The Rockets looked absolutely masterful in that fourth quarter with the two point guards playing in tandem.  I’m becoming convinced that the lineups which see Dragic and Lowry sharing the backcourt are the team’s best.  They were relentless defensively and a blur on the break.

One particular play stood out, lending towards an idea: Jamal Crawford danced, spun, drove into the lane, only to have the ball stripped by Lowry, leading to a fastbreak.  While Crawford isn’t particularly large, he is regarded as one of the game’s shiftiest players.  All along, in the panic to keep Dragic, the popular sentiment among many has been to move him to the ‘2’, next season.  The idea made more sense, in theory, than the proposition of playing Lowry at the ‘2’, due to the players’ respective heights.  But is that the proper way to think about the matter?

Offense isn’t an issue – they can be interchangeable and sort things out.  Lowry can’t guard point guards (see Parker, Paul, Westbrook destructions of Lowry earlier this year) and Goran can.  We’ve asked whether Dragic could guard shooting guards.  It’s time to ask whether Lowry can, full-time.

I point to former Rocket David Wesley as a historical archetype who at barely 6’0 and a similar build as Lowry, was regarded as one of the game’s best defensive shooting guards.  With the Hornets, Wesley was that team’s most effective defender against 6’9 Magic forward Tracy McGrady, using his low center of gravity to bother him in the blocks.  I also point to Derek Fisher who, while with the Jazz, gave McGrady fits on the defensive end, similarly using his bulk to his advantage.

The 7 offensive rebounds are alarming, but might have been resultant of poor boxouts from the frontcourt rather than some effect of an undersized backcourt.  We’ll need to dig deeper when we have more data at season’s end, on this, and on the overall production of the Lowry-Dragic combo when sharing the court.  For now, perhaps there is hope to retain both.  Can Lowry guard shooting guards over the course of an 82 game season?

A final note: Patrick Patterson was instrumental in helping the team pull away by frustrating Lamarcus Aldridge inside.  It was good to see him do well after a difficult stretch in March.

This post is the latest in a series entitled ‘Goran Dragic vs. Kyle Lowry.’  All previous and future installments can be found via the ‘Dragic vs. Lowry’ tag below.’

This year, in 16 games started, Goran Dragic has averaged 17.6 points and 8.7 assists in 36.6 minutes.  He has shot 53% from the field and 44% from downtown. In the 38 games this year in which he came off the bench, Dragic shot 42% overall from the field and 26% on 3′s.

Overall in his career, Dragic has now started 24 games, averaging 15.8 points and 8.1 assists in 36.7 minutes played.  He’s shot 51% overall and 41% on 3′s in these games.  In the 235 games in his career in which he has come off the bench, Dragic has shot 43% overall and 36% on 3′s.  These career starting numbers are obviously inflated by the 16 games this season.  Let’s break things down further.

In his rookie season, 2008-2009, Dragic started one game.  In that game, he played 30 minutes, scored 5 points, dished 4 assists and shot 29% (2/7) overall. He missed both of his 3 point attempts.  In his 54 games as a reserve that season, Dragic shot 40% overall and 39% from ’3′.

In 2009-2010, Dragic started 2 games.  In those games, he averaged 12.5 points and 6 assists, shooting 56% overall and 50% on 3′s.  In his 78 games as a reserve that year, Dragic shot 45% overall and 39% on 3′s.

In 2010-2011, Dragic started 5 games and came off the bench in 65.  In the starts, he averaged 13.4 points and 7.8 assists in 40.3 minutes, shooting 42% overall and 33% on 3′s.  In his appearances as a reserve, he shot 44% overall and 37% on 3′s.

Discussion:

It’s no secret that Dragic’s numbers as a starter, this season, have been off the charts.  He also fared extremely well in the two or three games he started for the Rockets last year.  (I can’t seem to find those numbers.)  I wanted to look back at his numbers in each individual season of his career to see if there was a trend. Perhaps he’s just better suited as a starter?

As expected, these rudimentary numbers don’t tell us much of anything.  He fared well in the 2 starts of his sophomore year, but that’s far too small a sample size to prove confirmatory.  He was awful as a rookie but….was a rookie.  He was pretty much consistent overall last season (in his games as a Sun.)

Why is all of this important?   To determine, or predict, whether this season will be the norm, we need to understand whether some part of ‘starting’ suits Dragic better, improving his play.  That will help us understand if this year’s production is a fluke.  Obviously, if it’s a fluke, and not close to the norm, it would not be a wise decision to trade Kyle Lowry.

Many NBA players play better off the bench.  In shorter minutes, they can expend more energy and produce more for their team.  The opposite effect is taking place with Dragic.  I noted last season that while intense, he often seemed completely out of control.  Now as a starter, as he said, he’s been able to calm down and pace himself.  This has seemingly affected his shooting.

If we want to be thorough, we should also explore Dragic’s respective turnover percentages.  That examination will come in a later installment.

We could also break things down even further by number of minutes played. How did Dragic play in games when, while coming off the bench, he played for 30+ minutes?  How did he play in games when he played 20+ minutes?  I can assure you that the Rockets have probably run that analysis.  How much would it tell us?  I’m not sure.  Is the impact on shooting the number of minutes or the a priori knowledge that one will play major minutes in that game (ie: starting.)?  I think it’s the latter.

In my first installment of this series–which you can access, along with all future installments, by clicking the ‘Dragic vs. Lowry’ tag below–many readers felt the ideal scenario was one which saw management re-sign Goran Dragic but rather than deal off Kyle Lowry, elect to retain him and play both guards together in the backcourt as they’ve done successfully in stints over the past two seasons.

The scenario begged one over-arching question: How would Goran Dragic feel about playing shooting guard for this team?  I decided to ask him.

I had completely forgotten that Goran was a shooting guard overseas, as he told me above.  Thus, I don’t think you can completely rule out the possibility of convincing him to re-sign to play the ’2′, next to Lowry.

With that said…

This logic overlooks two crucial elements.  First, while Dragic at the ’2′ is nice in spurts, the Rockets probably wouldn’t want the 6’3 guard at the position full-time.  Second, we don’t know how the starter/backup factor of all of this plays into the calculus.

To those who wanted to keep both Dragic and Lowry, I’m assuming the ideal scenario also includes retaining Lee.  That would mean having Lowry and Lee start with Dragic backing up at both guard spots.  We know from my interview that Dragic possibly wouldn’t object to staying as the shooting guard starter…but how would he feel if he thought I was asking about just getting some of his minutes at that position as a backup?

I’ve already asked him the starter/backup question in the past and he gave me the typical PC answer about it not being an issue.  (Courtney Lee was also sitting within earshot of our conversation so I wasn’t about to try and induce a response from Goran about taking #5′s job.)

So the question becomes this: If you told Dragic you were keeping both Lee and Lowry and thus couldn’t offer him a starting job, but that you could offer him heavy minutes at both guard spots (by trading Kevin Martin), would he accept the offer?

I’m leaning heavily towards ‘no.’  Despite what players say to the press, very few would turn down the opportunity to start for an NBA team.

Offense:

• As a starter, in 11 starts, Goran Dragic is averaging 16.6ppg, 9.5apg, while shooting 52% from the field and 46% on 3’s.
• As a starter, in 38 starts, Kyle Lowry is averaging 15.9ppg, 7.2apg, while shooting 42% from the floor and 39% on 3’s.
• Notes: The sample size on Dragic, 11 games, is small enough to where you’d probably expect those shooting averages to regress to the mean slightly, but, at the same time, it’s also large enough to where you can’t dismiss the sheer gaudiness as a total fluke.  I think the overall takeaway is that as a starter, Dragic is, and will be, very good.

• Per 36 minutes, Dragic averages 14.3 points and 6.9 assists while shooting 45% from the field and 34% from 3.
• Per 36 minutes, Lowry averages 16.1 points and 7.3 assists while shooting 42% from the field and 39% from 3.
• Notes: Pretty similar numbers.  Also consider that these averages include the games in which Dragic came off the bench.  I think the conclusion there, looking at those shooting numbers, is that he plays much better as a starter.  Maybe it allows him to pace himself and play more in control?

• With Dragic on the floor, the team scores 104.8 points per 100 possessions.  They give up 102.3 points per 100 possessions.
• With Lowry on the floor, the team scores 103.1 points per 100 possessions.  They give up 100.0 points per 100 possessions.
• Notes: I’m not going to read too much into these numbers because they aren’t broken down with enough precision.  There were a significant amount of minutes earlier in the year when Dragic and Lowry played side by side.  In a future installment, I will look more closely at the positional breakdowns provided by 82games.com.

• In the clutch–in the last five minutes of games when the score is within five points, Dragic shoots 65% from the floor and 71% from 3, with 4.4 assists.  This is in 65 minutes of such circumstances.
• In the clutch, Lowry shoots 36% from the floor, 46% from 3, with 4.2 assists.  This is in 85 minutes.
• Notes: Wow. Dragic’s numbers completely blew my mind.  I remembered that Lowry was shooting some insane clip from ‘3’ in the clutch.  It’s come down quite a bit but 46% is still very, very respectable.  But Dragic’s numbers are beyond belief.  And one can’t even say he’s played far less because the sample sizes are fairly close.  Now obviously, Goran isn’t going to shoot 65% from the floor over the long haul.  But the point is that he’s a pretty capable hand running the team in tense situations.  I’d like to see numbers that compare the team’s overall efficiency in the clutch with each player running the point.  At the moment, I can’t find that.

Defense:

• Dragic’s man scores 36% of the time against him and shoots 38% overall.  In isolations, his man scores 31% of the time and shoots 30% from the field.  When operating as the P&R ball-handler, Dragic’s man scores 35% of the time and shoots 38%.
• Lowry’s man scores 39.3% of the time he tries and shoots 44% from the field.  In isolation, his man scores 32% of the time and shoots 39%.  When operating as the P&R ball-handler, Lowry’s man scores 39% of the time and shoots 47%.
• Notes: I was really interested to see these numbers.  Take them with a grain of salt.  For one, Lowry has spent many more minutes guarding starters.  Having said that, we’ve all seen with our own eyes just how bad Lowry has been defensively this season.  It’s been so bad that Kevin McHale has/had regularly made defensive switches late in games with Lowry and Lee/Dragic when star point guards have lit up the former.  He’s looked close to helpless on multiple occasions against the likes of Tony Parker and Chris Paul.  It’s been shocking as, going into this year, one of the greatest things going for Lowry was that he was supposedly a great defender.  Maybe he’s getting gassed easier after logging so many minutes.  Maybe he’s just too fat?  Either way, the biggest takeaway, perhaps, is to hide these numbers from opposing teams.  If they saw them, they’d P&R Kyle to death.

Conclusion:

Dragic has the better numbers but Lowry’s come at a bigger sample.  If we assume that Goran’s numbers will slightly regress with time, it’s probably a wash. Perhaps a slight edge to Goran.

I think the takeaway is that based on the numbers, you can make a good case for either guy.  Lowry’s the proven product but Dragic’s sample is large enough to feel safe in handing him the team.

In my next installment, I will assess potential suitors for Goran Dragic this upcoming offseason.

During his six minute span in the fourth, with the game completely out of hand, we saw some of what he can do and what the Rockets hope he one day does against NBA regulars.  He posted up on the mid-block and hit a smooth turnaround.  He hit a mid-range jumper.  He showed some very impressive handles, crossing his man over on two different possessions and getting to the rim.

To be effective, Morris has to have the ball in his hands.  Fans need to understand that and also understand that that’s why he hasn’t gotten regular minutes and has also been in the D-League.  He’s not a bust; he just can’t help this current team at the moment.  As I explained the other day, Morris isn’t a guy like Patterson or Parsons who can do other things to earn minutes and contribute.  He’s learning a new position defensively and he isn’t a good rebounder.  In fact, he looks to be a very poor rebounder so far.  He’s very limited athletically; he doesn’t seem to have much of a burst either laterally or vertically.

The Rockets value Morris as a scorer.  And if tonight was any indication, he has the tools.  The touch seems there and he should get more comfortable in the post. As I said earlier, the ball-handling was a very pleasant surprise.  But realize, it will take time.  They won’t run isos for a rookie in the middle of a playoff push.

It will be interesting to see what the future brings.  Parsons seems more than entrenched at the small forward spot.  If you got the production he’s giving from a veteran, you’d be pleased; this from a second round rookie is unheard of.  That leaves just the backup spot for Morris with Chase Budinger to beat.

One of the toughest things about not having a superstar is that you still can’t sort everything out.  Everyone is always on the block until that long-awaited move is made.  Then you can fill holes around that framework and build chemistry.  In the meantime, some guys stay in limbo.

• Courtney Fortson has been pretty painful to watch in his two appearances thus far, and by that I mean that I teeter on the edge of cardiac arrest when he dribbles.  He bounces the ball so high that you feel he’s on the verge of losing it at any moment.  With that said, the kid is no doubt nervous and you really root for him to do well – he’s basically a normal guy trying to make it with the stars.

• That stretch last night when Dragic sat in the first half–and the game was lost–illustrates the difficulty of playing point guard in the NBA.  I think back to the Trevor Ariza saga and realize that most people don’t really understand how difficult it is to create shots and initiate an offense.  People see a guy like Courtney Lee who can bring the ball up comfortably and seems to have functional handles and naturally assume he can run an offense.  This is what happened when the team signed Ariza – many people thought he could be like McGrady.  The logic was hopelessly flawed.  Playing point/creating/initiating in the NBA requires so much more than just dribbling, from vision, to awareness, to a heightened level of body control.  (For much, much, much more commentary on this topic, see my ‘Assessing Ariza’ series.)

• Marcus Morris once again saw minutes with the team playing short-handed.  He hit a nice turnaround on the baseline, but overall, like the previous night, didn’t do much offensively.  He played pretty well defensively, however, which was encouraging as the issue of whether he could keep pace with perimeter players was the primary concern.  He was able to stay in front of Jared Dudley and for the most part, Michael Redd.  While Redd did score on a foul, it’s not an issue – he’s a shooting guard; not even a small forward.  Some observations or I guess, affirmations, on Morris – he doesn’t have that athletic explosion.  No burst.  We knew this though.  A lot of rookies are able to come in and impress and earn more playing time just by scrapping, without the ball.  I think back to Carl Landry’s rookie year when he came in and dunked back every offensive board in sight, earning himself a spot in the rotation.  Morris can’t do that because he doesn’t have the athleticism to get those loose balls.  For him to be effective, he will need the ball, and therein lies the problem because as a rookie, he isn’t going to get the ball.  Another example: Chandler Parsons and Patterson earned their spots by playing smart defense and picking their spots offensively.  Marcus Morris’ value is as a one-on-one offensive player.  See now why they kept him in the D-League?  The few times he was able to pin his man down in the post, he looked pretty good.  So calm down on Morris – it’s too soon to worry.

I decided to dig a bit into the numbers via SynergySports.

This year, in 77 post-up attempts, Patterson is shooting 40% and scoring 44% of the time.

Needing a frame of reference, I deliberated for some time on who to choose.  Carl Landry?  Luis Scola would be pointless as I figured his numbers would eclipse Patterson’s.  I decided to look regardless.

In 214 attempts, Scola has shot 41% and converted 38.8% of the time, numbers very similar to Patterson.

Granted, Scola’s is a) a much larger sample size and b) comes against much better defenders.  So it would be absurd to argue that the two are on equal level of effectiveness.  But what the numbers show, I think, is that with the team short-handed and already without an isolation star, Patterson might be good enough to at the very least test out in the post, as was done tonight.

Kyle Lowry diagnosed with bacterial infection. Will stay in NYC hospital til Tuesday then to Houston to continue treatment. Out 2-4 weeks.

March 11, 2012 7:55 pm via Twitter for iPhoneReplyRetweetFavorite

@RocketsJCF

Jason Friedman

If the Rockets hope to stay in this race, they’ll need to seek an alternative backup point guard.  If you watched tonight’s game, and his other appearances, you’ll understand what I mean when I describe Jonny Flynn as one of the worst basketball players I’ve ever seen.

In early January, I assessed Flynn’s game as follows:

Except for the fact that he’s now shooting 25% and Hasheem Thabeet is no longer relevant, the assessment stands.

Flynn dribbles for the mere sake of dribbling.  It’s beyond painful to watch.

The ‘crossover dribble’ is used to change direction and get past one’s defender. Flynn does it with no purpose, standing in place, almost as if having no plan of where to go.  As I tweeted tonight, it’s become so bad now that one can only watch and appreciate it.

If Lowry is truly out for two weeks and the Rockets hope to stay in the race, they’ll need a new backup.  With already a slim margin for error, I fear those few minutes per game when Goran Dragic sits might be enough to push the outcomes into the loss column.

I took this footage on December 15, one of the last days of training camp.  In the clip, Jeremy Lin, as a member of the Houston Rockets, makes things happen.

We were allowed in for the final twelve minutes of scrimmage, the last five during which Lin played.  In these five minutes, there were twelve total plays.  Jeremy Lin is directly involved in seven.  In order, Lin helps out on Jonny Flynn, committing the foul, but preventing the drive; contests a Courtney Lee jumpshot, recovering to grab the board; tips in the loose ball; picks off an errant pass from Jonny Flynn; races full-court, earning himself two free-throws; takes a Courtney Lee jumper in the face; and smothers Jonny Flynn, preventing even a decent look.  The clip contains only these seven plays.  I have omitted the other five plays–those in which Jeremy Lin had no direct involvement–from the raw footage.  Also note that Lin was not featured in any of the offensive plays and only had impact through his own opportunism.

It’s a limited sample size and we really have no idea what Lin did in the other dozens of hours he spent with the team.  But in this sequence, you have to admit, Lin looks pretty good.  He’s aware and active defensively, closing out strong on shooters and moving his feet to prevent dribble penetration.  On offense, he forces the action, despite never getting the ball.  But still, it’s hard to blame the Rockets for cutting him.

The clip shows Lin clearly outclassing the overpaid Flynn.  (In fact, in the seven minutes precedent, Flynn looked even worse, proving his label as the worst point guard in basketball.)  But did Lin show himself to be $3million better?  On this team?  I don’t know.

As is well known by now, the Rockets cut Jeremy Lin because they had 15 guaranteed contracts.  Keeping him would have meant swallowing the $3million owed to the aforementioned Flynn.  With Kyle Lowry and Goran Dragic already on the team, the dollars just didn’t make sense.

Furthermore, what’s made Lin special in New York is his leadership and penchant to make the right pass; he’s a true floor general who really makes his teammates better.  That wasn’t on display here.  (I know, he didn’t get the chance – more on this later.)  Even if the Rockets saw what we did above, it wouldn’t have been prudent to spend $3million (net) on what seemed like just a glue guy, especially when he would never have seen the floor.

The broader issue is of opportunity.  Lin couldn’t show his playmaking in Houston because he didn’t get the chance.  As I mentioned, in the cited scrimmage, he was never even passed the ball, much less given the reins to run point.  Especially in a shortened season, coaches can’t run plays for third-stringers not expected to play; those few reps are divvied between the starters who need to get up to speed.

It begs an interesting question: how can a point guard dispel his past and prior labels?  A big man or wing can show his rebounding or shooting in short minutes, without the ball.  He can force his way into a role.  But playmaking?  A point guard must be handed the reins.  There must already have been trust.  Look at Kyle Lowry.  As a former 1st round pick, I’m sure he got reps in practice with the Grizzlies, at least many more than did Lin.  But would anyone have ever known he could run a team as efficiently as he has had he not been dealt to Houston by chance?  It leads you to wonder.  How many other capable ’1′s are out there that might never blossom?  At least for point guards, perhaps the cream doesn’t necessarily always rise to the top.

There were a couple of plays, however, which particularly caught my eye.

The play starts out as a high pick and roll with Kyle Lowry defending against Ty Lawson, and Adrien spying at the top of the key.

Lowry gets picked off and Adrien slides over to cut off Lawson near the paint.

Lawson then tries to juke Adrien in the paint but is completely cut off.

Lawson decides to back out entirely out of the paint to square Adrien up and attack him in an isolation.

Lawson is able to juke Adrien with a shifty crossover and get past him.  No surprise there – Lawson is an NBA point guard.

But after getting crossed over and beat, Adrien is quick enough to recover and fall in step with Lawson.

Look at these next two stills.  Lawson has already started his jump with Adrien still grounded.  But in a nano-second, Adrien is able to leap and challenge, meeting Lawson and blocking the shot.

Here’s another play that shows some more of Adrien’s physical gifts:

Here, when the ball is swung to the shooter, Adrien is still in the paint, defending his man.

In a flash, he has raced to the perimeter to close out on the shooter, contesting the shot, and forcing the miss.

This analysis isn’t meant to imply that the Rockets should no longer pursue Dwight Howard this summer.  It remains to be seen whether Jeff Adrien will remain in Kevin McHale’s rotation or if his insertion last night into the lineup was merely intended to send a message to Jordan Hill.  Regardless, on these cited plays, the big man demonstrated some of what he can bring to the table for the Rockets if given the time.  With quick feet and a quick burst-leap, Adrien can contest shooters on the perimeter while also serving as a last line of defense in the paint.  When you have a big man that can cover long distances to help out others, it adds a lot of flexibility to your defensive schemes.  If Adrien can continue this kind of production, Rockets management will have no regrets in their decision to cut the cord with Jordan Hill.

As I said above, in the past, we’d usually see Lowry go north-south, driving to the hoop only either in transition or off of picks.  This year, much more often he’s attacked his man in isolation circumstances, with quick east-west dribble moves. The clip shows him use a conventional east-west wide cross, a between-the-legs cross, a stop hesitation dribble, a shot headfake hesitation dribble, and finally, most impressively, a behind the back crossover.

What’s the cause for this new creativity?  It’s tough to say.  We know Lowry worked his tail off this offseason, so it’s probable he improved his handles.  With that said, I explained at length in the Trevor Ariza series that the ability to create is rarely developed past a certain age; that comfort level is something that comes most easily during adolescence.  Sure Lowry probably brushed up a bit in the summer, but the cause is likely a combination of two factors: the new Rockets offense and confidence.

In the past, Lowry would typically walk the ball up, hand it off to Hayes or Scola at the elbow post, and then only receive it again off the screen.  This year, as the clip shows, he’s getting many more chances to attack his man in one-on-one situations.  Without a pick, not many people can beat an NBA-level defender head-on off the dribble without some form of crossover.  The added responsibility and repetitions have also probably worked to boost Lowry’s confidence to try out new things.  Simply put, while Kyle probably did improve a little bit over the summer, I think he probably already had all these moves you’re seeing this year, but only now decided/got a chance to bust them out.  After all, he is an NBA point guard.

Another theory might be more interesting: the ‘Love stomp’ occurred around the 8:30 mark of the 3rd.  After that point, most agree that Lowry was most affected, rallying his troops and delivering a hard foul to Love at the other end.  Notice that every play in the clip above occurs after the 8:30 mark of the 3rd.  These plays weren’t arbitrarily selected; I went into the Synergy log from yesterday’s game and pulled every instance of a dribble move from Lowry – I only noticed the coincidence afterwards. One theory might be adrenaline: it’s possible that an angry Lowry put the team on his back, when nothing was there from their set offense, using his natural talents to try and bring them back.  It’s encouraging that he has that in him.

While he didn’t really use a dribble move, I wanted to call attention to this play, from the 1st quarter, because it too is something we hadn’t seen from Lowry in the past.  As I explained in the 2009 Ariza series, that moving jumper going right (for a right-hander) is one of the toughest shots in basketball to make and a high indicator of skill.  Unlike when rolling left, the feet aren’t set and it requires a great degree of body control to stabilize.

This is all important because early in the year, after Lowry burst out of the gates to lead all point guards in statistics, I said he still probably might not ever crack the truly elite class due to his inability to create in isolation.  If the evidence above is representative, maybe he can?  With that said, because Ricky Rubio is such a poor defender, it’s best to just keep an eye on the situation before arriving at any conclusions.

The reason I felt so confident about this team’s chances was that Dalembert filled its most glaring weakness from the season before.  The Rockets were near tops in the league in offensive efficiency but their defense left much to be desired, to say the least.  They had some solid individual defenders in the likes of Kyle Lowry, Courtney Lee, and Chuck Hayes, but they just didn’t have the ‘length’ that allows a defensive scheme to come together, enabling guys to work as a unit and cover spaces instead of individual men.

Last night, against the Hornets, Samuel Dalembert won the game with his play in the final minute.  Watch below as he leaves his man to cover Jarret Jack:

But look more closely.

Last year, Jack gets the shot off.  This year, it doesn’t matter that Dalembert was slow to rotate – he recovers through his length, stretching his arm to block the shot and save the game.

You could argue that Hayes would have been quicker to rotate, beating Jack to the spot.  I’d counter that A) a blocked shot beats a contested hand-in-the-face challenge and B) at a macro level, if your big man has to stay closer to home on a shooting power forward, the shot blocking athlete has a greater chance to recover and disrupt than the fleet-footed Chuckwagon that has to trek perfectly to the exact spot.  Point being: when you’re 7 feet, there’s much more room for error for both you and your team.  When you’re Hayes, you have to be perfect, to contest or set up for the charge.

It’s not just defense though where the 7-footer earns his shekels.  Above, Dalembert scored the winning basket by just being long.

Were he younger, we’d have thrown a parade over having found the long-term solution at center.  A pity.  But for this season, I think Dalembert will be the difference.

For those of you who have not yet suffered the misfortune of watching Jonny Flynn attempt to run the Houston Rockets’ offense, I’ve broken down his play with a handy diagram:

How’s that for a title?  I debated for a good ten minutes as to whether it’d be worth writing out this post and risking it becoming obsolete before I even got to hit publish.  But here goes anyways.  Too much to say over Twitter.

Yes, young players are being sent from Houston, contrary to the reports from a few hours ago.  I’d be doing it too if I were Stern.  (In fact I can’t believe that first manifestation of this looked like that.)  But noone knows who these “young players” are.  Never before has a group of 1,000 to 2,000 people sat painstakingly trying to decipher the meaning of that phrase.  Is it our good young players?  Is it our crappy young players?  Hell, they can have our young players  as long as its not our good ones.

This calls for a hierarchical classification of our young players.

UNTOUCHABLE YOUNG PLAYERS:

1. Kyle Lowry – untouchable unless bringing back Chris Paul himself

YOUNG PLAYERS WHOM, IF WE LOST, I’D NEVER FORGIVE DAVID STERN:

1. Patrick Patterson

2. Marcus Morris

3. Courtney Lee

* NOTE: the young players in this group are all really, really good and will likely get better.

YOUNG PLAYERS I’M EMBARRASSED TO ADMIT I DON’T WANT TO LOSE:

1. Terrence Williams

2. Hasheem Thabeet

* NOTE: these are young players who suck now but are wild cards in that they have unlimited potential and haven’t really gotten a chance to play.  I am embarrassed to admit I don’t want to lose them as I’m still clinging on to hope that they one day become good.

“MEH” YOUNG PLAYERS:

1. Chase Budinger

2. Goran Dragic

* NOTE: these are young players that I like but not really that much.

CRAPPY YOUNG PLAYERS:

1. Jordan Hill

2. Johnny Flynn

* NOTE: these young players suck and you can have them.

On the other side of the tracks, sharing this award with one of the most prodigious players in recent memory, is Chase Budinger, the one out of 17 from 2006 who wasn’t a first round selection. Budinger isn’t Kevin Durant, nor is his name and stature in the same class with almost every player who competed in that classic game. No, Budinger is something else: The best bargain in basketball. The Rockets smartly signed the former Arizona Wildcat, now a worthy contributor, to what in effect is a four year deal for $3.3 million (two years guaranteed and two subsequent team options after that) after acquiring him from Detroit in a draft day trade.

Through his first two years he’s averaged just over 21 minutes per game, and saw improvements in almost every statistical category in his sophomore season. He looks more than comfortable at this level, and is all but a lock to see a handsome raise when this current contract runs its course. Until then, it’s almost as if the Rockets found a loophole in the old CBA. The contract is a no risk, high reward situation for them, mirroring when a baseball team has rights over their prospect for the first six years of service time. Players like Chase Budinger—more specifically, contacts like the one he’s signed to—are $1 scratch tickets with $50 payouts for savvy/lucky general managers.

It shouldn’t happen, but it does. Only because we’re human. Grading players not by their production related to their peers, but by the size of the paycheck and how much monetary value they’re worth to the team. Rarely does the consensus agree on a player receiving the perfect amount of money; they’re either given too much, debilitating their team’s chances of constructing a winning product by hogging more than their fair share of the roster’s salary, or given too little, grossly underpaid, looking like unappreciated mules being whipped by profitable owners (the most highly paid unappreciated mules to have ever existed, by the way). If a player manages to perform well enough through a slightly unjust contract and into his free agency, they run the risk of over compensation (see Barea, JJ) catapulting themselves into the category of overpaid fat cat. To be fairly compensated is to walk along a tight rope tied between two skyscrapers. When we’re discussing players who actually contribute, only a sparse few get what makes sense.

If all goes well, Budinger is expected to make $884,293 next year and $942,293 in 2012-13. According to HoopsHype, here’s a list of all the players within the Southwest Conference scheduled to make the same or less next season: Ian Mahinmi, Ishmael Smith, Danny Green, Gary Neal, Da’Sean Butler. Stretching it out to the rest of the Western Conference, we have Portland’s Armond Johnson, OKC’s Robert Vaden, Utah’s Jeremy Evans, Golden State’s Jeremy Lin, Los Angeles Clippers’ Willie Warren, Los Angeles Lakers’ Derrick Caracter and Devin Ebanks, Phoenix’s Gani Lawal, Garret Siler, and Zabian Dowdell. and Sacramento’s Hassan Whiteside.

All those players (apart from Whiteside, who like Budinger has a team option over his head next season) are in contract years, and will either be weeded out as unsuitable for the NBA, or have the opportunity to play for a larger contract. Budinger will have to wait two years.

So, now that we’ve established Budinger as someone who doesn’t make a lot of money in relation to a majority of his co-workers, let us figure out why. First, let’s analyze his physical abilities: at 6’7″, Budinger is a versatile player who can survive either at the two or three. He’s a player clearly motivated by his second round draft selection—he runs hard through screens, both to get open on curls that showcase his picture perfect shot, and shadow opponents looking to do the same.

Then there’s the glittering vertical leap, hovering safely above the spectacular 40 inch benchmark. Budinger can jump higher than almost everyone in the league (including Blake Griffin) and he isn’t shy to show it, attacking the rim on 26% of his shots last year, according to Hoopdata. He’s capable of turning the corner with a surprisingly quick first step and finish with what’s quickly become a patented two handed jam in traffic.

He’s more than just an energy guy off the bench. Budinger can score, but he does so both within the offenses structure while still managing to freelance on his own via put backs and an uncanny nose for the action. He slithers his way around the court, pogo-sticking high above the trees looking for ways to help. Chase Budinger belongs in the NBA more than any player in his contract situation. Barring an unfortunate injury, two years from now he’ll be a rightfully paid player. Hopefully, Houston’s writing the check.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

With the giant man in tow, perimeter players such as Kevin Martin and Kyle Lowry look to have been perfect cogs in an efficient inside/outside machine that now sputters and spits black smoke, leaving it longingly on the outside of a working plan, looking in.

What’s left are who we have to discuss, players with impossibly-sized shoes to fill. (We miss you, big man.)

Chuck Hayes

28-year-old NBA role players who’ve never averaged more than 22 minutes a game are supposed to be who they are, contributing in the ways they’re expected to and not adding new skills like sophomore lottery picks. But apparently no one informed Chuck Hayes of this nugget of practical wisdom. (thank you, no one.)

Two words: triple double. Did you (the ‘you’ here being ‘you’ the reader/self-aware NBA fan where ever you sit) ever think you’d read those two words and the name Chuck Hayes in the same sentence? Probably not, unless they referred to a player Chuck (I like to call him ‘Chuck’ like we’re friends or have ever met in actual life) may have had the unfortunate task of guarding on a particularly effective night. But here we are. It happened. And so did the Chuckwagon’s development of a reasonably productive offensive game, complete with high post passing and a hitch-less free throw form.

The man who can defend all five positions and has never, to my knowledge, been backed down in an NBA game is now also not a complete offensive liability? Why shouldn’t the team do everything in its power (within reason) to resign him, and when it does, why shouldn’t he start? I understand the argument against such a suggestion:  he doesn’t block shots. But neither does anyone else on the team who’s name doesn’t rhyme with Basheen Claheet. And I dare you to make a case for starting that lost puppy that doesn’t involve tanking for a lottery pick. Go ahead. I’m listening.

Jordan Hill

As with Chuck Hayes, Jordan Hill is probably a player who should more properly be included in a discussion of power forwards than centers, but this is where we find ourselves, team and fans alike. Coming out of college Hill was often compared to Amare Stoudemire, but since the draft about the only similarities between the two are that they have both played a home game at Madison Square Garden.

Hill has good size and athleticism, but if you watched any Rockets’ games last season, you probably saw him look lost on defensive rotations, hesitant on offense, and generally incompetent enough to, by the end of the season, lose the majority of his minutes to a rookie. Next season is the last guaranteed year on his contract, which, if he doesn’t start figuring some things out, could be his last in the NBA.

Hasheem Thabeet

The list of things we know about Hasheem Thabeet after two seasons in the NBA:

1. He’s very tall.

Thabeet blocks shots but so far isn’t so great at the actually playing offense or defense part of professional basketball. He averages enough fouls to be ejected from every game before logging 30 minutes on the court, and although centers often take a little time to come around, he’s 24 years old. Like Hill, the guaranteed portion of Thabeet’s contract is over after this coming season. And as well, like Hill, if he doesn’t start showing off some of that potential that made him a number two draft pick, his little time may also be up.

In recent NBA times, defining the power forward and center positions has been about as simple and clear as corporate tax code. Tim Duncan is apparently a power forward, while Mehmet Okur and Andrea Bargnani hoist three’s from the center position and Brad Miller passes out of the high post and looks cool in a headband.

For the Rockets, this ambiguity is not lost as the great fall of the giant man meant the team’s starting center was shorter than its shooting guard. Left to make sense of this mess, Kevin McHale’s starting line-ups next season are likely to be as consistent as Brandon Jennings’ jump-shot.

For the purposes of this lockout-(un)inspired task I’ve set myself upon, I’ve chosen three of the Rockets roster of post men to designate as Power Forwards.

Luis Scola

Let’s start with all there is to love about Scola’s game, because there really is quite a bit. Crafty doesn’t begin to describe his offensive contributions. While I’m not sure that I’ve ever actually seen him dunk, he scores around the basket with sneaky (scoopy) ease. When open, he has an effective jumper from the elbow and even rebounds a little. He excels at the fast break despite his ploddy sort of gait and had a career high water mark last season in PER at 18.43.

But then there’s the matter of his defense, which last year even seemed to lack the (often still ineffectual) effort he’d shown in previous seasons. Frankly, it was pretty much embarrassing to watch the man play on that half of the court, but if you watched the games, I’m telling you something you already know.

It’s obvious to everyone that if the season started tomorrow with the Rockets’ current roster that Houston’s favorite caveman should be the starting power forward. This is not even a question. He’s earned his place. But what he’s also earned in my estimation is a trade to a contending team, not because of his bad defense or anything negative about his play, but precisely because of the heart and effort he’s given to the team and to the city over the past four years. Scola will turn 32 before the end of this upcoming season and doesn’t deserve to languish away his remaining effective basketball years on a rebuilding franchise.

Patrick Patterson

Patterson started four of the five games Scola missed this past March with a knee injury, and while the first of the four wasn’t especially memorable, he posted double-doubles in the next three, notably putting up 18 and 12 with 4 blocks on 67% shooting in a drubbing of the Celtics at home. I remember at the time halfway hoping that Scola might decide to rest his sore knee for a few more games just so we could see what the kid could do.

A smart defender and efficient scorer, P-Pat didn’t seem intimidated by the NBA level of play. The usual rookie growing pains weren’t at all evident in the Kentucky star’s introduction as he managed a double-double in his first significant minutes in December. The relevant question it seems is how much he will improve on these initial efforts. His game already seems so polished that I genuinely wonder what more he has to offer. The good news for the Rockets is that even if Patterson simply continues his current, consistent production, he’ll be a valuable asset to the team moving forward.

Donatas Montiejunas

Montiejunas is a 7-footer who plays like a shooting guard: dribbles a lot, likes to face up and shoot the three, doesn’t rebound or play defense. He’s apparently very confident, and also apparently really loves eagles. If any of this scares you, it probably should. He certainly has a lot of (particularly offensive) potential, but he also has quite a lot of potential to massively (ok, maybe not so massively; he was taken 20th in the draft) flame out. Hopefully, Kevin McHale has a quality stash of magical big-man dust, because it looks like this kid might need it.

Flash forward to the present day, where I am highly aware of exactly how hard it is to do the things NBA players do with disarming ease after practicing for years. While everyone goes through slumps, and though a relative hierarchy among the haves and have-nots still exists among the league’s players, basically every NBA player has a skill set that brings something to his team that is of consequence (see: Thabeet, Hasheem- height). That’s why the beginning of the 2010-11 season brought a bigger surprise for Rockets followers than most NBA viewers get to see, in the worst kind of way: Chase Budinger did not just look bad; he looked like he did not belong on an NBA team.

The perenially fresh-faced Budinger had survived a tumultuous first season with more than a sliver of hope for improvement, showcasing an all-around game that looked brilliantly suited to Rick Adelman’s offense. His jumpshot looked pure enough to strike fear in any defender’s heart, enough so that he could use his seemingly boundless athleticism to find his way to the rim to make the easy play. While his initial 44% from the field might not have screamed sharpshooter, considering his constantly shifting role in an offense fraught with injuries and in-season roster tinkering, Budinger had actually showed more aplomb than most would have expected from the formerly lottery-bound Arizona star. Then that all came crashing down with the beginning of last season, as his usually steady stoke dissipated before viewers’ eyes, resulting in a 37 FG% over the first couple of months. Over that same time period (October- December 2010), Bud threw up an abysmal 28% from the arc, which, coupled with his poor defensive instincts (in a couple of early-season match-ups with Denver, the then-Nugget Carmelo Anthony repeatedly called for the ball when covered by Budinger, consistently getting wherever he wanted. Similar occurrences took place when Bud was matched up against Kevin Durant and LeBron James. This is not to imply that anyone can truly shut these guys down, but it can’t be good that guys’ mouths water when matched up against the floppy-haired volleyballer), made him an all-around liability to the Rockets while on the court.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lbFMAw5hP1U

Now, it’s important to note that this was the case with a good deal of the Houston Rockets early in the 2010-11 season, as Kyle Lowry, Courtney Lee, Shane Battier and Jordan Hill all also had their own early-season tribulations; the difference was not necessarily in production, though Budinger’s was especially low. Instead, Bud’s seeming complete lack of confidence in just about anything resembling a basketball skill deterred any viewer from feeling reciprocal faith that the kid would ever emerge from the mire in which he had found himself. Therein lies the biggest issue for Budinger, as it is for so many skilled swingmen in this league: does the kid have the fortitude to last these slumps or will this be the narrative from here onward?

Yeah, he got better by the end of the season, along with the rest of the team. That may be what determines the future for Bud, whether his team can survive long enough without him to gain his services again once things get a bit rosier. Can the Rockets, or any NBA team, wait around in the lean times for the fairweather talent that is Chase Budinger? I don’t know, but I’m no longer deluded enough to respond to the question of why he took so long to get going last year with, “He sucks.”

While the Houston Rockets have avoided dealing with quite too much of that mind-numbing defeat stuff (eh… there’s still been plenty of it), the question of who the team’s best player is has been of constant interest since Yao Ming fell down and never got back up in Game 3 of that Conference Finals those 125,000 some odd years ago. Whether it be the two since-traded heroes of those playoffs in Carl Landry and Aaron Brooks, the team’s most reliable (and least athletic and second-poorest defender of a) veteran in Luis Scola, or the high-scoring (and worst defensive player on the team) Kevin Martin, all who have taken that mantle have generally found their heads ill fits for the crown, reasonable considering Yao wore it last. Despite this and after a tragedy of a beginning to the 10-11 season, who should come to the forefront of the pack but the perennially underrated bench point guard, Kyle Lowry, coming intact with a shiny new jumpshot (only new by virtue of actually going in) and downtick in turnovers (outside of the month of March, in which Lowry’s usage rate skyrocketed with matching increases in shot attempts and FTA, he exhibited a beautiful touch for keeping the ball last season, possessing a 10.0 Turnover Ratio last year,  the sixth-best among starting point guards). Kyle Lowry, that bulldog”, that kid who’s “all heart”, the one who played good defense. That kid will be the Rockets’ best chance at having an elite player in 2011, and that thought is a terrifying one.

Lowry always seemed to be the team’s best-kept secret, a two-way guy in the truest sense, and routinely brought an absolutely crucial amount of energy when he backed up the shot-happy combo guard in a tiny package that was Brooks; it only seemed natural he’d one day lead a team, but the jaw-dropping change that took place last March in the baby-faced floor general shook up the Rockets’ hierarchy in the best of ways, presenting the no-problem of a new best talent, emerging from the cocoon of youth and the bench to exercise his will after recovering from an early bout of back spasms in 10-11 and having the security of his job as the starter as Brooks was shipped out to the desert. Yes, those (select) months last season truly introduced the world to NBA baller Kyle Lowry, the puppy with big paws.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ed4GJX8nf_g

Um, but what exactly do we know about Kyle Lowry? While advanced statistics have often been friendly to low-usage guys like Lowry who hold on to the ball and don’t take too many bad shots, the trend tends to be that said efficiencies drop with added minutes, and while that may be true in some respects for Lowry, he actually had a remarkably productive finish to last year. This should bode very well for the starting point’s future, but the sample size is so tiny that very little can be gleaned from a year of 37% from the three-point-line and seven full Win Shares (by comparison, Derrick Rose had 13.1 last year, Deron Williams had 7.3 and Jameer Nelson had 6.6), leaving a giant question mark in the middle of the Rockets’ lineup. The Rockets have to be happy at the point guard position, but does the team have the kind of advanced weaponry with which it seems all NBA teams are coming to the point guard arms race?

Kyle Lowry’s a quiet type on the court, not exactly the wizened veteran whose very face implies the kind of maturity a team’s best player is expected to bring daily nor the boisterous sort who brings the band of misfits together with his gregariousness and general basketball talents. No, if Kyle Lowry becomes the Houston Rockets’ best player in 2012, he will likely have to bring the game he showed last year with him. The fate of the Houston Rockets’ progress in this next season likely depends on just that.

But that’s exactly what I’m about to argue, not that any of us could play professional sports if we just studied hard enough, but that an NBA player’s mentality might be just as important his physicality.

This consideration, I believe, is particularly relevant to the Rockets’ current cache of Small Forwards.

Chase Budinger

Budinger ended last season as the Rockets’ starting small forward and will most likely begin next season in the same position. He is a fantastic athlete, can finish on the fast break, dunk from the fifth row, and has a good (though odd looking) form on his jump-shot. When aggressive, he can drive and finish at the rim, hit 3’s, and generally convince everyone he’s really great at basketball.

The problem is that he’s wildly inconsistent on offense and consistently bad on defense. Last year, he shot 50% or better from beyond the arc 26 times but also, though he took a three in every game he played, didn’t hit a single one in 30 games, five times going 0-4 or worse.

The source of this inconsistency seems to be his confidence (Chase suggested as much himself in interviews last season). But this is a big problem (remember Luther Head?). Raw talent at just about anything isn’t enough to succeed. Success requires perseverance and commitment. Constantly being discouraged/disappointed can hurt your ability to improve, which, in a highly competitive environment like the NBA, can be disastrous. I hate to say this (and am prepared for the comment backlash) about a player with as much obvious potential as Budinger, but my hope is that the team can trade him this year while he still has value and before his confidence dips so much that he can’t stay on the court.

Terrence Williams

I was about to write a Williams’ preview/analysis when I noticed this article by Noam Schiller on Hardwood Paroxysm. Schiller extensively and eloquently articulates exactly how I (and many of us, I think) feel about Terrence Williams. Hopefully, this season he’ll prove us all wrong and live up to the potential he’s been teasing us with since his days at Louisville.

Marcus Morris

Morris is exactly the type of player that the two men above him on this list are not. His major limitations look to be physical, not mental. Honestly, he wasn’t a prospect I was especially excited about leading up to the draft as he’s not particularly a guy who screams star potential, but the more I read about him and the more tape I see of his days at Kansas, the more genuine interest I have in watching his development as an NBA player.

He has fantastic footwork in the post, isn’t afraid of contact, and is crafty around the basket. He rebounds well, has good handles and a textbook jump-shot that should extend to NBA three-point range. He has great awareness on defense, active hands, and plays hard on every possession. He was named the 2011 Big 12 Player of the Year, led Kansas to a Conference Championship and the elite eight in the NCAA Tournament. But, most importantly, he improved his game every year he was at Kansas and seems committed to continuing to do so.

So what’s not to like about the guy? He’s not exceptionally huge or athletic. I understand that to say this doesn’t matter in a sport that largely depends on hugeness and athleticism might seem naïve at best and plain ignorant at worst, but that’s basically what I’m saying. (Just ask Kevin McHale, Larry Bird, Reggie Miller, Shane Battier, Paul Pierce, and Kevin Love) I’m not a betting man, but if I were, I would wager that Marcus Morris has a longer and more productive career than either Chase Budinger or Terrence Williams, precisely because of what he brings to the table mentally, and regardless of what he lacks physically.

What ensues beneath the jump is Michael’s first contribution to Red94:

I’ve chosen to separate the players by position, though I realize that in this post-modern NBA doing so is a somewhat dubious and often generally pointless exercise. For the purposes of this column and my hopes of not drastically straying off topic, position will serve a purely functional distinction.

As I began last week with point guards (the easiest to define), we’ll stay in the backcourt this time around and discuss Shooting Guards.

Kevin Martin

Martin is about as intriguing an NBA player as they come. Not in the way that weirdos like Ron Artest (excuse me, Meta World Peace) or Kevin Garnett captivate us with their eccentricities, but for exactly the opposite reason. I can’t think of a single memorable post-game quote or highlight that litter other stars of Martin’s caliber’s portfolios. And make no mistake about it, despite his slight frame and seemingly diminutive on-court demeanor, Kevin Martin is a legitimate NBA star.

Martin finished second in scoring per 48 – minutes last season, behind only Kobe Bryant and ahead of the household names like Carmelo, Durant, LeBron, Wade, and Dirk. He was in the top twenty in PER despite the fact that he doesn’t collect rebounds, assists, steals, or blocks, the stats that usually keep pure scorers like him out of Hollinger’s highest ranks. What makes Martin such a special (and interesting) player is his uncanny ability to get to the free throw line. He tied the NBA scoring champ, Kevin Durant, for the most made free throws and was 4^th in free throw attempts last season.

Why is this so significant? A possession that ends in free throws is potentially more successful than one that ends in an open look or even a made shot, especially for a player like Martin who converts nearly 90% of his attempts, because it also results in a foul, which can not only take opposing players out of games but also lead to more team free throws. Wonder why the Rockets had one of the top rated offenses in the league last year? Look no further than Kevin Martin’s awkward pump fakes and floppy jumpers.

Before we move on and I choke on this Kevin Martin love sandwich, it should also be noted that he is an absolutely miserable defender. This was particularly a problem at the beginning of last season as he far too often shared the court with Brooks and Scola, leading to Globe Trotter style alley-oops for opposing teams and a considerable collection of sideline face-palms for Rick Adelman. And while Martin looked at times like he was somewhat aware of defense as an idea that exists in the world of basketball by the end of last season, he can’t reasonably be expected to turn into Tony Allen any time soon. What we can expect from Kevin Martin next season is for him to continue to do what he does best:  score as efficiently as anyone in the league.

Courtney Lee

Unfortunately for Courtney Lee, what most people probably remember him for is missing the game winning lay-up in the Finals against the Lakers. And even more lamentable is the fact that that’s probably what he’ll continue to be remembered for. Lee’s greatest assets are his defense and three point shooting, skills that won’t make him a super-star anytime soon but will earn him minutes on most any NBA team. What he did well last season, particularly after the all-star break, was play within himself. He’s not the guy you want initiating the offense for your favorite team, but he is a dead eye three point shooter off the catch. He generally makes good decisions with the ball and isn’t turnover prone. He won’t fall asleep on defense and gets the occasional fast-break igniting steal. His biggest obstacle next season might just be finding playing time on this crowded roster, though I suspect his consistent play will earn him that as well.

Of the 17 men currently listed as Houston Rockets (counting Marcus Cousin and Marqus Blakely), only three are older than 25, and only one, Scola, is older than 28. The roster is nearly three deep at every position, teeming with young players with something to prove and a limited number of available minutes in which to prove it. With the coaching staff overhauled to a presumably more Morey-ball friendly bunch, we’ll most likely see long, shifting rotations that will look to experiment with player combinations rather than cleanly divide the starters from the bench.

If this holds true, most everyone on the roster will more than likely at some point have a shot to make his mark. But who will distinguish himself and who will get lost in the fray?

Over the next few weeks, I’ll attempt to make sense of this madness, one position at a time.

First up: Point Guard

Kyle Lowry

I discussed in April what I think Lowry could mean to the Rockets’ future.  Despite the team’s general state of flux, his performance over the second half of last season made him the clear incumbent to beat for the starting point guard spot. His stellar defense and ability to push the tempo on offense were evident even in his first few seasons in Memphis, but the development of his three-point shot and willingness to be a team leader on both sides of the floor are what could eventually make him an elite NBA point guard. If he can keep up the torrid pace he set for himself after the all-star break, by the middle of next season, he could be turning heads in more locales than just Southwest Texas.

Goran Dragic

Dragic is the perfect back-up point man. He hustles for loose balls and is a willing and relatively competent passer. His jump shot is streaky but can be effective in limited minutes. He’s not a great defender (though spelling Steve Nash may have made him seem like one) and will occasionally sell out for a steal but isn’t going to get beat of the dribble on every possession either. His greatest attribute (always a back-handed compliment) is his effort level. At 25, Dragic may not develop into an all-star floor general, but his motor could easily earn him minutes on most NBA teams. His problem this year, though, may just be the Rockets’ draft-day acquisition of Johnny Flynn.

Johnny Flynn

Flynn, chosen 6^th overall, joins the Rockets already extensive collection of 2009 draft lottery busts (Thabeet #2, Jordan Hill #8, and Terrence Williams #11). Much like the rest of this breakfast club, Flynn’s NBA career thus far can only be graded as an incomplete. He’s an extraordinary athlete with blow by speed and an impressive vertical. The form on his jump shot is textbook, and he’s creative around the basket. He’s also only six feet tall (5’11” according to some). And while he has good handles, he tends to over-dribble and turn the ball over, isn’t a great passer, and doesn’t often (enough) look to involve his teammates. Although he seems to have the potential to develop into a good defender (strength, lateral quickness, etc.), he certainly hasn’t shown any signs of the commitment it takes to do so just yet. Basically, he’s been a terrible NBA player up to this point. But he’s also still only 22. And he was also playing in a dysfunctional triangle offense that, even if functional, would not have suited his skill set. So do I hope the Rockets give him minutes this upcoming season and try to encourage his potential development? Absolutely. Could he continue to miserably inefficient on both sides of the floor and gun himself out of the league in two years? Absolutely.

I felt slightly embarrassed while typing that title.  But I have to admit.  I’m excited about Jonny Flynn.  In suppressing our intrigue and tempering expectations, we overlook the intrinsic uniqueness of the point guard position and the men who list it as their occupation.

We’re hesitant to have hope because Hill, Thabeet, and Williams have all struggled so mightily and appear unlikely to succeed.  But point guards are different.  When big men struggle, or bust out of the league, it’s usually due to laziness, lack of desire, or some innately immutable mental characteristic.  Bigs get picked high and carry expectations despite their flaws because of the scarcity of their breed.  But as a point guard, you can’t even get to Division 1 basketball without competitive fire; if you’re under 6’3, there are hundreds or even thousands of other men ready to kill you and take your spot.

(The issue of ‘talent’ or ‘skill’ isn’t even germane to this discussion.  Nobody takes point guards based on ‘potential’ talent development.  If a point guard is taken high in the lottery, rest assured he’s damn good talent-wise.)

When young point guards struggle, it’s usually because they don’t understand the game.  They’re either selfish or don’t yet know how to play the position.  The good news is that this can be fixed with time and experience.  These problems can be healed with age and tutelage.

Sometimes it does not work out.  Steve Francis is an example.  Sometimes it does work out.  Rajon Rondo is an example. But examples exist on both sides.

This takes us to Jonny Flynn.  So far, he’s a bust.  But by all accounts, he does not lack confidence or competitive desire. The likely cause of his struggles is an inability to play the position.

Of the team’s four draft busts of 2009, Flynn in my opinion is the likeliest to succeed just by virtue of the above hypothesis.  It’s likelier that Jonny Flynn learns how to play point guard than it is that Hasheem Thabeet gains self-respect and a desire to protect his paint; It’s likelier that Jonny Flynn learns how to play point guard than it is that Jordan Hill gains focus and intensity.

I expect Flynn to succeed.  I don’t know if it will be with Houston, but I think he will turn it around.  That’s a catch 22 because Goran Dragic is fantastic and Kyle Lowry has been Red94′s favorite player since its birth.

If things work out, the team will have options.  I don’t think you could keep both Flynn and Lowry – the two are quite similar.  Lowry is the Rockets’ leader but at the same time, he is the single most attractive trade chip on the roster.  With a modest annual salary and near All-Star tier production, Kyle could be used to entice some team into trading its star. But that scenario is a long way’s away.

Once we took Rubio, we knew for a fact that unless he was taken in the top two picks that year that he couldn’t come for at least a year, maybe two because of the buyout. So we knew we had no point guard on the roster, and if you recall in that free agent class, we had as the number one point guard, Ramon Sessions. And I was very worried that Ramon was going to cost a lot of money, because several teams were sniffing around Ramon already. Also, we didn’t have any tradable assets. Al Jefferson was coming off an ACL, Corey Brewer was coming off an ACL, Kevin (Love) I didn’t want to trade — he was just coming off his first year. We had a very, very thin team. So I just felt very strongly that night that we had to come out of the first round with a point guard. We loved Jonny Flynn. And I loved Jonny Flynn, I want to be very clear about that. And it’s my pick, I own it, I’m accountable for it. Our staff loved Jonny Flynn. We had him over Rubio on the board. I especially liked his leadership capabilities. Jonny has a lot of that — it’s like pouring out of him. But one of those things I think we suppressed that first year were those very same leadership capabilities, because we made him play a style of play that he wasn’t conducive to him, and it made him feel very insecure about who he was as a player.

I don’t know what to make of Flynn.  (I do know what to make of the Rockets’ stockpiling of former lottery pick failures.) ESPN reports had the team shopping him almost immediately after the acquisition.  But Houston had attempted to acquire the point guard even last season. Does Morey see hidden value here or not?