The following facts have been stipulated:

1. Jeremy Lin will effectuate an $8.37million cap hit next season.
2. Lin shot 34% overall from ’3′ last season.
3. In the month of February, Lin shot 42%; for March, he shot 40%.
4. The ideal guard next to Harden would possess some adequate long-range shooting proficiency. 

The above points are almost universally undisputed.  From there, things become a bit more unclear.

Lin’s greatest quality is his ability to attack the defense off the dribble, especially in utilizing the pick and roll.  Here in Houston, next to Harden, he’s been harnessed, not getting as many opportunities as he did in New York, often relegated to the role of a spot-up shooter.  Lin showed late last year that there’s hope for sustained shooting accuracy.  But the circumstances beg the question: if an accurate shooter could be acquired at a cheaper price tag, would it not be smarter salary allocation to simply trade Lin?

In example, now, you’re taking an $8million cap hit on a player whom you hope can shoot 40% on 3′s for the year.  Does that really make sense when you can most likely have someone who definitely can shoot at that accuracy but at a fraction of the cost?  (e.g: Aaron Brooks or one of many other options).

Now the obvious response to that question is that Lin brings many other skills to the table.  Unlike any sweet shooting alternative, he can get to the rim and in fact is among the best in the league in the pick-and-roll.  But does this really matter if he isn’t being allowed to attack?

The critics of Lin often brush the immediately aforementioned reality under the rug, rolling their eyes and hoping that denying its veracity will make it less true.  But to any neutral observer, the situation last year was indisputably clear: out of all of the team’s regulars, Jeremy Lin was the one player in whom Kevin McHale had the least faith.  Lin routinely sat on the bench at the end of games, regardless of whether it was Tony Douglas or Beverley playing in his ‘stead.  He was routinely the quickest to be pulled when the team got off to slow starts.  He was rarely ever the focal point of attack and in fourth quarters, he rarely handled the ball.*

(*One interesting thing I noted last season was that after crossing half-court, late in games, if Lin was on the court, he rarely ever set up the play.  This was in contrast to Beverley who, when in the fourth quarter, if not initiating the play, at least was allowed to handle the ball until Harden got free.  I’m not suggesting that this observation is probative of any greater implication, but at the least, it’s an interesting nuance of interteammate dynamics.)

It’s been beaten to death whether this shackling was for good cause.  But it happened.  Yet unlike Beverley, Lin is a player who, if given reps in isolation, is capable of production.  If that’s the case, shouldn’t he be getting them?  After his December 10th explosion against the Spurs where he scored 38 points–a game in which James Harden did not play–I mused:

In scoring 38 points in his first outing without James Harden, Lin put to rest any doubts regarding his overall ability.  It just simply is not possible that that performance (against the league’s best team) and last year’s Linsanity stretch were flukes.  It just cannot be.  One cannot achieve such heights in such a manner, in that many instances, by mere luck or random chance.  These games are indisputably probative of actual ability.  Jeremy Lin is not elite, but he can be a very good, game-changing player in this league.

It makes perfectly practical sense to want to keep the ball in Harden’s hands as much as possible.  But inevitably, at some point, he’s going to get bottled up by a long wing defender.  We saw it against Andre Iguodala and again against Paul George.  It’ll happen in the playoffs.  When that time comes, the Rockets need the one other guy on this roster that can create a shot to be ready; they need Lin to already have been fully acclimated as a second option; they need Lin to have already gotten enough reps to be comfortable in the role.  That definitely was not the case last year in the playoffs.

Aside from staggering Harden and Lin’s minutes to the full extent possible, Harden’s touches should be reduced with Lin’s increased.  Not only will it wet Lin’s feet but it will keep Harden fresh for the stretch run (he badly wore down late last year, as we all saw.)  Such tinkering might come at the cost of a few wins early on but it’s for the best in the long run.  It’s an adjustment that has to be made.

The Rockets need to make Lin more a part of the offense or trade him.  This isn’t some novel suggestion – you’ll see it parroted all across the ‘web.  But much of those who posit the call do it with just Lin’s interests in mind.  I’m saying it in the interests of the Rockets.  It simply does not make sense to keep a player at an $8million cap hit and play him out of role.  You either play him to his strengths or you make better use of that money.  But there are far cheaper alternatives to an $8million spot-up shooting Jeremy Lin.

The post Assessing Jeremy Lin: Part 2 appeared first on Red94 | Houston Rockets news and musings.

To begin, a recitation of prior thoughts: My stance all year long was one of opposition to Kevin McHale’s handling of Lin.  I believed that McHale did not properly manage Lin’s playing time and confidence, maintaining a short leash when, in my opinion, the circumstances dictated trust and nurturing.  As the only player on the team other than James Harden able to create his own shot, I believed that Lin should have been given more opportunities to succeed; instead, he was routinely benched in the fourth quarters of close games, after short spurts of poor play, and rarely allowed to attack as the primary point of offense.  I believed that early lenience would bear later fruit through renewed confidence and repetition.

[While McHale’s approach can only be characterized as myopic, I can’t particularly find fault.  Void of job security, McHale doesn’t have the luxury of coaching for the future, unlike Gregg Popovich of the Spurs.]

What transpired for Mr. Lin during the postseason was perhaps, with the benefit of hindsight, all too predictable.  In the few games in which he appeared, Lin provided little of anything productive, appearing, if not timid, wildly out of sorts.  However, it would not be accurate nor truthful to conclude that Lin would have fared better had he been given a chance to take his lumps earlier on or that the poor showing was direct result of McHale’s mismanagement.  It could very well be that Lin simply doesn’t have it to compete against physical defense.  Yet I contest that the only way to have truly known would have been to have given him a chance.  Without those in-season reps, Lin didn’t stand a chance in the postseason.

Lin, the player, is a fascinating paradox.  He shatters racial stereotypes in that his dominant trait is his athleticism.  He’s big, sturdy and possesses elite level quickness.  It’s his skill level that comes up short.  Lin’s main ability is in blowing past defenders with a lethal first step, either one on one, or off the pick and roll.  It’s in facing complex schemes or menacing defenders where he comes undone.  I’ve posited that Lin possibly has the lowest overall skill level of any starting point guard in basketball.  After having watched him closely for an entire season, I still feel comfortable with that assertion.

Unlike his peers, among deception/change-of-direction moves, Lin only has a standard right-to-left/left-to-right crossover, and a weak one at best.  (Other moves frequently seen in the repertoires of Lin’s peers include the in&out, between the legs, behind the back, and spin.)  Lin also does not have hesitation/head-fake moves.  For these reasons, if Lin is unable to simply blow by his man with sheer quickness, he is left unable to get past his man at all.

Towards year’s end, I spoke at length with a well-placed individual within the Rockets’ basketball ops specifically about Lin’s development.  When asked, in contrast, about which traits made the very best point guard—Chris Paul—truly great, he responded, “the ability to dribble the ball at different heights.”

While simple, this is rather profound.  What makes Paul, and formerly Steve Nash, so lethal, is that they can keep a live dribble within cramped spaces by using a tight, close dribble.  Paul can dip his way around picks, inside the paint, stop, stay low, and reassess the opposing defensive coverage prior to making his decisions.  Lin, in contrast, can only blow by initial coverage, maintaining a waist-high handle; he can’t stay low and protect the ball.  For Lin, there is no stop-assess, read-react.  There is only the first initial burst.

This inability on the part of Lin is a subset of the overall inability to play at different speeds.  Lin can only play fast which is why, to date, he is an average point guard at best.  Point guards are taught from a young age that they can and should always be able to control their man, simply by keeping him at his hip.  They can play slow, they can play fast, or they can even stand their ground in one spot, just by protecting the ball with their bodies.  Lin, on the other hand, lets his man control him, as he simply tries to get past him; Lin can’t keep a live dribble in one spot against a pressing defender.  To any trained eye, it’s apparent that Lin did not play point guard in college.

Among Lin’s other flaws are poor fundamentals and overall lack of variance in his arsenal.  He has an awkward hitch to his shot and most egregiously, he simply cannot drive left.  If you watch, Lin just isn’t comfortable going in that direction.  There is no burst and if he even does go that way, it will just be a few soft dribbles before a pass off.  Even worse, if taking a layup from the left, Lin jumps off the wrong leg and just resorts to a reverse right-handed layup.  Lin doesn’t have a floater or any unique finishing move.

For these reasons, Lin will never be a pure floor general even at the level of former Pacer Mark Jackson.  It’s possible that Kevin McHale, a man who’s seen a few games of basketball in his time, noticed this immediately and decided it wasn’t even worth the time and reps.  I contest, however, that even if not serving as a full-fledged pure point, Lin at the least, with more confidence, could have better used his elite quickness in the playoffs to create opportunities as a hybrid guard.  Alas, it didn’t happen and we won’t know.  With that said, if McHale’s thinking truly was in line with my theorization, it at least holds ground against the test of rational basis.

In the next installment, I’ll discuss Lin’s dramatic shooting improvement over the course of the year with a look ahead to his role in what could possibly be a Dwight-centric offense.

The post Assessing Jeremy Lin: Part 1 appeared first on Red94 | Houston Rockets news and musings.