you can’t teach.  It’s not possible to develop defensive instincts at the level Parsons operates; that stuff is innate.  But a shooting form can be fixed.  Just put the damn elbow in.

The Good:

1. The Camby trade:

At the deadline, the Rockets were too far to turn back and were headed forward for playoff positioning.  Morey traded the corpses of Hasheem Thabeet and Jonny Flynn (a package wielding the same trade value as the Which-Which sub I just purchased for $5.95 downstairs) for a guy I wonder how they ever lived without.  More than what he brought defensively and on the boards—which was a whole hell of a lot—Camby changed the entire dynamic of the team’s offense with his passing.  It was so striking that the team seemed to fall apart on that end when he’d go to the bench; they couldn’t run inverted pick and rolls from the high post any longer.

Camby should be back next year and will be a big part of the team.

2. The Fisher trade:

This was another good deal where the Rockets jettisoned a player for whom they no longer had use for a future draft pick.  The brilliance behind the deal was that through a hardline stance, the entire process was completed with very minimal (almost negligible) damage to the team’s 2013 cap, despite Fisher’s right to a player option.  This aspect of the trade was not given proper attention in the press.

As for Hill and his contributions with the Lakers, I discussed that issue on my tumblr:

Jordan Hill had an impressive performance in yesterday’s playoff opener for the Lakers.  But let’s please not get carried away and say the Rockets made a mistake.  Playing next to high-level talent relieves pressure and allows players to do what they do best.  In Hill’s case, that’s rebounding, and that’s all he’s had on his mind while sharing the court with Bynum and Gasol.  In Houston, with no other notable big men, he was asked to anchor the defense and the team suffered badly, as evidenced by the numbers.  L.A. can afford Hill’s mental lapses.  Houston, with already a slim margin, couldn’t.

Simply put, he was a sunk cost.

3.  Not panicking:

Finally, I have to credit Morey for not panicking.  Fans want instant gratification, discretion be damned.  Morey had an order to ‘win now.’  He probably could have made some move for an overpriced 30+ Class-B star and possibly saved his job in the process.  (For ideas on who all might have been possibilities, think “WWCDD? – What would Carroll Dawson do?”)  But instead, he kept his hand and went for Camby, keeping the team’s flexibility intact.  I’ll discuss this in future posts, but it’s a tough tightrope he’s walking.

Stop wasting my time: Linsanity

As an Asian (albeit South Asian), Linsanity was of particular interest.  As a friend put it at the time, “he seems like someone I grew up with.”  In a human interest element, Lin’s story is unrivaled.  But from a basketball sense, let’s not waste each other’s time.

Lin’s a pretty good player.  Dragic and Lowry are each significantly better.  Most around these parts would likely concede that point.

But critics point to Jonny Flynn, claiming Morey chose the current Blazer over Lin on the merits.  Not true.  On this topic, I spoke to Lin myself:

They cut Lin because Flynn had guaranteed money and an expiring contract that could be used in a trade at the deadline.  That same contract was the bait in acquisition of Marcus Camby.

Morey probably knew that Lin was better than Flynn.  (Considering that Flynn might be the worst player in the NBA, this is likely.)  But for a distant third-string spot, keeping the former wasn’t worth the financial ramifications.

If anything, Morey should be given credit for bringing in Lin when only Golden State and Dallas had also given him a chance.  Even New York was on the brink of cutting him loose before feces hit the fan and had even relegated him to the D-League.  Had Dragic been dealt to New Orleans, as had been expected, Lin would have been the backup point.  The team even tried to keep Lin, waiting until the last moment, until they had to clear the roster spot for Dalembert.

Referendum:

2012 was also a referendum on moves made before.  After a stellar first season, Patrick Patterson severely regressed.  Terrence Williams flamed out and was cut loose.  Goran Dragic and Courtney Lee proved to be principals of trades which were clear wins.

These four, all acquired the previous year, don’t factor into 2012’s grade.  At the same time, interesting notes can be gleaned.

Does the Williams fiasco make Morey more risk-averse?  Like Morris, we can chalk up Williams’ lack of playing time to the aforementioned ‘agency cost.’  Adelman and McHale didn’t care to deal with his BS to see to fruition his tantalizing skillset.  Does Morey then stop using picks on these types of high-potential guys when his coaches won’t play them?

In Part 3, I will look ahead to the next step for the team.

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Grade: B+

What we need to remember is that assessment should be driven by process, not solely results.  If a patient comes into the ER, deathly ill and profusely bleeding, and then dies on the operating table, is the surgeon a failure?  Context matters.  Did the surgeon take the right steps to mitigate horrendously unfavorable circumstances?  It’s not enough that the desired end was not achieved.  How did he do within the framework of the hand he was dealt?

I gave Kevin McHale a C+ because of process.  Sure, he failed in the end.  But it wasn’t that failure which determined the grade.  It was the way he failed, losing six consecutive games in the same identical manner.

For many, this is a difficult concept to grasp.  That’s why there exists “count the rings!” and other over-simplified verbiage in our discourse.

To wit, sports is entertainment – it’s meant to be simple.  We’re not exactly dealing with monetary policy in developing nations.  But if we’re committing time and resources to media coverage of sports institutions, our evaluation and discourse should at the least be informed and intelligent.  Otherwise, this is all just a waste of time.

Discussion:

I established in the last installment that the edict to “win now” came from ownership.  Inference from subsequent statements by Morey in the media only further cements this point.  In fact, this is almost accepted truth amongst close observers of this team.

It is crucial to stay mindful of this context.  There were certain decisions made by Morey this year with which, if in a vacuum, I would have strongly taken issue.  But I’m not evaluating him in a vacuum; I’m evaluating him within the framework of the order he was given.  From therein, the grade of B+ is derived.  I believe that while certainly not exceptional or outstanding, Daryl Morey did about as good of a job as could reasonably have been expected of him this year.

In a vacuum, the bad: 

These are the moves (or non-moves) that Morey made that I hated but that I can forgive because of his orders.

1. Signing Samuel Dalembert:

I hated this from even back when rumor first got out of the two parties’ interest.  A move like this is what perpetuates the mediocrity treadmill.  Why?  Because it’s non-transferrable production.  Adding a stop-gap veteran like Dalembert improves the team enough in the present to preclude being “bad” but then, because he’s not a part of the long-term solution, his production and impact can’t be factored into future team growth.

Think of it like this: You’re in Calculus.  You have four quizzes which make up, in total, 20% of your grade.  The other 80% of your grade is derived from a final exam.  The quizzes are leniently administered, so much so that it’s possible to bring in a cheat sheet.  On the other hand, it’s impossible to cheat on the final.

A friend breaks into the teacher’s filing cabinet after class and steals each of the quizzes before the respective administered dates and then pays off a nerd to provide him the answers on a cheat sheet.  (I’m using this example because I actually knew a guy who did this in computer science back in high school.  I still don’t understand how the teacher never caught on.)  He gets A’s on each quiz.  But because he’s cheated, hasn’t learned anything, and can’t cheat again on the final, he gets a 17 on the final.  He fails the class.

You, on the other hand, opt to do your own work.  You study hard, engrossing yourself in the material.  It isn’t easy.  There are sleepless nights.  You do very poorly on the first two quizzes.  But you learn from your mistakes and know what kind of effort success in the class will require.  Your grades trend upward and from this, not only can you measure yourself, but you gain confidence.  As the final is cumulative, because you’ve built a solid foundation, despite the early growing pains, you’re prepared and know what to expect.  You get an A on the final and an A in the class.

Signing Samuel Dalembert is like cheating on the quizzes.  Because he filled the team’s single biggest hole (interior defense), they weren’t forced to deal with the reality of their foundation.  Irrespective of win shares—and his first half offcourt/oncourt +/- figures serve as proof—I contest that this team would have been significantly worse without Dalembert.  If he isn’t brought back over the long haul, or even next year, what benefit did it serve?  The band-aid was artificial growth – it doesn’t carry over, and it prevents the team from really looking in the mirror and making the structural changes it needs to realize its ultimate goal: winning a championship.

Still, while in theory I detested this move, I can’t fault Morey too greatly.  He was given an order to stay competitive and this move achieved that end.

2. Not trading Luis Scola:

I had been advocating that the team trade Luis Scola for some time now, but the decision to not yet do so might have caught up to Morey.  The 32-year-old, still owed roughly $20 million guaranteed over the next two-years, had the worst numbers of his career, across the board.  His PER went down three points and his total rebounding %age declined by over two full points.  He shot under 50% for the first time in his career and looked worse than ever defensively.  At this point, I’m not sure the Rockets would be able to find a taker for Scola even if they tried.  It’s safe to say he’s begun the gradual descent players at his age experience.  It was argued that his lack of reliance on athleticism would indicate longevity, but his numbers would seem to imply otherwise.

On keeping Scola: think of it as having a tractor.  You plan on selling off your farm and all your equipment and moving to the city.  Furthermore, this year’s harvest is not expected to be good as a drought is on the forecast.  Rather than selling off the tractor—and the other equipment—and cashing in now, you hold on for this season.  You get little in the way of crops due to the drought, but worse, after further usage, the tractor’s resale value has diminished even further after another year of usage.  (For those attorneys out there, let’s forget about tax depreciation for the moment.)  You’re overall worse off.

The Rockets gain really nothing from playing Luis Scola.  They’re not winning a title any time soon.  But every additional year that they keep him, because of his age, his asset depreciates.  Had they traded him sooner, they might have gotten some pieces that could help them in the future.  Instead, like Dalembert, despite his statistical drop-off, his present production is hindering their ultimate end.

Again though, despite my contention in theory, I can’t fault Morey.  He has to “win now” and Scola is still a good player.  The nixed Gasol trade is at least indication that he is trying.

3. Not trading Kevin Martin:

Not much to say here.  Like Scola, I pushed for the team to deal Martin prior to the season for younger parts.  Now it looks like they’ll have to do so regardless, but for .25 on the dollar.  However, again, I can understand the decision, because of the need to win.  And unlike Scola, Martin will still certainly hold some value – his is an expiring contract.

In part 2, I will discuss the Marcus Morris selection, Patrick Patterson’s regression, and why Jeremy Lin is irrelevant.

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But there was a pretty interesting development over the weekend, at this year’s Sloan Sports Analytics Conference, which merited some documentation of sorts.

Since the fall of Yao, and the end of any realistic hope of title contention, many had wondered why management refused to allow evolution to take its natural course.  When the life of good teams runs its course, they get bad, get high draft picks, and build back up.  Even when the pick itself isn’t kept as part of the team, it’s usually used as part of a trade to bring in talent (see: the rebirth of the Boston Celtics.)  High lottery picks are the currency of NBA markets.

The Rockets lost out in their pursuit of Carmelo Anthony and Deron Williams because they didn’t have blue-chip prospects (Galinari, Favors.)  Eric Gordon was the piece the Hornets coveted for Chris Paul.  To date, opposing general managers haven’t cared for the Rockets’ assets.  In this market, one rare, prized commodity is worth far more than numerous ‘good’ ones.

So why has Morey refused to, for lack of a better term, ‘tank’?  Samuel Dalembert isn’t a long-term option.  Yet he was signed for basically one-year (it’s a 2 year, partially guaranteed deal).  Without Dalembert, the Rockets aren’t in the playoff race.  Luis Scola also probably won’t be around when the Rockets again are relevant, and his value is slipping by the day, but he too has been held onto. Why?

Some, like myself, believed that a numbers man like Morey, if he had his choice, would race straight to the bottom, for a quick rise to the top.  It only made sense. Too much was said at last year’s SSAC about the undesirability of mediocrity for the Rockets to willfully ignore.  The decree had to have come from Les.

Others posed a counter-argument.  I spoke to some people last week who felt that Morey himself was behind the plan.  They thought that Morey had weighed the odds, and that too many teams had been stuck in the lottery over the years, waiting on failed picks, to risk that route.  They theorized that Morey felt that the odds of building a title team through small incremental improvements were higher than taking a chance in the lottery.

While I disagreed that this was Morey’s belief, it was a compelling counter-argument and seemed plausible.

Over the weekend, interviews with Morey himself and former Rocket head coach Jeff Van Gundy, on Bill Simmons’ podcast, shed enough light to possibly put an end to the speculation altogether.

I wrote about the Morey interview on March 2:

1. Hearing that interview, in concert with other public statements made by Morey over the past few months, makes me almost positive that the decree to ‘keep a foot in both doors’ and try to rebuild while remaining competitive came down from Les.  Listening to Morey, assessing his tone, I think you’d have to infer that were he to have his choice, he’d take the path of least resistance and sink to the bottom for a quicker rise to the top.  He says to Simmons, regarding the ‘dual-approach’, that “it’s actually frankly never been done.”  Later, while responding to Simmons’ supposition regarding avoiding the middle path, Daryl says, “we’re adding a degree of difficulty to our turnaround,” though adding “I do think it can be done.”

Then, in a TrueHoop TV interview, Van Gundy says, about Morey:

He’s done a remarkable job. Making small, smart decisions may not have put them where they want to be, but it certainly has put them into position to try to get where they want to be given their ownership’s thought that they don’t want to get bad to get good which is the easiest way to do it.

The statements, in concert, seem to put the issue to bed altogether.  Why is this important?  Because it adds perspective on how one should evaluate this front office.

Things have not worked out too well for this team, and for the most part, the media at large has seemed to turn on management.  But it’s pretty tough doing a task when you have both hands tied.  Right now, Les is dictating this team like the bald guy holding on with a combover rather than shaving it all off.

If Morey were allowed to let nature run its course, he could get that high draft pick.  Most lottery picks flop, you say?  Doesn’t matter.  They still hold value and could be dealt for the veteran star Morey covets.  Instead, the Rockets cling today to the 8th seed, one game in front of a third straight year of the #14 pick.

In light of Les’ orders, one can understand why that nixed Gasol trade was so crippling.  Despite their circumstances, they had found a scenario that would allow them to contend without having gotten bad.  Their assets would have been enough for Gasol, and with their cap space, they would have signed Nene.  It’s unlikely the stars ever again align in such a way.  While they can possibly still deal for Gasol, there’s no attainable free agent on the market the caliber of Nene.

We’ll see what they do next week with the trade deadline looming.  Perhaps they’ll strike lightning and pull off the miracle, even in the summer.  If they do, they should be lauded.  They’re fighting the odds in following orders.  It can be done, but things could have been much simpler.

The post Discerning Morey’s Philosophy – Part 6 appeared first on Red94 | Houston Rockets news and musings.

A typical criticism of Morey would go like this: “I guess he’s smart but I don’t know how far he can take this team because there’s more to basketball than just numbers.”

The critic imagines Morey plugging numbers into his laptop and then basing his decisions solely on the printout, to the neglect of all other considerations.  From Morey’s public comments (i.e.: he stated that the decision to draft Patrick Patterson was impacted by a feeling that he would fit with the team culture) and from common sense, we know that this just is not the case.

The same misunderstanding exists about the stat movement in general.  When met by numbers, the wary observer almost always retorts: “These numbers are useless.  There’s more to basketball than numbers…like chemistry!  Just watch the damn games!”

Morey isn’t ignoring notions of chemistry nor is he neglecting on-court observation.  He’s simply using stats to aid in the overall decision-making process.  Stats don’t supercede other considerations; they supplement.

If you’re buying a used car, you’ll take it for a test drive, but if you’re smart, you’ll do some other research too.  So why should it be any different in basketball?  If you base decisions solely on what you see, the eye can play tricks.  That’s how catastrophes like the Stromile Swift signing occur.

The numbers need not intimidate or give cause for embitterment.  They are simply a part of the greater process of diligence.  Following an era featuring such signings as the Kelvin Cato and Matt Maloney contracts, greater diligence can only be a good thing.

The post Discerning Morey’s Philosophy 5.3 appeared first on Red94 | Houston Rockets news and musings.

As we know, the four-team trade landed guard Courtney Lee with the Rockets, and as has been established in the past week, while limited in potential, he’s pretty good.  Why was it, or is it, so hard to believe that Daryl Morey simply liked Courtney Lee, regardless of his thoughts on Trevor Ariza?  We can see that the former is a great fit on this team.  Why is the trade taken as an indictment of the initial Ariza signing or an indication of regret?

Daryl Morey’s feelings about Courtney Lee do not bear definitive deductions about his opinion on Trevor Ariza.  It’s completely possible that Morey was perfectly content with Ariza, after his post-Martin transformation, but simply preferred Lee as a player.  Why is that so far-fetched?

In addition, it was propagated by most media outlets that the trade was simply a cost-cutting maneuver to assist the bottom line.  This one is even easier to debunk: the rumored trade for Carmelo Anthony would have required use of the traded player exception created from that swap.  The Rockets clearly intend to re-invest those savings.

When you trade a player, it doesn’t somehow mean that you regret the initial signing or that you no longer value the player.  The only definite conclusion that can be drawn is that you place a higher value upon the other player.  So why are so many assumptions projected upon the Ariza-Lee trade?  The Rockets may or may not have been dissatisfied with Trevor Ariza – we don’t know.  All we know for sure is that they valued Courtney Lee more.

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Much has transpired since that last update.  With opening day closing in, I plan to compose a series of informal mini-essays in both assessment of our recent dealings and in response to some prevalent assumptions which have found their way into our conventional wisdom.

When I started this series, I was convinced there existed some staunch set of ideals which guided Morey’s philosophy.  ”Buy low, sell high; never pay market; avoid all long-term obligations.”  As we moved through February down toward our present day, it has become clear that this is not the case.  Morey is not an idealist and is distinct from Billy Beane; Morey has no managerial insistences.

The Rockets general manager is a realist guided simply by tenets of economic efficiency on a case-by-case basis.  ”What is the best route I can take in this instance to maximize production?”

Reports near the deadline unearthed that Morey indeed was willing to take back Samuel Dalembert [in an Iguodala trade], shattering one of my prior presumptions.  The team veered far above the tax line in re-signing free agents Luis Scola and Kyle Lowry, and nearly broke the bank with its acquisition of aging center Brad Miller, a move many would have deemed unfathomable just months before.  They’ve gone “all in” and I never thought that that would be the case.

Also unclear is whether there is a set course for the franchise.  The team has retained, and signed, veterans at or above 30, but was also heavily rumored to be in pursuit of Ricky Rubio and Demarcus Cousins, acquisitions which would surely have indicated the onset of rebuilding.  Most teams forcibly dismantle, trading productive vets because it seems like the logical course; in Houston, is there just a belief that “we’ll bide our time competing until an opportunity to get younger appears and then we’ll re-evaluate”?

And what of the ‘buy low, sell high’ theory of trade?  The team cashed in on forward Carl Landry, but took the opposite course with Scola.  In fact, Morey apparently did try to sell high on Scola, dangling him in deals for Amare Stoudemire and Chris Bosh before turning around and inking him to a new deal.  Evaluate each case on an independent basis, respective of present circumstances.

Finally, and perhaps most curiously, is Morey even completely wedded to quantitative analytics?  By most accounts, Carmelo Anthony is amongst the least efficient ‘stars’ in the league, yet the most reputable of sources all reported the MIT grad to have interest in a trade.

What we’ve learned since we last left off is that in regards to personnel management, there is really no set policy. The sole consideration is to simply not waste money.  Don’t pay Ariza $6million when Lee comes at 2. Get the most bang for your buck through independent evaluation of each event.

The post Discerning Morey’s Philosophy 5.1 appeared first on Red94 | Houston Rockets news and musings.

Yet it is a unique relationship forged with the Houston Rockets which makes them so intriguing.

The Rockets were the first NBA team to adopt the NBDL’s new “single affiliate partnership model,” an arrangement where a D-league team maintains responsibility of its business operations while one lone NBA franchise assumes complete control over all of its basketball decisions, from coaching, to offensive philosophy to even distribution of playing time.

Naturally, the partnership piqued my interest because of the parallels to a known practice of the Oakland Athletics.

**

In our email conversation, Sam Hinkie, Executive Vice President of Basketball Operations and head of basketball analytics for the Houston Rockets, explained the motivations behind the team’s investment:

We’ve been interested in minor league basketball for many years now. We spent a lot of time looking to create options to deeply evaluate more players and have a stronger hand in developing our own young players. But under the current rules, we wouldn’t actually own the NBA rights to those players in the NBDL. That puts a natural limit on the amount we wanted to invest, as the value of our work to identify and develop that talent is not guaranteed to accrue to the Rockets. So we looked for other alternatives to outright ownership that would meet our goals of broadening our basketball pipeline.

Indeed, the team truly is taking advantage of the arrangement to develop its players.  The Vipers run sets from Rick Adelman’s playbook, not only giving prospects a chance to acclimate to the big-league offense, but also providing the Rockets opportunity to test out new wrinkles in an environment with lesser stakes.

The relationship brings to mind the control the Oakland Athletics imposed upon their minor league affiliates.  A’s former general manager Sandy Alderson held a firm belief that “the organization as a whole functioned well only if it was uniformly disciplined.”  Thus, Alderson strictly enforced his unique beliefs on hitting, leaning on the organization’s minor league coaches whose teams were not walking enough.

To be clear, the Rockets’ is a gentler reign with the team maintaining awareness of the Vipers’ needs.  Still, the striking similarity is a cognizance of the value of uniformity.

In Moneyball, Michael Lewis goes on to describe how the Athletics’ organizational philosophy was ingrained into players.  To persuade them to be patient and to work the count and wait for the pitcher to make a mistake, the belief that strikeouts were not necessarily bad was drilled into their heads.

The Rockets had instituted their playbook.  But for an organization that so highly values the benefits of individual preparation, I wondered if, like the A’s, they stressed the importance of any specific individual practices at the lower levels.

Of the five players that spent time between both the Rockets and Vipers this year, Hinkie responded, delicately, that he would “hope those players saw many similarities in the larger philosophies and the way they prepare for a game,” adding that “they realize that the Rockets value similar things on both teams.”

**

In the Morey era, the Houston Rockets have been known to use purchased second round draft picks upon European talent, then stashing these players away abroad for further development.

While these prospects typically have higher ceilings than their American counterparts from that level of the draft, many have expensive buyout clauses and the investment does not pay dividends for some time.

Now having the ability to develop players in a controlled environment, with the option for immediate in-season call-up, would the new relationship with the Vipers shift the organization to prefer American players?

“Not really” responds Hinkie:

In the draft, we’re looking for who will be the best players over the long term. Any team that feels good about their ability or willingness to develop young players might have slightly more interest in acquiring young players in need of that development. But I think it’s a pretty small consideration overall compared to just evaluating who has the best chance to be a good player over time.

**

The Houston Rockets’ partnership with the Rio Grande Valley Vipers, the first of its kind, is just another example of the club’s attempts to optimize its use of its resources.

Much has been made of the experience young stars such as Aaron Brooks have gained in the D-league.  But it’s the subtle payoffs that are overlooked.

In a sport where mere possessions can mark the difference between winning and losing, a reserve’s increased familiarity and comfort on any given play could determine the outcome of any given game.  It’s for this reason that the Houston Rockets have sought yet another avenue to gain a competitive advantage.

The post Discerning Morey’s Philosophy – Part 4 appeared first on Red94 | Houston Rockets news and musings.

In Part 2, I mused on the value of lottery picks, theorizing that perhaps they aren’t worth their opportunity cost if procured through contrived means.

But what if rebuilding itself isn’t worthwhile?

While etymologically a euphemism, rebuilding carries a romantic connotation in our lexicon. I’m not just referring to the process of tearing a team down – that’s necessary in many cases.  By rebuilding, I’m speaking of the glorious fantasy to amass young talent, establish a so-called foundation, and then recline while enjoying a ten-year window of maturation.

I’m not so sure our attraction to this is rooted in practical considerations.  It’s more likely that our conditioning dictates a desire for long-term affinity to and identification with a static group of players.  Moreover, youth affords the vehicle to envision the group’s successful evolution.

Granted, I do concede that in theory, when successful, this process is the absolute ideal scenario – think Portland getting healthy and realizing their potential en route to four titles.

With that said, I don’t think it is wise to chase the utopian when recent history shows such a high rate of failure.  Too often, teams force the process, trading quality vets for unknown commodities, or even worse, locking up young players to underserved contracts, simply for the sake of establishing a foundation.

The fall-out can be catastrophic.  Perhaps it’s time to rethink the model.

**

This brings us to a discussion of present relevance:  the rumors pertaining to a possible acquisition of Andre Iguodala or Caron Butler.

Iguodala is not really much better than Butler.  He’s a better defender and better in the open court, but Butler has the more refined offensive skillset – Caron is far superior at creating off the dribble.

Yet our collective consciousness prefers Iguodala.  He fits neatly into that rebuilding vision.  He’s just 26.  Acquiring Andre Iguodala is a subconscious enabler: we now have a young nucleus; a young nucleus that can grow together.

On the other hand, Butler is a letdown.  A 30 year old.  Merely another mercenary.  This is not a guy you can build something with for an era.  Does it not seem myopic?  Does Daryl Morey have no foresight?

Our definition of foresight is flawed.

Foresight is not exclusive to the construction of a set foundation.  Foresight pertains to the health of a franchise and is inclusive of all future considerations, most importantly, the flexibility to escape from unsuccessful situations.

Caron Butler does not contribute to a foundation.  But getting Caron Butler would vastly improve this team, ensure competitiveness for the next two years, but also provide an escape route.

Butler has just one year remaining on his contract, owed a very reasonable $11million in 2010-2011; Iguodala will be due $16million in 2013-2014.

(This is not even mentioning that the poison pill that is Sam Dalembert’s contract would likely be attached to any Iguodala deal, pushing the Rockets into luxury tax hell for next season, likely prohibiting them from resigning their own free agents or addressing other needs.)

**

In the modern CBA era, perhaps the most pragmatic approach to personnel oversight entails, rather than the construction of one static team for the long haul, the planning and creation of separate teams in succession, wherein management continuously reloads, retaining flexibility and allowing the franchise to stay competitive in perpetuum.

Now, naturally, youth is preferred.  Young players possess certain desirable attributes and are less likely to become injured.

However, the distinction is between preference and outright discrimination.

In the new model, you prefer youth, but you don’t place a premium upon it.  Rather, you simply acquire talent, old or young, keeping assets in play, and maintaining competitiveness.

Each separate team would have a three-year half-life before the ushering of the next retooling.

This would eliminate the need for painful rebuilding, when gate receipts suffer as teams struggle both on the hardwood and in the market to unload undesirable long-term contracts.

The rebuilding vision is really a self-fulfilling cycle.  Each group is torn down in lieu of the next crop until things go awry for them too and hopes fade into reality.

Just look at the Sixers: they moved Iverson to usher in the Iguodala era but are back once more in the same rut, shackled by exorbitant contracts.    Does the vision ever bear fruit?

The new model would signal a radical departure from philosophical norms.  We’re  accustomed to the ten-year-window.  Assemble them, give them time, it will come together.

Too many GM’s have lost their jobs putting all their eggs into one basket.

**

There are two dilemmas:

1. Chemistry – there is merit to the argument that a revolving-door philosophy isn’t conducive to chemistry development; that chemistry is a factor of longevity.

I would present this current Houston Rockets team as my counter.  They have arguably the best chemistry in the league yet have not been together for very long.  I think that if a robust team philosophy is firmly entrenched, as is the case with Houston, and a premium is placed upon high IQ athletes, as the Rockets have done, this potential pitfall is avoided.

2. The greater dilemma would be confronting the throes of the fan base.  The masses would never sign off; they’re stuck on primordial affinities and emotional attachments.

This would certainly be a concern.  But in the end, winning heals all, and as the adage goes, if you win, they will come.

If any consolation, through even fleeting success in any odd year, teams would collect the revenue they would not have earned had the “all-in” approach failed and they were mired in mediocrity with no escape.

**

On a different note, in Part 2, I touched briefly on the issue of stars. I still feel they are necessary to win at the highest level.  But they’re difficult to acquire.  Is it wise to force it?  There really are very few stars in this league and most of them were acquired through the draft.

Is Andre Iguodala worth his price-tag when he’s not really a true star?  Is his acquisition worth taking on the chaff that is Sam Dalembert’s contract?

Rather than forcing through a bad trade for a pseudo-star, perhaps the ‘snowball’ approach is more advantageous: placing managerial emphasis on smaller moves, collecting small assets, while rolling along in competitiveness, until you can make a clean trade.

Case in point: While fans were upset, in want of immediate help, the Bonzi Wells – Bobby Jackson trade was what enabled the clean swap for Ron Artest.

Morey dealt off Wells and Jackson, taking back no chaff, rolled along, and did his diligence in the draft, maneuvering to acquire a prospect in Donte Greene whom other teams would find attractive.

Had Morey blown off the draft – like his predecessor – or forced through a bad deal for immediate help, the clean swap for Artest would not have been possible.  Take back a little good without taking back any bad, and keep rolling.

While a team’s record might end up slightly worse, it probably stands the same chance at winning a title with no stars as it would with a pseudo-star; but it retains flexibility for future improvement.

Taking back Iguodala and Dalembert would push the team far into the red for next season.  But imagine a more low-key McGrady trade – one where the team takes back only expiring contracts and a much less glamorous player than Iguodala.  The team would retain financial flexibility and go into the summer with a shopping cart of assets to put to bid in a sign and trade deal for a real star like Chris Bosh; a real star worth his market rate.

Overpaying for a pseudo-star really makes little sense.

There’s a common criticism in existence that Daryl Morey “overvalues his players.”  I’m not quite sure I understand the sentiment.  I think it’s a lot more accurate to say that he simply properly values other teams’ players.

**

Everyone is on edge in anticipation of The Trade.  The Big Splash.  Daryl Morey’s signature moment; the acquisition of the latest franchise corner-stone.  Caron Butler would certainly not fit that bill – he’s nothing but just a very good role player at this point.

We don’t know what will happen at the deadline.  Morey could very well surprise us and take back Dalembert.  Or, he could trade away McGrady for just expirings, taking back a young low-key asset in return.  Another asset to put away in the pocket.

Whatever the Rockets decide to do this deadline, it most likely won’t be flashy; it won’t appeal to what fans had been hoping for since last summer.  It most likely won’t activate the glorious vision of rebuilding or adding to a foundation.

On the surface, whatever the Houston Rockets do may not make sense, but we can rest assured, it will be part of some plan.

It’s anyone’s guess what Daryl Morey will do but, big or small, whatever he has in mind, it will tell us more about his managerial philosophy than any transaction to date.

The post Discerning Morey’s Philosophy – Part 3 appeared first on Red94 | Houston Rockets news and musings.

On Draft Night 2006, I had described news of the Battier-Gay trade as “the moment I had completely lost faith in the competence of management.”

It’s rather humorous to consider just how much my tune has changed.

After a decade of mismanagement, the team appears headed back in the right direction under the guidance of Daryl Morey.

Morey’s is an unprecedented approach.  Yet still, so little is known of his philosophy.

If success is borne from some madness, does this not beseech the quest for its method?

More Questions to Ponder

A natural starting point for our discussion is Daryl Morey’s decision to continue building this team around Yao.  Prior to his latest setback, the center had already had an extensive injury history.  Even more troubling were the odds he faced – most ‘giants’ in NBA history have had their careers shortened by foot problems.

Daryl Morey was certainly aware of this and had had the opportunity to trade Yao last year while he was in good health and for his full market value.  Yet he still retained him.  Why?

On the surface, this does not seem like a rational decision.  Every time Yao Ming steps onto an NBA court, his value depreciates because his risk for injury increases [with the added wear.] It’s certainly possible that Morey felt that because dominant low post scorers were so scarce and valuable that this risk was justified.  Still, I have a difficult time accepting that a mind like Morey’s would invest such a significant proportion of his cap space into such a volatile asset.

The more plausible explanation points to the lucrative Chinese business partnerships Yao’s presence on the roster affords to owner Les Alexander.  If the call to retain Yao was ownership imposed, this stands as the closest comparison in our study to the financial constraints placed upon Billy Beane.  In a league with no limit, Beane had no money.  Through keeping Yao, Morey might just have been forced to operate with less in a sport with a cap.

With the decision on Yao backfiring, we are brought to the strategy for replacing him.  In the 7’6 center, the team lost its only shot blocking and low post presence.  Yet Morey’s response was to sign a jump shooting Australian rookie and insert the 6’6 Chuck Hayes into the starting lineup.  Wouldn’t common sense dictate that he at least try to acquire an established inside presence?

Speaking on the loss of slugger Jason Giambi, Billy Beane once said that “the important thing is not to recreate the individual….the important thing is to recreate the aggregate.”

With the limited resources at his disposal, Daryl Morey could have never found a player that could duplicate all of Yao’s talents.  Rather than trying to replace Yao with a similar but inferior player, perhaps the most efficient solution was to put a premium on the attribute of Yao that most critically needed to be replaced?

The numbers suggest that Yao’s greatest impact was on the defensive end.  It could very well have been determined that extending defensive specialist Chuck Hayes’ minutes was the one route which would most significantly impact the team’s expected total output.

Whatever the case, rather than trying to mimic the recipe from last year, Morey decided that things would have to be done very differently this season.

Speaking of last year, I should also touch on the decision to trade veteran point guard Rafer Alston in midseason.  Few general managers would have had the gumption to deal their starting point guard in the middle of a playoff run.  One might surmise that the Rockets had mailed it in upon the announcement of McGrady’s surgery, but were that the case, the team surely would have also dealt the soon-to-be free agent, Ron Artest.

Alston had been the starter for four years while his eventual replacement, Aaron Brooks, was still being confused with the former New Orleans Saints’ quarterback.  Unless Alston was just that bad, maybe what we revere as ‘experience’ really isn’t as critical as conventional wisdom would suggest?  After all, what exactly defines experience?  How does one quantify its benefits in relation to the production brought by a younger, more talented player?

If we’re delving into basketball existentialism, then now would probably be an appropriate time to ask what exactly is a ‘shooting guard.’  No other general manager would start both Trevor Ariza and Shane Battier in tandem at the wings.  The two are unequivocally the worst ball-handling swingman duo in the league.  Daryl Morey knows this.  Does this decision illustrate contempt for the traditional basketball roles?

Might there be a belief that what is typically expected to come from one particular source can simply be replaced in the aggregate from other avenues?  Perhaps Ariza and Battier’s combined defensive impact was projected to offset the sacrificed expected output of an average conventional ball-handling wing?  This line of reasoning would render the traditional basketball role obsolete.

One could again counter that the team’s decision to start Trevor and Shane in tandem was rooted in apathy; that they didn’t care to compete in this lost season.  But were that the case, wouldn’t Morey have simply dealt Battier for younger players?

So we must now explore the decision to retain veterans such as Luis Scola and Battier while simultaneously ushering in this era of rebuilding.  It reeks of confidence, but would the team have not been better off in the long run by selling off its aging parts and positioning itself for a higher lottery pick?

Perhaps Daryl Morey is saying that lottery picks are overvalued commodities; that they are not worth their price of acquisition: lost time.  Perhaps the odds of finding a contributor later in the draft are comparable to the odds of finding one in the late lottery?

If you feel that the odds of landing a ‘star’ player through the lottery aren’t relatively high, and you know that using your methods, you can find a contributor at a later draft slot, is it not rational to place a higher premium on the culture developed through competitiveness than on the slim chance of landing a ‘star’ by ‘tanking’?

Finally, we’ll close with the issue of that which we call a ‘star.’  No team in the modern era has boasted a roster wherein each player’s production proportionately correlated with his earnings.  But does precedent in a changing game serve as a sufficient ideological deterrent?

Intellectual competitive advantage in an inefficient market might make the prospect of winning through unconventional means as probabilistic as ultimate success through the sacrifice of time in the quest for a true ‘star.’

We don’t know if this is the case, but of course, with our subject, Daryl Morey, so very little is truly known.

The post Discerning Morey’s Philosophy – Part 2 appeared first on Red94 | Houston Rockets news and musings.

Due to the novelty of his approach, and the immediacy of his success, oft forgotten is it that we still lay merely in the earliest of stages in the shaping of this team.  Only precious little is known of Daryl Morey’s managerial philosophy.  The forethought with which he has guided the transformation of this roster would indicate some grander scheme yet to unfold.  This is the subject of my intrigue.

What is Known

The signature transaction thus far of the Morey regime was the infamous draft night swapping of Rudy Gay and Stromile Swift in return for Shane Battier.  Up until that point in time, while it was known that the assistant general manager placed emphasis on statistical analysis, this bombshell was really the first indication that with the changing of the guard, conventional wisdom had completely been thrown out the window.  In my opinion, even moreso than relinquishing the rights to Gay, most fascinating about this deal were the implications regarding Stromile Swift.  His inclusion in a trade that already appeared lopsided in favor of Memphis was quite bewildering.  That a 6’9, 26 year old physical marvel was actually deemed to hold negative value signaled that whatever they exactly were, there were now new considerations being given weight in personnel analysis.

It has since been established that Daryl Morey is employing some combination of proprietary metrics in his player evaluations.  So much is known.  From there, things get a bit more unclear.

What We Think We Know

• In 2007, entering Daryl Morey’s first draft as general manager, the Houston Rockets had a gaping hole at the power forward position.  With viable power forward options still remaining on the board, the drafting of point guard Aaron Brooks shed some light upon Daryl Morey’s drafting philosophy.  At that point, I still held deep reservations regarding his guidance of the team – I had not been a proponent of the Battier trade.  However, I loved the selection of Brooks.  It seemed to indicate a primacy of talent over need, at least in the later selections.

• In taking back  Jackie Butler, the Scola trade demonstrated the willingness to absorb unfavorable contracts.  However, relatively speaking, Butler’s, and the one year albatross later taken on in the form of Brian Cook, were menial in burden.

• The Bonzi Wells – Bobby Jackson trade not only showed prudence, but was our first glimpse of real asset creation.  While Bobby Jackson had value as a veteran reserve, the real significance of this acquisition was that his expiring contracted created an asset of future value (later to be used for Artest.)  As Rockets fans, such maneuvering was a foreign experience as for the previous decade, every move was only made with present concern.

• I believe that the contract negotiations with Carl Landry proved that Morey will not hastily pay above the market rate to retain his own players.  Morey could have moved quickly to resign Landry at the price of his (agent’s) demands, but instead, he opted to wait until Charlotte set the market rate.  This patience is in stark contrast to the practice of Morey’s predecessor (see: Norris, Moochie; Maloney, Matt etc.)

• The Ron Artest acquisition taught us that Morey isn’t completely averse to risks.  There was an assumption that ‘Moreyball’ meant playing it safe, but this episode debunked that notion.  This would seem to serve as proof that Daryl Morey will make a dangerous investment if the potential return (i.e.: proximity to a title) is deemed worthy.  On the other hand, one could easily argue that in giving up just two late first rounders, the Artest trade actually wasn’t a risk.

• As Morey’s philosophy began to seem clearer, the Trevor Ariza signing came as a surprise.  Before, my assumption was that Morey unwavered in his inclination towards bargains.  The acquisition of Ariza indicates that Daryl will also pay the market rate to acquire talent.  Simply put, it’s not just about compiling a roster of cheap bargains as many had assumed.  He will pay full value for players.  (Of course, this assertion is prone to the counter-argument that perhaps Trevor Ariza was determined to hold more worth than the MLE.)

• As seen each year, we know that Daryl Morey will maneuver in drafts, using his intel to accumulate future considerations.

• We also know there is a propensity to draft foreign talent and stash it overseas, allowing it to develop for later use.  However, we are still so early into Morey’s reign that we have not yet seen the fruits of this exercise.  Does Daryl Morey hope to play these players or are these simply assets to be used in trades?

• Finally, many conclusions can be drawn from the decision to start Chuck Hayes this season at the center position.  Most importantly, I think it shows a resolve against the pressures of conformity.  Daryl Morey didn’t just follow the existing model and sign a veteran stopgap to fill a hole.  He was convinced that his team could win in a different way (i.e.: starting a 6’5 center and running) and thus he implemented his vision.

Looking Ahead

Daryl Morey has only been general manager of the Houston Rockets since May of 2007.  When he joined, the roster was bereft of talent and thus, he was relegated to the task of cleaning up previous mistakes and expunging toxic assets (i.e.: Juwan Howard).  Concurrently, starting with the draft class of 2007, he slowly began accumulating his own collection of talent.

What becomes interesting is that, with the roster having been cleansed of dead weight, and the emergence of players like Lowry, Brooks, and Landry, this is the first season that Daryl Morey actually has valued assets at his disposal.  So what does he do with them?

Does he simply retain them or is the philosophy to buy low, develop, and sell high?

Take Aaron Brooks for example.  I think his trade value might actually be higher than that of his actual player value.  Sell high?

Then there are the imminent free agency decisions on Luis Scola, Kyle Lowry, and (the next summer) Shane Battier.  The former two are probably due big raises.  Would Morey be willing to pay the market rate to retain them?  Or was their value to him simply the fact that they were underpaid?

How will Morey handle the issue of Carl Landry’s emergence?  He too will be due a big pay raise at some point and I would imagine this would impact the decision on Scola.  Conventional wisdom would dictate simply moving Scola in a trade to open up more room for Landry, but this is Daryl Morey of whom we are speaking.  Perhaps the equation isn’t really as simple as assuming a direct correlation between increased playing time and production for a young, emerging talent?  It is completely conceivable that to Morey, the two players hold more real value in tandem as a platoon.

And of course, of what importance is chemistry?  This is the distinction with Billy Beane’s ‘Moneyball’ model of management.  Baseball is essentially a game of one on one matchups where independent parts can be interchanged with little effect to their relations to the whole.  In our case, cohesion is critical, and of greater relevance, we already know that these players play well together (one could argue that the Rockets have the best chemistry in the league).  What value is placed upon that in personnel considerations?  This reality of ‘synthesis of the whole’ makes it increasingly difficult to assess independent assets for their true value.

What about the salary cap?  Billy Beane had to keep selling his assets because he had ownership-imposed financial restrictions.  Morey doesn’t but at the same time, he has to deal with a fixed cap and the menace of the luxury tax.  So while Morey doesn’t have that suffocating imposition that would force his hand, he still has a finite amount of resources which would influence its allocation.  To date, Les Alexander has not shown a willingness to exceed the tax.  Does this make it more important to land a true star or is it actually more important that resources be put to good use?

What about ‘stars’?  Does Morey even buy into the concept of ‘star players’?  He has spoken of wanting to acquire a premiere talent, but we really have no idea what he might have in mind.  It is plausible that Daryl Morey might just think that ‘team-oriented’ basketball is more conducive to success.  If he does believe in ‘stars’, at what cost is their acquisition justified?

The conclusion of the McGrady saga will also be very revealing.    As aforementioned, the Scola trade proved a willingness to absorb bad contracts required for facilitation of a trade.  However, Jackie Butler’s and (later Brian Cook’s) were still relatively small deals.  Would Morey be willing to take back some long term albatross to acquire the player of his desire?  My hunch is that he seems to prefer flexibility over the conventional ‘star at all costs’ ideology, but I have no basis for this hypothesis.

Final Thoughts

Daryl Morey has finally begun to receive the praise he is due.  With this team’s surprising success, his methods are no longer dismissed as mere novelty.  Because of the brilliance in his approach, it has been easy to forget that still, many questions remain unanswered.  Still, much is yet to be revealed.  Still are we only in the earliest stages of the construction of this team.

It will be fascinating to observe as Daryl Morey’s managerial philosophy further comes to light.

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