This is barely the tip of the iceberg in describing how remarkable Chandler Parsons’ rookie year has been. He’s received public praise from Kobe Bryant (more on that later), assumed the role of Houston’s clutch shot-taker on more than one occasion (he’s shooting 40% from three-point line in the fourth quarter), and, in a strange, inconceivable way, might be the last player on Houston’s roster that Daryl Morey would be willing to part with.

Here’s where things get interesting. Chandler Parsons is 23-years-old. He can shoot, dribble, pass, rebound, defend, and make smart decisions with, at the very least, a B- grade. But what is his absolute limit? Can Parsons become an All-Star by following the Luol Deng, Andre Iguodala path? Is he athletic enough for that? Or because of his glue guy playing style, is what we’re seeing right now in fact as good as he can be—a player who’s a tiny bit above average in every area but free-throw shooting (which is correctable), with no real room to meaningfully improve?

Figuring out a player’s ceiling is obviously a guessing game, but with most guys, coming close to estimating how good, or bad, a player will be is entirely possible. Parsons is different. His ceiling is impossible to gauge. With a well-rounded skill set, Parsons has to ask himself which is more important: making everything a little better, or choosing to excel in one specific area and finding a niche.

According to Synergy, Parsons is one of the league’s 30 best isolation defenders, with opponents (more often than not it being the other team’s best offensive player) shooting 22.9% and scoring 0.6 PPP. By comparison, Tony Allen—widely regarded as the league’s most tenacious on-ball perimeter defender—is holding opponents to 34.9% shooting and 0.68 PPP in isolation sets. (Parsons has been placed in isolation situations 40 more times than Allen, too. Making these numbers borderline incomprehensible.) For the most part Parsons can defend four positions without a double team, and apart from Sam Dalembert and Marcus Camby, is undoubtedly the Rockets best/most important defensive player.

Here’s a performance chart of every shot Kobe Bryant’s taken this season against the Rockets with Parsons on the court. He’s split the duty with Courtney Lee,  but more often than not Parsons is the guy Kevin McHale wants on Kobe.

And here’s a chart detailing every one of Kobe’s shots that came against the Rockets with Parsons on the bench.

Look at the mid-range area specifically. At this stage in his career, this is where Bryant loves to torch his defender, but he’s been unable to do so with Parsons. As they say, a picture’s worth a thousand words.

On the offensive end it’s very, very difficult to game plan against a player like Parsons. He’s mostly utilized as a spot up shooter (for the league’s fourth most accurate jump shooting team from 16-23 feet), where he’s 40.6% from the floor and 36.2% from deep. But he’s also effective in isolation, running a pick and roll, tipping back missed shots (which is where he first made his name) and running in transition. The ways he can kill you are numerous; he defines versatility.

Last week, Kevin McHale talked about how the Rockets are having so much success without any “superstar” on the team. What he had to say was that it’s not how good the players are, but how good they make their teammates that’s important. This is probably the most impressive part of Parsons game right now. He goes out of his way to make things easier for everyone around him, which is something that can’t be taught. The Rockets score 3.21 more points per 100 possessions, and give up 2.43 fewer points on defense when Parsons is on the court, and he’s second on the team in minutes. The sample size is officially large enough to say he’s been one of the league’s most pleasant surprises, and he isn’t going anywhere.

Chandler Parsons was drafted by a team that’s yet to place too much responsibility on his shoulders, while at the same time giving him the opportunity to thrive in a comfortable setting. What the future holds for Parsons is anybody’s guess. But no matter what, it’ll be a super exciting career to follow.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

Listening to Luis Scola do an interview on a local radio station last night, he repeatedly made reference to the fact that he thought the Rockets actually played a relatively bad game last night, and he had a point: the first quarter had been a 40-25 bloodletting on the part of the Lakers in which the 16-time champs posted a filthy field goal percentage of 62% during which the all of the Lakers’ strengths (Kobe Bryant’s all-around offensive wizardry, their massively skilled and sized Gigantors inside, their ability to force turnovers and shots away from the rim) shined as reasons teams like the Rockets cannot beat LA. Throughout the game, the Lakers looked dominant on the interior (while Houston won the overall rebounding war, this was mostly thanks to a 17-8 advantage in the fourth), making Houston have to do what they also have to against better teams: play like madmen. Instead of trusting their two relatively newly acquired big men on the inside to hold down the fort, the Rockets played a constantly moving, ridiculously dangerous brand of defense focused on ball-hawkery that eventually worked out as the Lakers continued to try to feed their three dominant players in Bryant, Andrew Bynum and Pau Gasol. As those three would predictably make their moves, even against double teams, third defenders would either take bear-like swipes at the ball or head to the weakside to opportunistically lunge at the kickout pass, hoping (and in this game, succeeding enough) to get their hands on what would lead to one of the team’s only easy buckets on the other end. While this kind of defense can often have adverse effects when kept up throughout the entirety of a game (I’m guessing everyone’s YMCA coaches have already established the moral failings of selling out for a steal), Houston recognized that it was terribly outmatched on one-on-one plays and had to cause just enough chaos to make the Lakers try to either beat them another way or foolishly keep at this brand of iso-ball.

Offensively, the Rockets had almost nothing coming consistently on offense, unable to feed Scola or Patrick Patterson in the post thanks to the moving forest of Lakers bigs or penetrate with Dragic thanks to mostly the same reasons; to combat this, they opted for the home run swing over and over again, whether it be the aforementioned layups on the fast break, the always beloved three-ball (the Rockets opted for 20 of em, 25% of their overall shots at the basket) or pull-up jumpshots in delayed transition. Without offensive anchors Kyle Lowry or Kevin Martin to either run the offense or run the offense through, the Rockets look to their sampler platter of sort-of offensive skills: pindowns for Chase Budinger and Courtney Lee, pick-and-pop plays run explicitly to get Scola open 16-footers, allowing Dragic enough air space on pick-and-rolls for the feisty Slovenian to gobble up some contact and go to charity stripe. On any given night, watching this mashup of plays and half-hearted ideas come to life can be alternately inspiring and cramp-inducing, both thanks to the simplicity and diligence involved, and a few times in this past month, the Rockets have been able to steal a few wins from the Thunder and Lakers thanks to similar tactics, along with some infantile moments from Russel Westbrook, Andrew Bynum and some NBA referees.

Playing superior teams can often feel like an endless burden for teams like the Rockets, stuffed full of players that can only do so much as opposed to the few Lakers types that can do so much, but when facing such limitless power, a team can either crumble and stick to the old game plan or do the only rational thing: go crazy. Taking risks can always lead to consequences no one wants to face, but if losing’s the worst that can happen, why not overstretch, overexert, overextend? Sometimes that’s the only way to victory.

The most commonly posited thoughts about a proposed deal shipping Kevin Martin and Luis Scola, along with some sort of melange of picks and bench assets (Jonny Flynn, we knew ye so little), for Gasol state that while Gasol might present an improvement over the existing Rockets team, the improvement would not be major enough to lose key contributors and/or take on his massive contract (which will pay him almost $40 million over the next couple of years, years in which he’ll be 32 and 33 years old). What could Gasol bring that either would improve or fail to change a Rockets team that seems to have less glaring holes than in recent years? There stands the obvious uptick in defensive efficiency, a marker of which the Rockets have been perilously close to the bottom leaguewide until this season, where Houston lands smack dab in the middle as the 15th best defense in the L; Gasol’s Lakers, of course, have done remarkably well on the oft-forgotten end of the court, posting top 10 finishes every year since his arrival, peaking at fifth in 2008-09. While many might attribute that to the added benefit of wing defenders like Trevor Ariza and Ron Artest/Metta World Peace/Tru Warier/my favorite human and another giant presence in Andrew Bynum on the interior, no proposed deal for the Spanish giant has dealt the Rockets’ recently acquired paint protector Samuel Dalembert, making the interior in Houston likely to be similarly formidable.

Photo courtesy of Philipp Klinger via Flickr

While that gives an overall idea of what the defense might improve to with Gasol helping to man the paint in Houston, we should look more carefully at the man he’d likely be replacing at the power forward position, Scola; while Scola’s production this year has plummeted and later risen back up to respectable levels of scoring and (somewhat respectable) rebounding, his deficiencies on the defensive end have always matched up nicely with those of the Rockets, and this year has been no different. On the block, Scola’s lack of height and foot speed make him an easy target to push around, predictably making him the 107th best post defender in the league, giving up 0.91 points per possession (PPP) on post-ups, a group that makes up more than 30 percent of the plays Scola’s defended this year. Spot-up shooters, those pesky open men who are just waiting for your team’s big man to collapse on a penetrating point guard or wing so that they can clean up on a kick-out pass (something Scola himself is particularly adept at doing, even if the stats don’t bear that out), make up the other heaviest portion of Scola’s defensive workload, accounting for 39.3% of his responsibilities on that end, and his stats are predictably middle-of-the-road there, ranking as the 97th best defender of the play in the league.  While spot-up shooting defense actually surprises as a strong point of the Rockets defense (12th in the league), post-ups compose one of the many Houston vulnerabilities inside, where the Rockets rank 18th in the league at guarding such plays.

Gasol’s Lakers unsurprisingly, with their massive frontline, dominate the paint on the defensive end, as even slowed down veteran defenders like World Peace, Matt Barnes and Kobe Bryant can funnel their offensive charges directly into the walls of Bynum and Gasol; on one-on-one post-ups, the Lakers’ towers rank even better. The team as a whole plays the sixth-best post defense in the league, but Gasol himself is no slouch; his numbers guarding post-ups, 35.7% of the possessions that he handles, ranks as 13th-best among all defenders, giving up a minuscule 0.59 PPP. While guarding the man headed toward the basket off of a pick-and-roll doesn’t happen nearly as often for Gasol (only 7.6 percent of his defensive possessions), he also stands among the best in that department as the fifth-best inhibitor of such plays, ones which have consistently given the Rockets trouble all year (Houston gives up 1.03 PPP guarding he roll man, the eighth-worst mark in the league).

Though generally more concise and informative than defensive stats, offensive marks for both Gasol and Scola seem like unfair marks given their respective down years on that side of the floor, both taking huge dives from last year’s numbers (dives that hopefully have nothing to do with age-related entropy). For a good guide on that side of the floor, we turn to adjusted plus/minus numbers that let us know exactly how much better their teams are offensive when they’re on the floor as opposed when they’re not; using this stat, Scola’s +.02 mark is slightly better than Gasol’s -.94 one, but the difference is negligible. When factoring in PER, though, Gasol’s 21.12 is still All-Star worthy, while Scola’s 14.03 makes him a blow-average NBA player on the year.

Important to remember in this discussion of how much of an improvement Gasol makes over Scola is that Martin would also be sent out in this deal; equally important might be the fact that those minutes will not just be given to a vacuum and that Courtney Lee would almost certainly eat those up. Martin’s production has taken a furious tumble from last year’s All-Star level offensive numbers, but rather than this year being an aberration, it rather looks like a return to the norm. His PER of 17.4 sure looks a lot more like the 17.1 and 17 numbers that he posted in the two years preceding the last one than the 21.4 he posted last season. Of course, he also posted similar efficiency ratings in the 20′s when younger; Lee, for his part, really has never had a season other than his second, a run in New Jersey for one of the worst teams in NBA history, when he got consistently big minutes; still, his efficiency numbers have number quite demanded such playing time. He’s posting his highest offensive rating and PER this year, but Lee’s already 26, pretty old for a fourth year NBA player, and unlikely to go through transformative offensive changes in the next couple of seasons, though he’ll likely sustain his current improved pace, if not slightly better it. More importantly, his on-the-ball defense ranks far superior to that of Martin, making that proposed starting line of Dalembert-Gasol-Parsons-Lee-Lowry look that much more dangerous when guarding opposing offenses.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TldUEViX36c

Most of this disregards the most important, usually immeasurable aspect of having a player of Gasol’s caliber and utility: the star effect. Players will have to double team him, and his passing ability has been well documented while helping run the Triangle under Phil Jackson. His outside shooting can make a Lowry/Gasol pick-and-roll look damn near unstoppable when Lowry’s shooting well, and Samuel Dalembert could be looking at a lot ore bunnies inside if he’s ready for those beautiful touch passes that Bynum’s greedily enjoyed over recent years. Add to this the actual positive direction in which this will send the Rockets’ cap situation, and this deal seems like a no-brainer, at least on Houston’s part. A star, and no matter what the doubters have still lodged in their brains from years of media training or one miserable tango with Kevin Garnett years ago, he is a star, can change everything for a team; when that team is already just one game out of the number three seed and looking at a very cushy end of the season schedule, a star might even turn a little-outfit-that-could into a title contender.

Such established dominance didn’t come to fruition immediately, though. No, instead a well constructed collection of veterans led by a single basketball god took down those Heat in last year’s Finals, finally giving the 2004 Pistons some company as an alternate plan to winning a title besides “collect a lot of superstars, preferably three”. In the interim, many have argued that Dirk’s guidance of the Mavericks to the promised land doesn’t deviate too greatly from past champions, but only the 93-94 Rockets stand out so remarkably in memory as a team guided by one hand so greatly (though PER disparities between the top two players on champions of recent years tell a different story, most notably among the Spurs of the early 00′s and the Shaq-led Lakers). What Nowitzki and Dallas’ triumph might ultimately have done on a macro-level is change the strategy: since not every team can collect all of the stars, why not just collect as many of them as you can and instead amass all of the talented role players that those top-heavy teams can no longer afford thanks to their salary obligations up top? Or better yet, why not just do the talented role player collecting through the draft and keep that cap room flexible to be able to nab the first available superstar that will join the team in question? Enter Houston.

The Rockets obviously aren’t the only ones with this idea; the lockout-shortened 2011-12 season has been the year of the team, in its truest form. From the defensive-minded younglings in Philadelphia to the slightly bigger defensive-minded youth in Indiana to the gun-em-to-death athletes in Denver, many squads have found success in 2011 through a reliance on more than just a select group of players on both sides of the ball, replacing star power with good ol’ fashioned manpower, usually obliterating opposing benches with their endless platoons of guys (who can ball). Never before has piling up a collection of good pieces looked like such a viable strategy, even if pundits around the NBA universe seem more than happy to pour a bucket of spirit-crushing upon all who think these teams can actually do anything except take a couple of game come May. Still, this phenomenon might just be new enough that we will get a few years of it to crush the traditional notion of star-collection.

One team with a particularly strange hold on this group is the Portland Trailblazers, a group that seems the natural standard-bearers of the Mavericks’ legacy of last year (since the Mavs themselves don’t quite seem up to the challenge, even if both teams share a 14-11 record at the moment. Look at those point differentials, people). After years of building a Thunder-like trio of stars through the draft, injuries seemed to have robbed them of the Roy/Oden/Aldridge era, leaving just the latter to head a bunch of über-talented, lacking-in-traditional-position players that can basically all shoot, (mostly) all defend (looking at you, Crawford) and all play given the right matchups. If any one team has seen this shift in the traditional power structure of teams and embraced it, it’s been the perennially forward-thinking progressives up in the Pacific Northwest.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h9Chx1DKgG4

Still, Houston holds it own strange place in this new paradigm as a team just waiting to be branded among these contenders, scraping and clawing for its chance both to be respected and completely vindicated once it gets its hands on one of those franchise-direction-shifting studs. Unlike most oft hese teams, the Rockets seem not to have fallen into this state by chance (Utah), portending-failure-turned-good-fortune (Denver) or rebuilding-gone-right (Philadelphia), but rather by outright strategy. While Houston’s GM, Daryl Morey, has taken his fair chance on high-risk assets who could turn out to be stars in Terrence Williams and Hasheem Thabeet, most of Houston’s plan has been to consistently contend with guys that other teams simply thought of as “good, but not good enough”. THose guys, Kyle Lowry and Luis Scola most obviously but several others, have helped turned Houston in to the kind of bare-knuckled, indefatigable grouping of talent that competes with just about any team any night, even as the Rockets’ organization tries at any cost to deal a handful of these men to any team with a disgruntled star that can come be this crowd’s Aldridge or Dirk.

What’s flatly silly about all of the doom and gloom foretold by those who short-sightedly claimed the Heat and its ilk would ruin the NBA landscape was that, for decades, collections of superstars had been ruling the league without (and sometimes with) cries of unfairness, from the Showtime Lakers’ triumvirate of number one picks to the old Boston big three to the Bulls’ ridiculous run with the league’s best player, best rebounder and best all-around player (somehow all different men). Miami’s hutzpah-showing move to snatch all three of the 2010′s prized free agent class was simply a new way of committing to a time-tested, true plan; instead, the Rockets, Nuggets and 76ers look to be the (don’t say trailblazers, don’t say trailblazers) pioneers here, trying what none, or at least very, very few before them, have done: win without the star

The year is 2007. Present any Celtics fan (let’s go with Bill Simmons) a hypothetical situation. You have Paul Pierce at the apex of his career. He is wasting his prime on a 24-58 team where Ryan Gomes is the third-best player on the team and Rajon Rondo is benched in favor of Sebastian Telfair. Goodness gracious, that team was dysfunction personified.

Let’s say I tell Bill that they will get Undisclosed Superstar A, Undisclosed Superstar B, give their roster a massive overhaul, beginning with the release of the immortal Allan Ray. We’ll also provide Bill with a semi-functional basketball GPS, letting him know before the season starts that sometime between 2007 and 2012, the team will win a championship, but the year when that happens will be kept a mystery.

If I’m Bill Simmons, or any sane basketball fan for that matter, I would say yes without batting an eyelash. That’s a Larry O’Brien we’re talking about here. Whether it takes place in 2008 or 2011, a title is a title. Of course, we can say this because of this too-late-the-hero superpower everyone in the world is gifted with: hindsight.

There have been two methods to creating a contender, much akin to a house: buy or build. The Celtics went with buy, going after Kevin Garnett and Ray Allen. The Heat went with buy, hoarding LeBron James and Chris Bosh. The Lakers rigged Pau Gasol in a trade. Twice, for those of you keeping score.

On the other hand, the Thunder went the opposite way, farming young talent with the hope that Kevin Durant, Russell Westbrook, and James Harden mesh and succeed. Only time will tell where that direction takes them. The Bulls are somewhere in between while the Spurs are the result of the perfect storm consisting of a David Robinson injury at the right time, extensive scouting and picturesque chemistry.

And how about those Houston Rockets? They are neither buying nor building. They are the highly liquid team who doesn’t want to spend on a marquee asset or two. Somehow, it works. Since 2002, they’ve only had one losing season. They toil through the season with quasi-decency and flame out in the playoffs. In a previous article, Daryl Morey has been chided on focusing too much on statistics, thereby bloating the offense while compromising the defense.

The thing is, Morey is a great GM. But he has been so enamored with his Moreyball approach, grabbing value-for-money players. The problem is that there are too many what-ifs. For example, he picked up Donatas Motiejunas with the 20^th pick, a 21-year old 7-footer with an outside touch. That pick is decent, mind you, but at the same time I am troubled with how Morey plays the waiting game. A bit too long, in all honesty.

You see, the problem is Morey is banking on unrealized gains possibly more than any other GM. If this were a finance class, you could say that he keeps computing at the future value of money but has no context on the repercussions of the Euro crisis or the Nigerian oil price inflation, a byproduct of economics.

Going back to D-Mo (as Kevin McHale calls him), let’s say he jumps to the NBA at the age of 25. That would be sometime in 2016 or 2017. What if Kyle Lowry suffers a season-ending injury that year, knock on wood? There are too many variables.

The point I am driving at is that Houston should aim buy, not build. Building would mean that Jordan Hill, Patrick Patterson, and Marcus Morris get as much, if not more playing time that Samuel Dalembert and Luis Scola. That isn’t the case. McHale stubbornly keeps his best five in, not the five that should be bringing this team forward. His decision to play Chandler Parsons and hand over the keys to Lowry have been the two best decisions he has made as the Rockets’ coach so far.

I do not mind dropping this truncated season with a record of 24-42. None of you would remember how many wins the Rockets had in this season seven or eight years from now unless you have an eidetic memory. Trivia: What was the Rockets’ win-loss record in 2005-2006, the year both Yao Ming and Tracy McGrady were significantly sidelined? My point exactly.

Now, I know most of you will point out the Knicks as an example of a team that bought talent, bringing in Amar’e Stoudemire and Carmelo Anthony, but the payroll has not yet translated to wins, if it ever will. That concern is understandable. You see, the team was so infatuated at the idea of “AnthoNY” back in his home turf that they were oblivious on how gutted their roster was post-trade.

Let’s tip our caps to the Rockets. The team is giving their full effort, eking out wins against the Blazers and Spurs. However, the wins are flukes, the exception rather than the norm. It would be nice to be keeping in step with the Clippers, who prove that the sun does shine, even for the unluckiest of franchises. A team with so much potential cannot be kept waiting, going for one Pyrrhic victory after another.

There is only one instance where the build scenario works out: the 2012 draft pick. Build on that pick, whether it turns out to be Michael Kidd-Gilchrist or Austin Rivers. Then dole out. Buy talent. This team also needs to sell some tickets, so a true superstar that can draw the masses would be very much welcome. Their game against Sacramento saw people coming in to cheer for the Jimmer. That was a sad sight to witness.

As we have seen, the Celtics’ window lasted four seasons, as they have spiraled downward this year and are looking more like a washed-up team than a Gatorade-pouring one. But that four-year window has been much better than anything the Rockets had going for the last 15 years.

The Dwight Howard Sweepstakes is coming up, and it would be better to punch in a ticket for that miniscule fraction of a chance. Remember, it was thanks to another big man that the Rockets were able to raise a couple of banners.

Because counting division title banners is so lame.

Photo via askal bosch on Flickr

Despite Michael’s understandably dour take on things, Tuesday’s loss to the Los Angeles Lakers had to bring smiles to Rockets fans, at least for three quarters. Regardless of the not-so-sudden realization that the Rockets, along with almost every NBA team, have no answer for a skilled 7-footer with length and strength to spare or that fella named Kobe Bryant, Houston embroiled itself in a very even-footed struggle with a team still capable of dismembering squads that have no business sharing a court with it. Some of the Lakers’ greatest weaknesses remain some of Houston’s best attributes: dominant point guard, depth, perimeter shooting; that might give any viewer pause that wants to credit the Rockets too much for their ability to hang with the former champs, but that’s not what those unadorned in Rocket red got out of this. They just got to watch one helluva game.

What is a sadder realization than knowing that you’d love something more if you just didn’t know it so well? The moment a lover’s quirks turn into his or her frustrating habits, the one when a once beloved job’s duties become its unending tedium, that first time the usual at your favorite restaurant just tastes too damn usual— unfortunately, that’s exactly where I find myself with these Houston Rockets. Their game-to-game development into something worthy of attention, if not quite admiration, stands out as something that a follower should be proud of, at least up until the moment he or she remembers exactly how much mediocrity all of that “development” ensures for the team’s future. Where the outside fan can marvel at Kyle Lowry’s improved jumpshot and ability to finely thread passes through the tightest of passing lanes to hit a charging Luis Scola or Samuel Dalembert, all I can do is wish for more, ever the petulant ingrate. What if he shot like Eric Gordon or passed like Ricky Rubio? What if Patrick Patterson and Jordan Hill could combine their skill sets and become even the brokest man’s Amar’e? When cheering for almost pretty good, the viewer only gets an amuse-bouche for greatness, never the fulfillment of an entrée.

Now I might be (or definitely am) another greedy Rockets fan trumpeting the horn for immediate misery in hopes for future ecstasy, but this flirting-with-good-business has left me and a host of other Rockets heads left in a perpetual purgatory, while other onlookers get to see Houston for the rollicking barrel of excitement that its offense really is. For them, Lowry’s growth represents just that, not a failure to be something that never reasonably could have been expected of him. Scola and Kevin Martin, suddenly anchors dragging the Rockets down to the lowly territory of the winning, look like the competent craftsmen they are, established professionals working within the framework of the low post and open jumper, respectively. Jordan Hill’s jump toward respectability at defense? The mercurial Nash-isms of Goran Dragic? Every single thing about Terrence Williams? All of these random strangers are getting to enjoy the fruits of the team I cover, the team I’ve kept my eye on since I can remember having eyes, all because these bystanders have nothing invested in the team rather than a rooting interest in the game and teams that play it interestingly, that play it well.

What has become of us viewers if we cannot appreciate that? The Rockets, if nothing else, remain a League Pass staple for those who like to see a team actively push and struggle to win nightly and brew up some fun doing it. Crisp perimeter passing and unprecedented angles for scoop shots make the nights of most fans surveying the daily NBA landscape, so Houston’s status as “everyone’s fifth favorite team” (I’m realistic about the space the Rockets occupy in the minds of even the most devoted hoops junkies) works perfectly, especially for a team so used to being the unofficial squad for the world’s biggest country. This seems like a reputation worth embracing, something the Golden State Warriors and Phoenix Suns have at times in the past, because the ones who win aren’t always the ones people like, and there has to be a place for the lovable loser.

Well, the night’s other big contest, the Iowa presidential caucuses, produced a winner in Mitt Romney that plenty of those that wish him well don’t even particularly like, other than for one reason: he can win. He didn’t always seem like the most enchanting option to those ready to elect him, but it didn’t matter if he could get the job done. So forgive us unappreciative suckers who can’t even find a heartwarming, captivating team for which to cheer even if its underneath our noses; we’re too busy trying to figure out how to turn all of this excitement into some plodding, monotonous winning.

Yes, this essay should have entailed a sincere look into the Rockets’ odds at winning the West in the next three years, during the duration of Pau Gasol’s contract.  Instead, we scramble to assess what we have and what our objectives should be during this challenging season.

What is tanking exactly?  I’ve argued vehemently for it, but have I ever defined it, or at least my personal connotation of the term?  Tanking–as I propose it–is not simply throwing games in hopes of losses.  Perhaps that’s the normative use of the word.  Tanking is ‘purposeful destruction.’  The objective is not to just lose games.  The objective is to avoid winning games through nontransferrable means.  If the Rockets make the playoffs on the strength of play from Terrence Williams, Marcus Morris, and Jordan Hill, more power to them; I’m all for that.  That success translates to the future.  Those guys will only get better and by extension, the team has upward trajectory.

What I’m against is a playoff run on the backs of Kevin Martin and Luis Scola with young players playing minimal roles.  That success is fleeting; it doesn’t translate because those guys aren’t getting any better.  We know what they can do and we know the ceiling of a team with them at the helm.

Based on their success last season, I thought that had the team retained Chuck Hayes, even if remaining stagnant elsewhere, the Rockets would have likely made the playoffs as one of the lower seeds.  Now I’m not completely sure.  Losing Chuck Hayes was a bigger blow than is being reported: not only was he the team’s anchor inside but he initiated a large percentage of the team’s offense from the high post.  With no real passing threats inside, that production will be difficult to replicate.  Still, they have enough talent that they won’t be completely awful.  That could be a bad thing.

**

After the game Saturday night, we asked Terrence Williams what triggered his eruption in the second half after such a poor start.  “He told me even Jordan had bad halves,” he recounted, speaking of a dialogue with head coach Kevin McHale.

You can see it in the way he talks to them, individually, at practice, instilling confidence through a constructive manner.  With the Gasol deal squashed by the league, the McHale-Adelman swap almost seems prescient.  If you’re a young player, struggling to find your niche in this league, who better to provide reassurance than a hall-of-famer and one of the 50 greatest players to ever play this game?

Up front, in their young trio of big-man lottery picks, the Houston Rockets feature a wealth of physical riches, with long-limbed men bestowed with all the gifts an athlete could want.  Now they must be built up and given the chance to sink or swim.  They must be taught and thrown directly into the fire.

Patterson will succeed.  The numbers indicate so much.  Hill exploded last weekend, walking all over the Spurs’ backup bigs, to the tune of an impressive double-double.  Can he sustain such production?  From reports, the knock on Jordan Hill has always been a lack of focus, but not of effort.  He’s eager to learn and eager for responsibility.  Who better to teach than Kevin McHale, just as he did with Kevin Garnett over a decade ago, taking the determined young man and showing him the ways of the paint.

Thabeet is the wild card.  To amnesty him would be a mistake.  How many men on this planet stand 7’3?  He has struggled, yes, and did not look too impressive Saturday night.  But recall that he’s never been coached.  At UConn he was instructed to stand in the paint while in Memphis, he was castaway as a failure.  The experience has clearly rattled him.

It was a relief to hear McHale, speaking of Craig Smith, say that he “wanted to see how long he had with Hasheem.”  It seems the team is willing to give Thabeet his chance.  Why wouldn’t they?  If he fails, nothing is lost.  If he even becomes serviceable, they’ve gained a valuable, rare piece to their roster.

**

When I spoke to him Saturday night, Marcus Morris explained that he had slimmed down in preparation for his role at the ’3′.  Can he play the position?  It’s a calculated risk by Rockets management.  As a power forward, Morris’ ceiling is average at best, causing him to slip to the back end of the lottery.  But like Billy Beane’s juggling of catchers and first-basemen, the Rockets feel Morris hasn’t been properly valued.  As a ’3′, he can create mismatches against smaller opponents, using size that didn’t gain him any advantage at power forward.  For a team with no star, it’s a smart gamble.

The other wing with promise is Terrence Williams who thus far has been the star of camp.  Williams possesses all the talents but many wonder if he’ll ever get his head straight.  On Saturday, the team featured him more at the head of the attack, allowing him to create with the ball in his hands.  Last year, he was relegated to a slasher within the Princeton offense; the former role clearly better suiting.

**

Between Hill, Thabeet, Patterson, Morris, and Williams, the Rockets have two former #14′s, an 11, an 8, and a #2.  It’s a good debate whether the big men or the wings have more potential or which group is more likely to realize it.  But at one spot, the team is rock-solid for the future.

Kyle Lowry emerged last season after claiming the keys upon Aaron Brooks’ departure.  He’s elite defensively and showed huge strides last season in his offensive prowess.  This is his team.  Where Lowry goes, the Rockets go, and the numbers reflect that during his stint with the team.  Whether he continues his improvement is anyone’s guess.  He seems to have capped out his ceiling, adding a shot to an already impressive ability to barrel his way to the hoop.

While Lowry has transcended, he’s not quite elite.  He still can’t really create off the dribble like some of his counterparts, using more of an opportunistic approach within the system or in fastbreaks.  This is where Williams, with his handle, could be a game-changer.

**

The Rockets must see where they are, must evaluate the track of the franchise.  They have youth, they must now assess where it is, and if it can help them.  An unwillingness to do such probably costed Rick Adelman his job.

They made the first right move, turning to McHale to move toward the future.  But where is that future headed?  One second it seemed towards the Western Conference Finals but David Stern had his way.  Now where do the Rockets go?  Chris Paul will stay in LA (for at least another year) and Dwight Howard seems to also be on his way somewhere else.  There is no hope of summer 2012. There seems to be no other trades on the horizon.  From where will they get a star?

The Rockets must trade Luis Scola and Kevin Martin at some point during this season.  They must bring back value for players who cannot help them when they are again ready to win.  This isn’t about losing.  It’s about avoiding pointless wins and wasting time in stagnation, mired in mediocrity.

The Rockets have tried every route.  They must now acquiesce to the inevitable and allow nature to take its course.  All great teams were bad.  The “culture of winning” is a myth and faux bravado has no place in honest discussion: “the point is to win” doesn’t sound as tough next to 40 victories.

This draft is the deepest in years.  If the Rockets spend time cultivating their current young talent and nab a blue-chipper in June, they could be back on their way.  If not, this could be a vicious cycle with no exit in sight.  Mediocrity perpetuates mediocrity and demoralizes a fanbase.  Few things are worse at the box office than apathy.

2011-2012 should be, not about wins, but about the future.  If Williams and Hill emerge, and lead the team on a run, applause is warranted.  But 30 point outings from Luis Scola or Kevin Martin to the tune of victories does nobody any good.

2011-2012 is not about now.  That’s a tough pill to swallow but it’s the right course.  If the Rockets don’t look ahead, they’ll stay stuck in place.

5. Ron Artest

This was a tough call.  Were it not for his positives, he would have ranked far lower down on this page.  Close and late in crucial games, he’d get an “itch” out of nowhere, going berserk in attempts to shoulder the team.  Left was palatable, but if he ever drove right, it almost always ended badly; we all remember the one-footed fallaway jumpers in that direction.

Still, Artest played his role for the most part, deferring to Yao.  He was a surprisingly good post passer and rarely took plays off.  But most in his favor was the ‘aura’ he brought, something this team has lacked sorely since his departure.  Today’s Rockets ‘play hard and never quit’, a cutesy backhanded compliment better reserved for children, but they lack ‘nasty’ and command of respect.  Ron Artest did not allow hard fouls or unnecessary roughness against his ‘mates.  At the end of bad losses, he made sure opponents were given something to at least remember.  For this fan, that attitude was hugely appreciated.

4. Steve Francis

There are few guys whom from watching I’ve learned more about basketball.  Most importantly, just because someone can dribble and is short doesn’t mean he is a point guard.  Steve Francis has as many ‘crossover mixes’ as anyone on YouTube, but he wasn’t a floor general.  Looking back, with the basketball knowledge I’ve accrued since his rookie season, it’s mind-blowingly stupefying that Rudy T. ever even put him at point to begin with.  (Then again, considering Rudy T’s overall inabilities as a coach, perhaps this isn’t so surprising…).

Francis played shooting guard in his sole season of college ball.  These kids that play the ’1′ spend their entire lives through drills and rigorous training developing the cognitive instincts necessary for the position.  Just because you have a nice ‘in and out’ dribble and can make someone fall doesn’t mean you’re a general.  Point guards have it drilled in their brains to stay in the middle of the floor, get to the kill spots, feed the hot hand, never over-dribble, pass out of a press, and not try to dribble through a zone.  These were all foreign concepts to Steve Francis.

To his credit, few men in franchise history gave more effort.  But watching him featured as the team’s centerpiece at a position at which he didn’t even have the tools to succeed epitomized frustration.  Maybe Rudy T. and Carrol Dawson should have inhabited this spot on my list?

3. Matt Maloney

I’ll forever maintain that were it not for Matthew M. Maloney, the Houston Rockets would have won the Western Conference in 1997 and finally squared off against Michael Jordan’s Chicago Bulls.

As the story goes, Carrol Dawson turned down an offer that would have brought veteran point guard Derek Harper to the Rockets in exchange for Brent Price and a future first.  Dawson balked at the deal, Price got hurt, and the rest is history.  Several other veteran point guard options were available (Tim Hardaway?  Kevin Johnson?).  Entering the playoffs with only a rookie Maloney and Sedale Threatt was completely inexcusable.  In fact, after Game 4 of the semifinals (against Seattle) the team might not have even missed a beat with me playing the position.  With 7 minutes remaining in the series-clinching Game 6, Jazz point guard John Stockton went ‘Hall of Fame’ on Maloney and that was that.

One could even argue that since that 7 minute mark, the Rockets franchise has still not recovered.

2. Luther Head

As I quipped on ESPN, Luther Head may have been the worst professional basketball player I’ve ever seen.  How a 6’3 guard without handles or passing made the NBA is a mystery or perhaps should provide incentive to go work on your shot.  He’d throw passes at big men’s feet and get abused by anyone with ability.  If Head put it on the floor, it was almost always a turnover.  Who can forget his epically historic ’08 postseason when he shot .071% from the floor (going 1-14) as a crucial bench contributor upon whom the squad was depending.

In fact, perhaps the only redeeming quality about Head may have been his last name which made for some convenient punchlines.

1. Trevor Ariza

Trevor Ariza is indisputably the most frustrating player to have ever graced a Houston Rockets uniform.  The thing about the preceding four on this list is that they were at least lovable.  Artest instilled pride and commanded respect.  Francis played his ass off and had a swagger that at times was admirable.  Maloney and Head were just cute clueless kids you felt guilty soon afterwards about trashing to your friends.  Trevor Ariza was none of these.  Trevor Ariza not only was bad but had cringe-inducing character.  He’d bitch at teammates for not passing him the ball.  He’d ignore the hot hand (usually Carl Landry during one of his typical fourth quarter outbursts.)  I realized I abhorred Ariza when he swung at a helpless DeMar DeRozan, even then failing to connect on his target.

Ariza brought with him a strange sense of entitlement, the former small forward from the then-defending world champion Lakers.  He was awful, yet thought he was the best player on the team.  He’d try to drive, but failed the handles or footwork to do it.  He’d routinely get caught in awkward positions.  If it wasn’t a slash to the hoop, there was little he could do.  In fact, the one thing I gained from the Trevor Ariza experience was an appreciation for the refined skillset of Tracy McGrady.

Honorable Mentions: Shandon Anderson, Cuttino Mobley pre-JVG

Shandon Anderson should have been ‘Shandn Andersn’ because he had no ‘o.’  He’s up there with Head in offensive futility.  How can NBA guards dribble so poorly?  Second thought: John Stockton and Jerry Sloan were really, really good at getting this guy his contract.

I lost a lot of hair watching Cuttino Mobley especially when he’d hold the ball down, stare down at his defender’s shoes, dribble, dribble, and jack.  But to his credit, I can’t remember a more drastic transformation than Mobley pre and post Jeff Van Gundy.  He completely changed his game, becoming more efficient, utilizing screens and spotting up within the offense.  Mobley was also the most underrated defender in recent Rockets history.

After eight seasons, Yao Ming has retired from the NBA.

In eight seasons with the Houston Rockets, Yao Ming averaged 19 points and 9.2 rebounds per game.  The 7’6 center shot 52% from the field and a sparkling 83% from the free throw line.  The first overall pick in the 2002 NBA Draft, Yao made eight All-Star game appearances and was an All-NBA selection five times.  He earned over $93million in salaries over the course of his career.

What’s most striking in reflecting back upon Yao’s career is the good health he enjoyed in his first three seasons: the giant only missed a total of two games in those years at the time assuaging fears that a man his size could not endure the pounding of the NBA game.  The rejoicing was premature.  Yao went on to play more than 60 games only once in the next six years.

Was Yao Ming’s career a failure?  The bar is high for first overall selections and Yao’s Rockets only passed the first round once during his time with the team.  Having said that, he will go down as the greatest ‘giant’ in the league’s history, proving far more productive than any other man over 7’4 to have played the sport.

Was Yao the right pick?  While he certainly fared better than Duke’s Jay Williams–the man many believed in 2002 should have been the first overall selection–few would argue against Amare Stoudemire’s body of success.  While Stoudemire himself has never been considered a true ‘superstar’, the power forward was vastly more productive than Yao over the course of his career.

What’s forgotten are the expectations Yao carried upon entering the league.  While taken with the first pick, he was not selected as a ‘franchise savior.’  In those days, the Rockets belonged to Steve Francis and Cuttino Mobley and it was believed by many that if the core could remain healthy–Francis had missed the majority of the previous season–the team was already on track for the playoffs without Yao. Yao was picked to simply complement – to stretch the floor for the guards with his soft shooting range.  At the time, it was thought that anything more would be gravy.  Yao was picked to be, not the cornerstone, but one of many pieces to a developing championship core.  (The team at the time had huge hopes for the late Eddie Griffin.)

But Yao turned out to be far better than advertised–showing off an NBA-level postgame–and from there, our expectations became warped.  No one thought in ’02 that he’d be virtually unguardable inside against single coverage. When we saw it, we wanted more.  We demanded more and he couldn’t deliver.

Yao was a conundrum.  He was the league’s single most unstoppable force.  When receiving the ball in the paint, it was almost an automatic hoop.  Yet at the same time, he was so easily neutralized.  Simply putting a 6’8, athletic power forward in front of his body would force the Rockets to completely take Yao out of the game.  He would obliterate Dwight Howard head to head, but the likes of Al Harrington and Boris Diaw rendered him useless.

Like former teammate Tracy McGrady, Yao’s career ultimately boils down to a case of ‘too litte, too late.’  By the time Rockets management surrounded him with a capable supporting cast, his body had failed him.  In the ’05 and ’07 playoffs, with stars healthy, Houston relied on the likes of Ryan Bowen, David Wesley, and Luther Head to play major roles.  Had the team had even one of Aaron Brooks, Carl Landry, or Luis Scola–Daryl Morey signature acquisitions–one could see those teams easily advancing to the Finals.

The plan after surgery was to team Yao with a new star and retool the franchise with Yao still as its centerpiece but with a more balanced roster.  The team struck out last summer and Yao got hurt once again.  He has now announced his retirement.

Questions abound: might Yao have stayed healthy had he not faced the demands of playing basketball year-round?  The NBA was taxing enough on his 7’5 frame – we forget that due to his national obligations, his body never got a break.  But to that question, and many more, we will never know the answer.  What is clear though is that his jersey will likely hang from the rafters at Toyota Center, the #11 never to be worn again.  As one of the greatest ambassadors this sport has ever seen, his case for the Hall will be made.  Despite not having brought success, Yao will be remembered as this franchise’s third greatest center.

The page is now turned for the Rockets, a divorce from an era.  McGrady is gone, and now, so is Yao, with that faintest of hopes for a return completely smothered.  They will pick up the pieces, as they have been doing, and continue the quest for a new star and a new block upon which to build.  One thing is for certain: whoever he is, whoever our new savior may be, he will not be nearly as unique a figure as was Yao Ming.

click to enlarge

Assessing Ariza – Part 3

For context, be sure to check out the previous three installments of the series.

At the start, nothing from the numbers is too shocking.  Ariza won out in the per-game statistics due to playing thirteen more minutes per game than Lee.  Lee had far superior shooting percentages and a greater PER.  What struck me was that Ariza had a higher AST%, BLK%, STL%, and TRB%.  The AST% was particularly surprising in light of Lee having a higher USG%.

I think one could argue that from protecting the passing lanes to rebounding, Ariza does ‘other’ things better than Lee. But at almost $5million more, is that enough to override Lee’s superior shooting?  I don’t think so.  There are also the factors for comparison that don’t show up in the numbers that every one of us observed: attitude, willingness to play within the offense, and overall decisionmaking.  In each of the aforementioned three, Courtney Lee eclipsed Trevor Ariza.

In the next installment, I’ll look deeper into the numbers, using SynergySports’ database to assess how each player fared in particularized scenarios such as isolation scoring attempts and spot-up shooting.  This will give us a better understanding of how each man’s game fits in relation to the Rockets’ offense/needs.

For now, my evaluation stands as such:

1. I was wrong about Ariza being the perfect role-player for this team.  He was a disaster.
2. I was right about the signing itself.  It was a good signing in that he was easily traded and for actual value.
3. Courtney Lee for Trevor Ariza was a positive swap for the Houston Rockets.

In succeeding a future Hall-of-famer, Kevin McHale has big shoes to fill. Expectations will be high — Rick Adelman got the most out of his teams. But I’m confident about the staff. All indications are that McHale will be flanked by specialized strategists, allowing for a divvying up of the load. (With the glut of data available in today’s NBA, this ‘round-table’ approach is not only practical but perhaps even necessary if desiring to process information at optimal levels.)

There has been a sense that time is running out for the Rockets' superstar trio.

At 12-5 now, it’s tempting to panic, especially in light of last year’s torrid start.  But prudence must serve as the NBA grind is a marathon and not a sprint.  Artest, McGrady, and Yao are each a year older and several miles more worn after last summer’s push into June.  If keeping the veteran trio fresh for an encore foray to the Finals means a few more losses, so be it; the ultimate prize is the end goal and why this team was assembled must be kept in mind.

From the blogs to the papers, observers abundantly seem baffled at what has been an unexpected start.  The West’s defending champs should not be sitting 5th in the conference.  But for all that has gone wrong, there is cause to reflect on what has been right.  Ron Artest, it seems, is normal, seemingly having put his demons behind him, last night’s ejection notwithstanding.  For the many cases of microfracture sounding the death knell upon an athlete’s career, Tracy McGrady has enjoyed a rebirth of sorts, while not the high-flying acrobat of his younger days, still one of the league’s craftiest stars; McGrady’s duel with Paul Pierce in last June’s Game 6 was an epic which will not soon be forgotten and evidence that the vet is not to be dismissed.  And the early-career concerns over Yao Ming’s health now seem to have been entirely premature with the large man now having started in the team’s last 130 consecutive games.  Yes, Yao is as good as ever and the force that keeps this outfit hopeful and a safe pick for the ‘ship.  We knew we’d look back on ‘toe-gate’ one day and laugh.

This is still the league’s deepest team and perhaps it is reliance on that depth which has triggered the slow start; that is not a bad thing.  Point guard Aaron Brooks has reportedly removed the walking boot from his injured foot and is scheduled to return within the week.  Brooks’ emergence last season was popularly cited as a catalyst to the summer run with the lilliputian’s scoring serving as impeccable complement to McGrady’s playmaking prowess.  The loss of Brooks should not be overlooked.  Backup Kyle Lowry has looked sluggish, moving many to dub him overpaid, but back spasms are not a pleasant feeling.

Yet through injuries to their point men and slight wear on their superstar trio, through it all the power forwards have been the Rockets’ rock.  The duo combining for a season average of 26ppg and 14rpg, the Rockets have the highest positional PER in basketball by a whopping margin.  Backup Carl Landry attained cult-hero status with his Game 7 posterization of Kevin Garnett-evoking memories of Robert Horry’s Finals flush over Patrick Ewing–while Luis Scola held firm against the provocations of that same gadfly.  Yes, the irony of the Houston Rockets is that for the greatness of their hall-of-fame trio, the team’s strength stems from two unheralded pivotmen standing each at 6’9.

For all that has gone wrong, for the many doubts that have surfaced, the Houston Rockets have seemed a team of destiny at times.  With health, they can persevere.  In ’08, it seemed frighteningly possible that McGrady was finished.  With that hurdle cleared, the worst is behind the team, and anything can be realized.

Lowry, Landry, Brooks, and the enigmatic Von Wafer continue to grow and the wisdom of Battier seldom ceases to guide the way.  The Rockets’ is an assembly of talent most enviable in this league, with fresh legged youth able to carry the load through the rigors of the grind, overwhelming opponents with waves of pace, just in time to hand the torch to a 30-something hall-of-fame trio for the closing of the door in the waning moments.  The Rockets’ is an embarrassment of riches.  For the second straight year, one would be wise to not bet against them.

A typical criticism of Morey would go like this: “I guess he’s smart but I don’t know how far he can take this team because there’s more to basketball than just numbers.”

The critic imagines Morey plugging numbers into his laptop and then basing his decisions solely on the printout, to the neglect of all other considerations.  From Morey’s public comments (i.e.: he stated that the decision to draft Patrick Patterson was impacted by a feeling that he would fit with the team culture) and from common sense, we know that this just is not the case.

The same misunderstanding exists about the stat movement in general.  When met by numbers, the wary observer almost always retorts: “These numbers are useless.  There’s more to basketball than numbers…like chemistry!  Just watch the damn games!”

Morey isn’t ignoring notions of chemistry nor is he neglecting on-court observation.  He’s simply using stats to aid in the overall decision-making process.  Stats don’t supercede other considerations; they supplement.

If you’re buying a used car, you’ll take it for a test drive, but if you’re smart, you’ll do some other research too.  So why should it be any different in basketball?  If you base decisions solely on what you see, the eye can play tricks.  That’s how catastrophes like the Stromile Swift signing occur.

The numbers need not intimidate or give cause for embitterment.  They are simply a part of the greater process of diligence.  Following an era featuring such signings as the Kelvin Cato and Matt Maloney contracts, greater diligence can only be a good thing.

As we know, the four-team trade landed guard Courtney Lee with the Rockets, and as has been established in the past week, while limited in potential, he’s pretty good.  Why was it, or is it, so hard to believe that Daryl Morey simply liked Courtney Lee, regardless of his thoughts on Trevor Ariza?  We can see that the former is a great fit on this team.  Why is the trade taken as an indictment of the initial Ariza signing or an indication of regret?

Daryl Morey’s feelings about Courtney Lee do not bear definitive deductions about his opinion on Trevor Ariza.  It’s completely possible that Morey was perfectly content with Ariza, after his post-Martin transformation, but simply preferred Lee as a player.  Why is that so far-fetched?

In addition, it was propagated by most media outlets that the trade was simply a cost-cutting maneuver to assist the bottom line.  This one is even easier to debunk: the rumored trade for Carmelo Anthony would have required use of the traded player exception created from that swap.  The Rockets clearly intend to re-invest those savings.

When you trade a player, it doesn’t somehow mean that you regret the initial signing or that you no longer value the player.  The only definite conclusion that can be drawn is that you place a higher value upon the other player.  So why are so many assumptions projected upon the Ariza-Lee trade?  The Rockets may or may not have been dissatisfied with Trevor Ariza – we don’t know.  All we know for sure is that they valued Courtney Lee more.

Much has transpired since that last update.  With opening day closing in, I plan to compose a series of informal mini-essays in both assessment of our recent dealings and in response to some prevalent assumptions which have found their way into our conventional wisdom.

When I started this series, I was convinced there existed some staunch set of ideals which guided Morey’s philosophy.  ”Buy low, sell high; never pay market; avoid all long-term obligations.”  As we moved through February down toward our present day, it has become clear that this is not the case.  Morey is not an idealist and is distinct from Billy Beane; Morey has no managerial insistences.

The Rockets general manager is a realist guided simply by tenets of economic efficiency on a case-by-case basis.  ”What is the best route I can take in this instance to maximize production?”

Reports near the deadline unearthed that Morey indeed was willing to take back Samuel Dalembert [in an Iguodala trade], shattering one of my prior presumptions.  The team veered far above the tax line in re-signing free agents Luis Scola and Kyle Lowry, and nearly broke the bank with its acquisition of aging center Brad Miller, a move many would have deemed unfathomable just months before.  They’ve gone “all in” and I never thought that that would be the case.

Also unclear is whether there is a set course for the franchise.  The team has retained, and signed, veterans at or above 30, but was also heavily rumored to be in pursuit of Ricky Rubio and Demarcus Cousins, acquisitions which would surely have indicated the onset of rebuilding.  Most teams forcibly dismantle, trading productive vets because it seems like the logical course; in Houston, is there just a belief that “we’ll bide our time competing until an opportunity to get younger appears and then we’ll re-evaluate”?

And what of the ‘buy low, sell high’ theory of trade?  The team cashed in on forward Carl Landry, but took the opposite course with Scola.  In fact, Morey apparently did try to sell high on Scola, dangling him in deals for Amare Stoudemire and Chris Bosh before turning around and inking him to a new deal.  Evaluate each case on an independent basis, respective of present circumstances.

Finally, and perhaps most curiously, is Morey even completely wedded to quantitative analytics?  By most accounts, Carmelo Anthony is amongst the least efficient ‘stars’ in the league, yet the most reputable of sources all reported the MIT grad to have interest in a trade.

What we’ve learned since we last left off is that in regards to personnel management, there is really no set policy. The sole consideration is to simply not waste money.  Don’t pay Ariza $6million when Lee comes at 2. Get the most bang for your buck through independent evaluation of each event.

As I’ve maintained for some time, the team is in a rather precarious position.  It would come as no surprise were they to capture the #2 seed, yet at the same time, they could just as easily return to the lottery.

On the basis of my preseason rubric, I graded the 2009-2010 campaign as a resounding success.  Through its resolve in maintaining competitiveness without Yao and with the midseason trade, the team at least gave itself a glimmer of hope for future contention.

Loyalists of this page are familiar with my evaluatory philosophy: I don’t grade success off the strength of arbitrarily determined win totals or conference seedings.  My lens is fashioned upon the ultimate prize.  Did what transpired this season push this team closer to a title?  To that end, perhaps counterintuitively, a 32 win finish seeing substantial development from younger prospects is preferrable to a 43 win campaign off the strength of aging vets. In isolation from extrinsic factors, win totals in and of themselves hold no inherent value.

The Method

To determine our evaluatory process, we must build backwards from our end goal.  As has been established historically and accepted within our body of collective wisdom, championship teams are classified into two personnel models: a) the ‘star’ model and b) the ‘Detroit’ model, the latter coined in homage to the two Detroit Pistons title teams (the two-peat and 2004 title).

As currently composed, this manifestation of the Rockets does not fit within either personnel model.  Our objective is to identify the factors necessary to forge this team into either cast.  Satisfaction of these factors, or goals, rather than arbitrary win totals, is what will constitute success for the 2010-2011 Houston Rockets.

Where We Stand

After a half-decade of futility adhering to the ‘star’-based model, the Rockets now find themselves without a ‘star’ (or, more appropriately, the hope of someone recovering to ‘star’ form), and worse, in a dry market bereft of the commodity.  While the roster is rich in young talent, the team boasts no blue-chip high growth prospects, and thus, barring some unforeseen development–I’ll name the blog after Morey if we got Chris Paul–management must resign itself to building through the ‘Detroit’ model.

A team lacking one lone man who can carry it upon his back must overwhelm its opponents with waves of talent, chemistry, and robust philosophy.  On the two latter elements, the Rockets’ stuff would seem to suffice.  But do they have the talent?

The degree of potency of the Detroit lineup is not quite truly appreciated. (We’ll exclude the Thomas-Dumars Pistons for purposes of this assessment due to the age barrier.)  Their’s was a lineup replete with All-Stars at every position. Unless Chase Budinger morphs into Tom Chambers overnight, Wallace-Prince-Wallace-Hamilton-Billups is a lineup undoubtedly superior to that of Scola-Battier-Yao-Martin-Brooks.

The Factors

What must occur for the Rockets to bridge the gap?

1.  Of primary concern is the health of the giant.  With the cap-killing extensions and acquisition of Scola, Lowry, Miller, the Rockets have rid themselves of an exit strategy and placed all proverbial eggs within the Yao basket.  If the 7’6 center cannot adequately recover, these writings lose relevance – Yao cannot be traded nor would his retirement/relinquishment emancipate salary obligations sufficient for significant acquisitions under the cap.

2.  The team must regain its defensive identity.  Daryl Morey has opined that both a top 10 defense and offense are necessary statistical prerequisites for title contention.  The team will most likely never return to its previous perch atop the rankings–the current personnel, with guard Kevin Martin in the stead of Ron Artest, is not conducive to such prowess–but they can become acceptable, a far cry from last season’s output.

The three factors necessary for defensive stringency are a) a robust team philosophy (and corresponding adherence) b) cohesiveness through familiarity and c) interior defense.

Through injury and personnel turnover, the Rockets were lacking on the two latter counts last season.  With the return of Yao–one of the best goalees in basketball–and the addition of legitimate size in Brad Miller, the team should recover some of its interior defense, dependent on Yao’s health/mobility.

The team has an entrenched philosophy, but observers have noted that the further this franchise is chronologically removed from the Van Gundy era, the less that regime’s predominant “culture” is retained.  These young acquisitions will gain team familiarity with time, but only Yao Ming, Shane Battier, and Chuck Hayes had the notion that defense held preponderance over sleep and food ingrained within their psyches.  Whether this team can restore some of that stuff is a troubling concern.

The good news–and I am of the minority opinion here–is that I do think Kevin Martin and Aaron Brooks can suffice defensively as a championship backcourt.  Perimeter defense is simply a function of effort and interior help.

3.  Some value must be procured from the 2011 Knicks pick: I wrote last season that one of the governing determinants of last season’s success would be abstracting value from Tracy McGrady’s corpse, either through his recovery to 2008 form or through return in his trade.

Similarly, for this team to inch closer to true contender status, they must convert upon the first Knicks pick, either through trade or via a fortuitous lottery ranking.  Holding onto the pick is a gamble which I feel Daryl Morey will not deem worthy of undertaking.  If the Knicks’ pick ends up in the mid-teens, (and some other significant trade is not made through utilization of the other assets), I will grade this season as not successful.

Simply put, this club, as currently composed, does not have the talent to contend.  The trio of Jordan Hill, Patrick Patterson, and Chase Budinger hold promise for development, but none wield franchise-altering potential.

Some upgrade, somewhere, will be needed for the Yao Ming Rockets to challenge for the throne.  With their impressive depth, and a Yao resurgence, I do not think the Detroit model is too far off.  An Iguodala acquisition would strengthen their core unit offensively while retaining the defense lost from supplanting Battier.  While they would not be favored over the Lakers, such a team, I feel, could at least pose as a notable challenger.

The bottom line is that this team must upgrade its talent base to seriously contend.  Yao could regain his former dominance, the defense could be plugged, but if even winning 50 games, the team will not have positioned itself for true contention without obtaining additional firepower to compete with the elite.

Potpourri

• Guards Aaron Brooks and Kevin Martin may constitute the most difficult backcourt in basketball to defend. How will the presence of Yao Ming impact their production?
• Between forwards Patrick Patterson and Jordan Hill, upon whom do the Rockets place more value?  The latter holds more potential with his impressive measurements and athleticism, but Patterson is the safer choice for a quality career.
• Of similar analogizing, the team improved itself this summer with the swap of Trevor Ariza and Courtney Lee.  Ariza made the Rockets’ lineup more potentially dynamic, but the steady Lee is a better fit for a team which prided itself upon a conservative approach.  With Yao Ming returning to plug the middle, management may no longer have placed value upon Trevor’s fastbreak inducing gambles, desiring players to stay home as they had in the past.
• One absurd notion I’ve seen propagated in the media was that the Ariza trade was a salary dump and an admission of mistake.  Morey’s attempts at acquiring Carmelo Anthony (a maneuver which would require the TPE) should debunk this assumption and Lee’s play–and Kyle Lowry-esque oncourt impact–should speak for itself.  Trading A for B, when you actually prefer B and B comes at a cheaper price, doesn’t and shouldn’t necessarily mean you regret signing A.
• Forward Chase Budinger is the wild-card and I’m of the opinion that the Arizona standout is primed for a breakout campaign.  He’s tailor-made for the offense with discipline and composure beyond his years, but can he supply enough defense to justify removing Shane Battier from the lineup?  For what it’s worth, until he’s eventually traded or retires, I don’t think Shane will ever be sent to the bench: he’s the lettuce that makes this team work and fuels its overachievement.

Final Thoughts

The Houston Rockets are at a crossroads, a phrase used in reference to this team for far too many years.  They escaped a plunge into the abyss of irrelevance just last season through the deadline deal – a trade that gave them life and breath for future hope, in concert with their on-court overachievement.  Can they now take that next step towards greater relevance?

The team finds itself standing at a precipice, perhaps a mere trade away from glory, yet a botched recovery removed from eternal mediocrity.  They could finish second or send guard Aaron Brooks back to New York for the draft lottery.

Wins are not a determinative measure of success.  In assessing the Houston Rockets’ progress through the 2010-2011 season, the objective observer must inwardly inquire, “did this team position itself for contention in the proximate future?”

I felt it necessary to review that earlier post before delving into our projections for this upcoming year.

Some key points:

This current season epitomizes the sports equivalent of ‘Limbo.’ We’re essentially awaiting some later triggering event, whether it be a blockbuster trade, or the return of Yao, and we have no real room for tangible collective improvement. So I must ask myself, “what exactly am I looking for this season?” Wins and losses are not a proper measuring stick for this team, and depending upon your perspective, the former could even be detrimental in the grand scheme (though I do not necessarily feel that way.)

To that end, we got our ‘triggering event’ in the form of the deadline deal for Kevin Martin.

Most of you seem to care primarily about Aaron’s playmaking and point guard skills. That is not what I will be observing at all. If he finally learns to run the offense, that will be gravy, but the most important aspect to this season is Aaron Brooks’ improvement as a scorer. Simply put, he has to become a legitimate 18-20 point scorer. If that doesn’t happen, there will probably have to be some sort of further transaction down the line.

Here’s why: When Yao Ming returns, and if Tracy McGrady is retained, this team will still be in need of additional firepower. They have been in search of the elusive ‘third star’ for 6 years now, and that need will be even more greatly heightened in Yao and McGrady’s declined physical conditions. If the plan is to bring back McGrady, then Aaron Brooks needs to make the jump to consistent scoring option for this team to realistically contend in 2010-2011. At an ideal, best case scenario, you will see McGrady recovering to his 2007 form and compensating for Aaron’s weaknesses with his superior playmaking skills. In turn, Brooks can thrive off the defensive attention thrown at McGrady and the relinquishment of actual point guard duties. In theory, I think these two players’ skillsets complement each other beautifully while their strengths compensate for their respective weaknesses. They could really flourish together in the backcourt, but they each have to take the next step. That means staying healthy and staying focused for McGrady and developing as a pure scorer for Aaron Brooks.

It’s interesting to look back at my thought process here in hindsight.  My assumption at the time (and I would recommend reading the accompanying paragraphs for context) was that McGrady would return long-term, for no other reason than that it was unlikely we could find a favorable trade.  Given his passing prowess, it was critical that Aaron make the jump as a legitimate scorer.

I should add that in retrospect, I’m embarrassed by my use of the primitive ppg metric as something of any value.

In any event, what I am watching for with T-Mac is just getting something out of his salary slot, whether that be production from him or new pieces through a trade. The goal should be to have full confidence in the backcourt heading into 2010-2011 on the basis of what was done/observed this year. If Yao Ming is back, we can’t waste the precious few years he has remaining.

Mission accomplished.

If we are fortunate enough to find a good deal for McGrady, then that obviously will set off a domino effect the nature of which, due to its unpredictability, there is no point in discussing at this time.

I concluded in that post that the development of Aaron Brooks was the central concern for that season.  I sporadically made mention of a possible McGrady trade, deeming it so improbable so as to not be worthy of discussion.  It really speaks volumes about what Daryl Morey was able to accomplish with that deadline deal and lends support to the faith held by so many in his ability to strike gold once more before this February.

Reviewing that post, from all angles, it’s simple to see that for the Houston Rockets, last season was a complete success.  If assessing through my original lens of a McGrady rejuvenation, Aaron Brooks’ emergence satisfied the test.  If applying the grander test of a franchise-saving McGrady swap, management exceeded all expectations.

Through the trade, Morey did push the ‘triggering event’ which I spoke of, pushing his team back into the right direction.  What we now await is the final domino in the chain in our quest for contention.

While primitive and unadjusted, these measures, in combination with observation, allow us to confidently posit that the presence of Kevin Martin significantly impacts the production of Trevor Ariza.

In addition, because Ariza’s 3pt% remained roughly the same, we can attribute the improved production to, rather than open looks on the perimeter, a shift in the manner in which he took his 2’s.

With the season over, it would now be appropriate to revisit my earlier assertions regarding Ariza, originally made in Part 1, then reaffirmed in Part 2:

Will never become a go-to player on a good team

The belief by many fans prior to the season that Ariza could become a go-to player for the Rockets was so preposterous that it was beyond maddening.  I don’t think I need to spend any more time here re-establishing my assertion.  Anyone who has watched more than two games all year can recognize that Trevor Ariza is not a go-to player.  He can’t create.  Without that, it can’t be done.

Prior to the season, fans and media alike mistakenly believed that Trevor Ariza could simply run offseason drills, and, with more touches, blossom into a go-to option.  As I had explained, it’s not that simple.

Somewhere along the line, the notion that Rockets management actually signed Ariza to fill such a role became imbued within the collective wisdom of broadcast crews across the nation.  For a front office which likely conducts adjustments for even variables such as tightness of jock-strap, it’s far-fetched to think the Rockets weren’t aware of Trevor’s limitations.

Given Daryl Morey’s comments that Ariza’s defense alone justified his salary, in combination with the distinct change in the latter’s role upon the acquisition of Kevin Martin, it’s pretty safe to conclude that Trevor’s first half usage as a playmaker was simply heuristic and not intended as part of the team’s long term plan.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5TIVwiEbYLc

In an addendum to Part 1, I tried to explain the difference between creating and slashing.

The clip shows instances of Ariza attempting to create off the dribble.  See how after receiving the pass, he has no advantage over his defender and the two men are squared up?  Because the offensive situation has not presented any advantage, Ariza has to try and create a situation.  That is creating – making something when nothing is there, either for oneself or for others.

Skilled guards, in fact most starting guards, can get past their defender, using various counter-moves such as spins, stutter-steps, or crossover dribbles.  A skilled player does not need favorable defensive conditions to advance past his man.  A skilled player does not need to start from a position of advantage – he can create a situation for himself.

Because Ariza is so unskilled, in these isolation situations, he either attempts to use his speed, or if using a counter-move like other guards, turns it over.  If choosing the former option, because most NBA defenders can stay in front of their man unless crossed-over, Trevor is usually either cut off or forced into an awkward position.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gUhWujMSXzo

Trevor Ariza has other weaknesses which severely limit him as an offensive threat.  As seen in the clip, he has very poor body control which hinders him when finishing against contact.

More importantly, because Ariza always uses his speed when driving, rather than controlled skill, he gets tunnel vision, putting him in very awkward situations.

When skilled players drive to the basket, they maintain control and awareness of their surroundings, allowing them to recover if cut off.  Ariza goes full steam.  If cut off, since he can’t put on the breaks, he either flings up a prayer or awkwardly lofts out a bad pass back out to the perimeter.

It should be clear by now that Trevor Ariza does not have the tools be a go-to player.  On the year, he scored on only 33% of his isolation attempts.  While serving as the ball-handler in pick&roll situations, he scored only 29% of the time, and while posting up, he scored at only a 35% rate.

Perfect role player for this team

I still stand by this assertion.  My reason is because I was referring to the long-term big picture and Trevor’s role on a team with both Yao Ming and Tracy McGrady.

Ariza is struggling right now simply because he is not suited for his current role.  He’s just not skilled enough to have the responsibilities he currently has in this offense.

(At the same time, I don’t blame Rick for experimenting because this year is the only chance he will get for that.)

If Yao returns and another impact player is acquired, I do still think that Trevor can be a very productive role player for this team.  As I said earlier, Ariza is at his best when put in situations where he does not need to make decisions with the basketball.  If playing next to dominant offensive players, when the defense gives them heightened attention, Ariza can thrive by slashing to the hoop or spotting up.

If given the same amount of attention as his other four teammates and required to create on his own, as has been the case this year, Ariza is just not very good.  The results this year don’t exactly come as a shock.

As we saw, Trevor Ariza’s performance significantly improved after the trade for Kevin Martin.  This should not have come as a surprise.  As I had explained, because Martin can handle and create, his presence alters Ariza’s usage, allowing Trevor to slash, cut and play off the ball.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UR79z0FfC7w

The above clip illustrates slashing. See the difference with creating?

In those plays, when Ariza caught the ball, the defense was still rotating and was thus, off-balance.  In essence, the offensive situation provided Ariza with an advantage over his defender.

With his defender off-balance, he was able to catch, pump-fake if needed, and immediately make his move to the basket.  Unlike his problems against pressure, it didn’t matter that he was only using his speed/quickness because the defender was not set – counter-moves were not necessary.

In the first half of the year, because only Aaron Brooks could create, and none of our players regularly commanded double-teams, Trevor usually found himself facing a set defender upon receiving the ball.  But in the second half, with both Kevin Martin and Brooks doing the initial creating, forcing the defense to scramble, Ariza was able to catch and attack against off-balance defenders.

Slashing is where Trevor thrives because of his physical gifts.  We saw it last year with the Lakers.  With Yao likely to command double-teams next season, defenders will again need to rotate and help.  If they are slow to recover, Ariza can feast on their mistakes.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=okI8hKTGEPw

The clip illustrates a cut. The man moves without the ball and is fed near the basket.  Trevor’s length and athleticism make him a dangerous cutter in Rick Adelman’s offense.  In fact, Ariza scored on 66% of his cutting opportunities.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sO9KmtXrcRA

The above clip shows that Trevor is actually very comfortable bringing the ball up.  He has natural form, unlike someone such as, for example, Shane Battier.  I think that, combined with the slashing Ariza displayed in the ’09 playoffs, seeing Ariza’s natural comfort in handling against little to no pressure is what led so many to assume he could also create. But of course, it’s a different animal against tight pressure.

Still, the ability should not be dismissed.  Many NBA small forwards are not comfortable bringing the ball down the court.  Playing what is essentially a backcourt of two shooting guards in Aaron Brooks and Kevin Martin makes this ability of Trevor’s a boon because he can set the offense up if needed (not to be confused with creating for others) or, grab the rebound and take off in transition on his own.

This signing was a ’slam dunk’

Many have recently expressed their disappointment with the signing, stating that it was a blunder on Morey’s part.  I strongly disagree and still feel this was a very good signing.

We can all agree that Ariza has performed very poorly up to this point.  I personally think  his production will improve if/when the team personnel is upgraded (via Yao’s return or a trade), but let’s set even that aside.

Regardless of his actual production, this was a good signing simply because it gave the team another plus asset.  It doesn’t matter how poorly he performs – Ariza is just 24, earning just the league average, and has significant contributions to a title team on his resume.  He can easily be traded.

For his production, Trevor’s salary is great value.  At just 25 and due roughly $28million over the next four years, he is a plus-asset for potential trades.

Assessing Ariza

Trevor Ariza had a difficult first half, reflected in his mediocre eFG% (.460) and PER (13.3).  His overall USG% (21.2) underscores the peculiar nature of his first-half role.

USG% is an estimate of the % of plays used by a player while on the floor. See how Ariza compares to other swing-men. Click to enlarge.

But in the seven game stretch where he and Kevin Martin were both healthy and playing together in the starting lineup, when forced back into his natural role, we saw Ariza’s strengths on full display.

There is of course the contentious issue of his defense, something which will be the subject of a later installment.  But going forward, I feel validated in my earlier assertion that this was a great signing.

Sources:

• SynergySports
• Hoopshype
• Hoopdata

Yet it is a unique relationship forged with the Houston Rockets which makes them so intriguing.

The Rockets were the first NBA team to adopt the NBDL’s new “single affiliate partnership model,” an arrangement where a D-league team maintains responsibility of its business operations while one lone NBA franchise assumes complete control over all of its basketball decisions, from coaching, to offensive philosophy to even distribution of playing time.

Naturally, the partnership piqued my interest because of the parallels to a known practice of the Oakland Athletics.

**

In our email conversation, Sam Hinkie, Executive Vice President of Basketball Operations and head of basketball analytics for the Houston Rockets, explained the motivations behind the team’s investment:

We’ve been interested in minor league basketball for many years now. We spent a lot of time looking to create options to deeply evaluate more players and have a stronger hand in developing our own young players. But under the current rules, we wouldn’t actually own the NBA rights to those players in the NBDL. That puts a natural limit on the amount we wanted to invest, as the value of our work to identify and develop that talent is not guaranteed to accrue to the Rockets. So we looked for other alternatives to outright ownership that would meet our goals of broadening our basketball pipeline.

Indeed, the team truly is taking advantage of the arrangement to develop its players.  The Vipers run sets from Rick Adelman’s playbook, not only giving prospects a chance to acclimate to the big-league offense, but also providing the Rockets opportunity to test out new wrinkles in an environment with lesser stakes.

The relationship brings to mind the control the Oakland Athletics imposed upon their minor league affiliates.  A’s former general manager Sandy Alderson held a firm belief that “the organization as a whole functioned well only if it was uniformly disciplined.”  Thus, Alderson strictly enforced his unique beliefs on hitting, leaning on the organization’s minor league coaches whose teams were not walking enough.

To be clear, the Rockets’ is a gentler reign with the team maintaining awareness of the Vipers’ needs.  Still, the striking similarity is a cognizance of the value of uniformity.

In Moneyball, Michael Lewis goes on to describe how the Athletics’ organizational philosophy was ingrained into players.  To persuade them to be patient and to work the count and wait for the pitcher to make a mistake, the belief that strikeouts were not necessarily bad was drilled into their heads.

The Rockets had instituted their playbook.  But for an organization that so highly values the benefits of individual preparation, I wondered if, like the A’s, they stressed the importance of any specific individual practices at the lower levels.

Of the five players that spent time between both the Rockets and Vipers this year, Hinkie responded, delicately, that he would “hope those players saw many similarities in the larger philosophies and the way they prepare for a game,” adding that “they realize that the Rockets value similar things on both teams.”

**

In the Morey era, the Houston Rockets have been known to use purchased second round draft picks upon European talent, then stashing these players away abroad for further development.

While these prospects typically have higher ceilings than their American counterparts from that level of the draft, many have expensive buyout clauses and the investment does not pay dividends for some time.

Now having the ability to develop players in a controlled environment, with the option for immediate in-season call-up, would the new relationship with the Vipers shift the organization to prefer American players?

“Not really” responds Hinkie:

In the draft, we’re looking for who will be the best players over the long term. Any team that feels good about their ability or willingness to develop young players might have slightly more interest in acquiring young players in need of that development. But I think it’s a pretty small consideration overall compared to just evaluating who has the best chance to be a good player over time.

**

The Houston Rockets’ partnership with the Rio Grande Valley Vipers, the first of its kind, is just another example of the club’s attempts to optimize its use of its resources.

Much has been made of the experience young stars such as Aaron Brooks have gained in the D-league.  But it’s the subtle payoffs that are overlooked.

In a sport where mere possessions can mark the difference between winning and losing, a reserve’s increased familiarity and comfort on any given play could determine the outcome of any given game.  It’s for this reason that the Houston Rockets have sought yet another avenue to gain a competitive advantage.

JCF: I don’t know about you but I enjoyed the heck out of this season. True, it didn’t end the way we wanted it to but I loved watching our young players grow and, what’s more, there were so many compelling storylines to follow.

Of course, the biggest subplot coming into the season centered around Tracy McGrady: Would he be traded? For whom? Etc. It was all bittersweet in a way – the Rockets unquestionably received maximum value in dealing him to New York but it also closed the book on a player who helped author a handful of thrilling chapters, yet couldn’t quite bring Houston the happy ending we yearned for when he first arrived in Clutch City.

Rahat: Looking back to the time of that trade, there is not a present parallel to such a union. To fully grasp the extent of the excitement, one must place themselves in that moment, frozen in 2004. That Tracy McGrady was today’s Kevin Durant, a league savior of sorts, inimitable in talent, and peerless in potential.

And remember, Yao was still ripe with promise. No one knew the limits of what he could become.

For the pair, historic notoriety seemed almost inevitable.

JCF: Here’s the way I see it: Take a look around the league right now. So many teams have worked so hard to clear enough salary cap space to go after the mega free agents assumed to be on the market this summer. Now imagine the bedlam that would ensue if any club is able to convince Superstar A and Superstar B to come to its city. That would be pretty huge, right? And yet, for as titanic a pairing as that hypothetical duo might be, I’m still not quite sure the fervor generated would equal what Houstonians felt the day Tracy arrived. Given their productivity at the time and their respective ages – T-Mac was 25 and Yao just 24 – one could argue that the closest current comparison would be if a player like Carmelo Anthony were to join forces with Dwight Howard. Think about that for a minute and allow your mind to reflect upon the dreams such a combo would generate within the mind of a fan. Then and only then can you get a glimpse of what the people of Clutch City had in mind when McGrady uttered those fateful words, “I’m looking forward to something special happening here in Houston…”

Rahat: Even more depressing was that this was not just a match ‘in theory.’ Tracy McGrady and Yao Ming meshed beautifully and more importantly, they were fond of one another.

It amused me that the pundits’ charges of the duo’s purported on-court incompatibility only arose when one of the two was sidelined by injury. On the court, when both were healthy, Yao-Mac was a dream union. The pair simply needed help and that was the collective sentiment entering 2006.

JCF: It just goes to show how much timing, luck and circumstance dictate each and every one of our lives. It’s no different than any other relationship; just because you put two great people together it doesn’t mean they’re going to get married, have a pair of beautiful kids, buy a white picket-fenced house and live happily ever after. Life happens: familial stress; emotional baggage left behind from other failed relationships; health issues; dumb luck and dumber decisions. Any combination of those things can be powerful enough to infiltrate, infect and ultimately wreak havoc upon even the most seemingly sound of foundations.

On paper and in video games, the Rockets were the envy of the entire neighborhood. In real life, however, those tiny cracks and fissures forced our dream home to require some rather significant renovation.

Rahat: Many use McGrady’s failures as an indictment of the trade itself. But even in hindsight, you would pull the trigger again.

That Francis team had no room for growth. They were mired in mediocrity – the worst thing in sports.

It’s absurd to blast management for rolling the dice on a chance at greatness. It didn’t work out, but you can live with that – the best organizations dare to be great.

If a patient dies on the operating table, that doesn’t somehow render the decision for surgery ill-advised. It’s illogical to judge decisions on the basis of their end results.

JCF: Look, the Rockets rolled the dice on a top-5 player – top-10 at worst – who was at one point considered by some to be even better than Kobe Bryant. That’s a fact. Francis, even during his best years, was nowhere close to occupying that sort of rarefied air. In a league which practically requires you to have at least one top-10 player to be considered a relevant championship contender, the trade was a no-brainer, a slam dunk and a steal of a deal for Houston.

Speaking of steal of a deals, let’s fast forward to the present and reflect on the Rockets’ big trade deadline move this season.

Rahat: It was interesting to see how poorly McGrady played down the stretch with the Knicks. That really underscores the prudence in the decision to deal. Furthermore, with the revelation regarding the cap, New York probably didn’t need to give up Jordan Hill at all…

JCF: Well, to be perfectly honest, I always thought McGrady’s play and whatever he had left in the tank were irrelevant to that deal – both for the Rockets and for the Knicks. The time had come for a parting of ways here in Houston – and all the Knicks truly cared about was cap space anyway.

Rahat: For both managements, it was definitely irrelevant.

What I speak of is a prevailing sentiment within the Houston Rockets’ fanbase that perhaps the divorce was premature. I think those concerns have been completely erased.

JCF: That’s a great point. From a PR perspective, there’s no question that trade worked out well for Houston. But as for as the actual basketball component – which, let’s be honest, is the only thing that really matters in the big picture – I thought it was fascinating to watch Jordan Hill the last two months because it really hammered home how important he was as a key piece of that deal.

What did we talk about all year? The Rockets needed more size and athleticism up front and – voila! – Jordan Hill appears, all long limbs, gorilla dunks and bursting with potential.

Rahat: His production came as a huge surprise because most of the reports from New York seemed negative.

I would venture to say that the emergence of Jordan Hill was the most promising plotline of the Houston Rockets 2009-2010 campaign. At this point, for Jordan, I don’t see any barriers.

There is really no way that a 6’10 big, with plus-athleticism, and a track record of strong work ethic and desire for improvement, doesn’t evolve into a legitimate starting power forward at some point, especially considering the glimpses which we have already seen.

JCF: I agree. To me, the key is the work ethic. With those physical tools, anyone who is willing to bust their butt and learn from good coaching should be a lock to contribute in this league. It also makes one wonder why the Knicks gave up on him so quickly but there’s no need to turn this into a Big Apple bashing session. They only really care about one thing right now anyway.

So we agree on Jordan Hill. Let’s talk about the bigger prize – and biggest surprise – of that trade, Kevin Martin. What stood out to you while watching him the last two months?

Rahat: Martin was also a surprise. I hadn’t seen much of him prior to the trade and so, in retrospect, I feel the online scouting reports were a bit inaccurate, or at least, without much merit.

We were told he could shoot, and we were told he drew fouls. But the other subtleties of his game were entirely overlooked and therein lay his real value, in my opinion.

He is very fluid off the dribble, and more importantly, makes his moves quickly without holding the ball. Because these are traits also shared by Aaron Brooks, the Houston Rockets’ backcourt is extremely difficult to defend.

The relationship is fascinating because championship teams are typically built around the greatness of one individual. Daryl Morey probably recognizes that he cannot acquire a player worthy of this pedestal.

Rather than attempt to fit a square peg into a round hole with an unworthy individual, as is done by many teams, I think he wants to construct a team where the ‘superstar effect’ is manufactured through team synthesis. Other than Detroit in 2004, it’s never been done, but then again, much of Daryl Morey’s approach is unprecedented.

JCF: Hmmm, I don’t think I’d ever say that Daryl feels he’s unlikely to acquire a “pedestal” player. While he displays a tendency to publicly temper expectations, I also believe he has so much confidence in the hard work and overall creativity of his team that anything, even that which presents the longest of odds, is within the realm of possibility. To be sure, NBA history indicates that franchise players are far more frequently drafted, rather than acquired through other means. But I suspect Daryl and the rest of the Rockets’ Basketball Ops group view that as a mere inconvenience or challenge, not as a dead end. Until that day arrives, however, I do think you’re right: the construction of the quintessential “team” will continue.

To that end – and especially as it pertains to Brooks and Martin – I like the fact both players are so unselfish. They each have the ability to go off for 30 points in any given game but I don’t feel as if that’s something either one of them genuinely cares about. They’re not ball-stoppers; in fact, I was especially impressed with Kevin’s quick decision making the moment he receives the ball. He either makes his move, or moves the ball along right away.

So there’s no question that tandem makes the team very difficult to defend. But we also can’t ignore the other end of the floor – can they defend well enough to lift the team back into a top-10 unit, which was Morey’s mandate at his end of season press conference?

Rahat: Defensively, the team slipped noticeably this year, finishing 17th in defensive rating after being 4th last season. But I’m not too concerned. So much of defensive competence is predicated upon shot-blocking and overall familiarity. We had many new players this year so it is only natural that there would be a slip.

While we finished roughly the same in shot-blocking as we did last year, one can’t discount the intimidation affect of having a 7-6 giant planted in the paint.

In addition, for the most part, except for extremes on both ends of the spectrum, any quality NBA guard can get past his defender. It’s the help defense and rotations that make great defenses.

JCF: Very good point. Much like the term “shutdown corner” is a misnomer now in the NFL, I think the same is essentially true for the term “lockdown defender” in the NBA. These guys are just too quick and too skilled to be consistently contained one-on-one.

Team defense is really where it’s at, and at the core of nearly every great defensive team is a big man who can control the painted area. I’ve made this point several times in the last few months but it bears repeating: Look at the Orlando Magic – would you consider Jameer Nelson, Rashard lewis, Hedo Turkoglu or Vince Carter good defenders? I think most people would say no, while adding that each is merely average at best. Yet each of those guys has been part of the NBA’s best defensive team over the past two years.

Now Yao is not Dwight Howard, of course. But he is one of the game’s best rim protectors and there’s no question he will make a BIG difference as part of the team defensive concept. The question is, if Yao is only able to play limited minutes at the start of the season, how will that impact the Rockets’ D?

Rahat: There will need to be some other acquisition in the frontcourt, in my opinion, for this team to contend. I don’t see Yao playing more than 25 mg mpg right off the bat.

JCF: That’s certainly a legit possibility, though no one knows for sure what the exact timetable for bringing him along and easing him back in will be. So put yourself in Morey’s shoes then and take a look at the team’s current needs. What holes are you trying to fill via the draft (assuming the Rockets get the 14th overall pick) and free agency?

Rahat: Had you asked me this question last year, I would have said that the greatest need was playmaking from the perimeter. But the trade for Kevin Martin proved that the Rockets are, as I mentioned earlier, moving with a ‘team’ oriented approach, where no one player dominates the ball. In light of that, I feel that the team is completely set along the perimeter for the next half decade.

The greatest need is size up-front. They need a talent upgrade at the ‘4’ to realistically contend. Addressing that should be the primary focus. There is a premium on skilled ‘bigs’ in this league in that they aren’t quite so easy to acquire. The Rockets are in a position now where they have accumulated some assets to try and make a deal, either in the draft or other trade avenues.

JCF: No question, the addition of someone who could provide the team with size, length, athleticism, shot-blocking and rebounding skills would be a major coup for the team. Of course, I just listed the exact attributes and characteristics every club in the league lusts after in its big men which, to your point, is precisely why quality front-court players are also so difficult and expensive to acquire. On the bright side, however, is the fact that this is shaping up to be a draft rich in bigs bursting with potential and given Morey’s reputation for unearthing gems, you have to like the Rockets’ chances of finding a key contributor whether they decide to stay put in the draft, or move forward or back.

One other note: I’d also like to see the team pursue another playmaker on the wings. Quite frankly, I don’t think you can ever have enough of those guys – players who can create for both themselves and their teammates – and though you’re right to say Houston has a solid stable of players manning those positions right now, I’d still welcome the opportunity to bring another one into the fold. The NBA is increasingly a guard’s game – just look at the way point guards have impacted the postseason thus far – and, as far as I’m concerned, the more perimeter threats you possess who can dictate tempo and conjure big plays come crunch time, the better.

In terms of fit, I also think it’s worth mentioning how desirable Houston is as an NBA location. Just off the top of my head, here’s a quick list of the top things the Rockets have going for them right now:

1.) The roster is loaded with a ton of young talent either in its prime or still blooming. As Daryl has pointed out, this year’s Rockets were the best team ever without an All-Star. Now people can quibble with the specifics of that claim all they want but the core element is true either way: this team has one heck of a supporting cast in place AND it’s getting back Yao Ming.

2.) Speaking of whom, while Houston might not rank with NYC in terms of American exposure, the Yao effect means you’ve got 1 billion ready-made die-hards in China ready to worship the ground you tread.

3.) There is a Hall of Fame level coach at the helm.

4.) There is one of the top GMs in the NBA with a proven track record of making sound, creative decisions in order to give the team a chance to win both now and in the future.

In other words, if you want to win both now and in the future, Houston has to be at or near the top of the list of the most attractive NBA options.

OK, that’s it for my impromptu travel brochure extolling the benefits of playing in Houston. I want to touch on something else now. I know you’ve been a bit harsh on last summer’s free agent signing Trevor Ariza. But I’ve also noticed that your thoughts on Trevor’s game seem to have shifted somewhat since the trade, correct?

Rahat: Yes and no.

What was interesting was that when I would skim through discussions about my pieces on Ariza, where they had been cited online, the conclusion was seemingly, primarily from Laker fans, that “the Rockets/Rockets fans sure do regret the signing.”

That was frustrating because I have maintained all along, despite my criticism of his play, that it was a great signing – I knew that the organization had expectations different to those which were being attributed.

Now, through the emotional subjectivity that accompanies also being a fan of this team, it was tough to see Trevor masquerading as a playmaker, and thus, I certainly did do my fair share of venting my frustrations. But it was also understood that the nature of this season dictated player experimentation and that the role was delegated partly out of necessity and not cemented in the team’s long term vision.

I thought that we would really see Trevor at his true worth upon the return of Yao and McGrady because their presence would allow him to play his natural role. Of course, those two did not return, but we saw that the addition of Kevin Martin, through forcing down his usage, really enabled Ariza to play to his strengths, filling the lanes and slashing to the hoop.

With Trevor’s much improved play down the stretch, I feel the Houston Rockets have one of the most enviable perimeter trios in basketball.

JCF: I don’t think there’s any question Martin’s arrival had a profound positive impact on Ariza and I also believe there was definite value to be gained by allowing him to experience all he did this season. Trevor, his teammates and the coaching staff got a better feel for what he could do and what he couldn’t – and that’s not insignificant. The Rockets gave Ariza an opportunity to expand upon his usual role somewhat this season – in part, due to necessity – and I think the successes and failures Trevor experienced will only help him going forward.

I liken it to a young quarterback making the leap from college to the pros. The reads must be made quicker, despite the fact they’re also exponentially more complex. There are going to be moments when you just look flat-out bad because your brain and body haven’t caught up to the massive increase in degree of difficulty. But eventually things start to slow down as you and your offensive coordinator figure out your strengths, weaknesses and how to best tailor the offense around your particular skillset.

Now in this case, perhaps quarterback isn’t the proper comparison because Trevor won’t be asked to QB Houston’s offense. Perhaps it would be more accurate to describe him as a deep-threat wide receiver; not someone you go to every down but a guy capable of providing a big play at any time.

Either way, his baptism by fire this year was almost akin to asking that WR to play a little QB and I think that’s why we saw several awkward moments. But especially toward the tail end of the season, it appeared that Trevor and the coaching staff were gaining the benefits of those growing pains and we were seeing more and more of the player Houston coveted last summer

Rahat: So let’s say that no big trades or signings are made. Just bringing back Yao, is this team a contender?

JCF: To me, that was one of the more interesting revelations, if you want to call it that, from Daryl’s end-of-season press conference. He essentially said the team probably needs to add at least one more significant piece besides Yao in order to be a true title contender but that he believes they’ll still be a very good team if Yao is their only major summer addition.

I happen to agree with him, by the way. I mean, you’re adding Yao and a lottery pick in a deep draft to a team that won 42 games this season. I’d say that team can expect to experience a big improvement.

But, and I know I wandered here, here’s the truly interesting part about what Daryl said: He mentioned how he feels some teams make mistakes by trying to force a big splash in the summer, thereby limiting their flexibility to make moves in-season. I heard that and was immediately intrigued.

I don’t view that statement as Daryl hedging his bets or attempting to temper fans’ expectations. I see it as a classic example of this regime’s mentality: They are always going to be aggressive in trying to make significant moves to make this team a title contender. But they’re also not going to be forced into potentially making poor decisions simply based on someone else’s timetable. If the opportunity exists to make a big splash this summer, they’ll do it. If not, Daryl and Co. feel supremely confident they’ll be able to pull the trigger on something bigger and better at a later date

Rahat: It’s extremely frustrating that so many still don’t quite grasp the brilliance behind Daryl Morey’s machinations. He just waits…and then takes all the chips.

But when he doesn’t pounce immediately, the village idiots commence the chorus that he “can’t make the big move.”

I feel that with a healthy Yao, this team is on par with the rest of the West’s best, sans LA. They just need one more move.

JCF: No question, this is going to be a fascinating summer. As I said off the top, I’ve thoroughly enjoyed watching the way this team has undergone its rather extreme makeover. Of course, the often maddening aspect we haven’t touched on yet is that one of the necessary ingredients for championship success is luck. Bringing this conversation full circle, the Tracy and Yao days didn’t have luck on their side. Let’s hope these next-generation Rockets do.

The available data really underscores why Chris Bosh would be such a great fit with the Houston Rockets.

As a measuring stick, I used the numbers on Luis Scola because I felt he served as the comparison most conducive to conceptualization.

In 170 instances as the ‘roll man’ in pick&roll situations, Luis Scola shot 46%, scoring 47% of the time this past season.

By comparison, in 187 occurrences, Bosh shot 64%, scoring 63% of the time.

Anyone familiar with the personnel of this Houston Rockets team can easily imagine how such potency in the pick&roll could come as a boon.  Having a ‘roll man’ as dangerous as Bosh would make this backcourt even deadlier as both Aaron Brooks and Kevin Martin can already pull-up and create off the dribble.

But with Bosh, you wouldn’t exactly be sacrificing interior scoring.  The 6’10 forward shot 53% on his 548 post-ups, scoring on 55% of these occasions.

By comparison, Scola shot 49%, scoring 46% of the time during his 375 attempts.

But what about the other end of the floor?  Defense at the ‘4’ spot is imperative against the Western Conference’s powerhouses.  Chuck Hayes has been lock-down in shutting down opponents, but to win a title, the team cannot rely on his presence beyond situational circumstances.  To win without a superstar, all five players must be capable/potent scorers.

In post-up situations, Luis Scola’s man scored on 54% of the occasions, shooting 55% on these attempts.  Against Bosh, on the other hand, opponents shot 43%, scoring on 43% of the attempts.

There’s a small minority that still believes this team would be best served standing pat with Luis Scola at the ‘4’.  While Scola is a fine player, Chris Bosh he is not.

For many more reasons than just those outlined above, Chris Bosh will be worth every penny of the $16million he will earn next season and worth every last asset it would require the Houston Rockets to relinquish in a pursuit through trade.

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This post is Part 2 of ‘Yao Ming’.

Yao Ming is victim to the most unrealistic of expectations.

As the league’s “best offensive center”—a title holding more rhetorical impact than actual significance—it is concluded he should be capable of carrying a team by his lonesome.  In light of his weaknesses, such an assumption is wholly impractical.

First, Yao is a poor passer and prone to turnovers.  He does not read defenses well and is slow to react against double teams, often stripped by guards from the weakside.  Based on a few spectacular passes his rookie year, it was believed that Yao would blossom into an elite passing big man.  It has not happened.

In addition, despite his magnificent touch, Yao is also a poor shooter outside of the paint.  The team attempted to position him at the high post, like other Adelman 5’s, to start the ’08 season, and the results were disastrous.

Most troubling of all, though, is that Yao is easily neutralized.  He struggles mightily in the pick and roll and does not fare well against smaller centers.

If fronted, Yao is completely taken out of games.  Under normal circumstances, teams can counter a fronting defense by lobbing the ball over the top of the defender.  However, due to Yao’s slow reaction time and poor hands, he is incapable of gathering himself off the high catch, leaving him prone to weak-side blocks.

Yao can also be fronted by just one player.  As Jeff Van Gundy noted during the broadcast of one playoff game last spring, it is not necessary to sandwich Yao with two players as was done by the Blazers throughout the series.  I would argue that it was this faulty strategy that lost Portland the series.

**

So this naturally begs the question, if flawed and not truly a franchise player, is Yao worth the max?

In Part 2 of the ‘Discerning Morey’s Philosophy’ series, I had argued that the club should have looked to trade the big man in years past, prior to this latest injury.  However, going forward, the team stands nothing to gain from cutting its ties.

Yao has always fared well against Lakers center Andrew Bynum.

In his current state, Yao’s trade value pales in comparison to his potential real value.

Keeping him (and risking further injury) is justified by the mere possibility of what he could provide in the postseason, if healthy.  In the next few years, any title will undoubtedly have to come through the Los Angeles Lakers.  A healthy Yao would help counter Lakers center Andrew Bynum, forcing him to the bench or rendering him ineffective, making L.A.’s twin-center attack much more manageable to contain.

In addition, for whatever reason, the upper echelon teams in our league typically avoid fronting, preferring more conventional defenses.  Having a low post option such as Yao in the playoffs would be a serious boon.

Letting him walk in free agency would also serve little purpose.  Assuming this summer transpires as expected, renouncing Yao in 2011 would not push the club far enough under the cap to make a splash in free agency.¹  (Yao will undoubtedly exercise his player option this summer.²  If still hurt by the summer of 2011, the issue of re-signing him will be a moot point.)

Finally, the business partnerships enabled by Yao’s presence on the roster allow owner Les Alexander to exceed the luxury tax threshold–as he has announced he will do next year–and to also purchase draft picks as he has done every summer.

Thus, we can conclude that there is probably no better use of the cap space allotted to Yao Ming.

The discussion should be about maximizing the return on and protecting him.  If they are going to pay Yao Ming, the Rockets must have him healthy and effective.  They cannot succeed with idle salary.

Going forward, Yao’s playing time absolutely must be reduced.  His feet can no longer take the pounding of prolonged minutes.  Moreover, rather than as a hub, he must be used as a weapon, milked repeatedly against favorable matchups, but sat when ineffective.

Reducing Yao’s minutes would have the added benefit of forcing the team to diversify its attack.  One of the Rockets’ biggest problems last season was their total dependence upon Yao.  The team would force-feed the post and predictably, the offense would stagnate, grinding to a halt.  When he was shut down, everything would unravel.  And far too often, Yao was shut down.

That leads us to the silver lining in this season:  Yao’s absence has enabled the development of some critical elements.  Aaron Brooks has grown into a lethal scoring threat.  The void in the post allowed Carl Landry to blossom to the point of having trade value sufficient to land Kevin Martin, a legit scorer, Jordan Hill, a mobile ‘big’ who could potentially cover some of Yao’s weaknesses, and two draft picks that could bring in even more help via a trade.  Mediocrity will also bring the team’s highest draft pick since Rudy Gay.

**

For nearly a decade, Yao Ming has been the face of the Houston Rockets.  Throughout his time, the organization has been unwavering in its support.  Steve Francis was traded in some part due to his inability to share the ball with Yao; Tracy McGrady after assuming the lion’s share of the blame for the duo’s failures.  When he returns next winter, it will be the third era during Yao’s tenure of which he will be the centerpiece.

At age 30, for Yao, time is running out.  But there remains hope for a happy ending.  Cavaliers center Zydrunas Ilgauskus underwent the same reconstructive surgery and returned for a long and productive career.  The same can happen for Yao.

While he may return to a diminished role, Yao remains the key to the team’s future success.  He is still the foundation; the backbone; the anchor of their trademark defense.  Time will tell how Yao’s story ends.  After this latest setback, most would have hung it up; called it a career.  But Yao had the valor to undergo yet another grueling rehabilitation.    After what he had already overcome, it only made sense to return and try again.

1. A forecast of the team’s cap situation in 2011 is dependent upon a plethora of variables ranging from potential trades, free agent signings via use of the exceptions, the re-signed salary figures for Aaron Brooks, Kyle Lowry, and Luis Scola, and the final projection for that year’s salary cap.  Renouncing Yao in 2011 could put the team below the cap, but not far enough under to pursue a max level free agent.  If Yao’s presence enables ownership to exceed the luxury tax threshold, it would be a better course of action to re-sign him and make further expenditures (via trade/MLE/sign&trade) than to cut ties and sign someone to a modest deal with the money available.
2. Yao has long been expected to exercise his player option this summer.  However, The Houston Chronicle reported on March 29, 2010 that because the next collective bargaining agreement is expected to reduce the number of years and value of a maximum contract, there is a slight chance that Yao might seek to opt out from his deal this summer and ink a new one under the current rules.  With that said, even if Yao were to opt out and not be re-signed, the team would still not be far enough under the cap to pursue a max level free agent, unless gutting the entire roster.  We can see that moving forward, there is really no scenario in which completely renouncing ties with Yao Ming would serve any purpose for the organization.

In six seasons with the Houston Rockets, Tracy McGrady averaged 19.2ppg. In his four healthy years with the team, he put up 24.1ppg, peaking out at 25.7ppg in 2004-2005.

McGrady is unfulfillment personified, the most uniquely gifted player this league has ever seen, but likely to be remembered as the biggest “loser” in its history.

He not only had the vision and length that Jordan and Kobe didn’t, but also the fine footwork that Lebron has still yet to develop.  At 6’8, with a handle matched only by the league’s point-men, and raw springs bestowed from the heavens, McGrady possessed a tantalizing mix of gifts and painstakingly developed talents that should have ensured a place among the league’s legends.

But ultimately, his legacy will be as history’s biggest loser.  The 90’s quartet of Stockton, Malone, Ewing, and Barkley became infamous for their inability to capture the throne, the punchlines of much derision; in our era, T-Mac has not even passed the first round.

But to appraise a man’s worth by such simplistic calculus is a grave injustice.

It is true that McGrady could have done more – he refused to drive in the final seven minutes of Game 7 in ’07 with the Jazz in the penalty; he disappeared completely in the deciding 3^rd quarter of Game 6 against Utah in ’08, deferring to an aging—and hopelessly ineffective–Bobby Jackson; and he missed almost 2/3 of his shots in Game 7 against the Mavericks in ’05.  Yes, there was much he could have done – I completely concede he wasn’t perfect.  But the stigma still is unfair.

The presumption we hold that our deified heroes should persevere over all, circumstances be damned–and that failure is reflective of some tragic flaw—is simply too Pollyannaish.  One could say that McGrady didn’t have killer instinct but it must be considered that it takes a toll carrying an overmatched team by oneself through an entire playoff series.  Even Jordan never succeeded at this task (in the years before Pippen) but the fact that he probably later could have should not serve as indictment upon McGrady.  And why are Kobe’s failures prior to the arrival of Gasol so readily overlooked?

In the case of McGrady, we make no effort to uphold the truth because while he deserves it, his very nature impedes our conveyance of sympathy.  He just finds a way to invite criticism.  His propensity to explicitly verbalize things already implicitly acknowledged does the utmost damage to his cause.  Dwyane Wade never tells reporters he doesn’t have help.

But for historical integrity, it is our duty to look back on what McGrady did do for this team.  Really, he carried it until his body simply no longer would allow the feat.  There were nights when he was all the Houston Rockets had, a depleted roster in tow, and Yao still not having mastered the ability to not foul.  Yet still, there they were, always winning 50 games on the strength of a suffocating defense and the passes fulgurating out of McGrady’s right arm.

In eulogy, we immortalize 13 in 33 as his greatest moment, but really that only serves to reduce his contributions to ephemeral paranormality.  What he meant for this franchise was so much more than that half-minute brush with God.

In ’05, he was arguably the best player in our conference, guiding the team on a torrid pace after a lackluster start.  And later that year against Dallas, we viewed greatness through the tragic lens, watching all that it took him to merely keep us in games.  McGrady did not only score, but he set up every play, guarded Nowitzki because no one else stood a chance, and even brought the ball up himself when our guards proved incapable of even that.  The few minutes he would rest to catch his breath, all would collapse.

His finest hour was undoubtedly The Streak, the achievement of which was breathtaking to witness.  It wasn’t the classical bamboozlement we have come to associate with such prolonged dominance in sports.  It was perfection at the margins, emotional exhaustion at its very apex.  With just one botched rotation, one surrendered offensive board, all that had been built would have come crumbling.  And there was Tracy at the start of every play, palming the ball in his right hand, the head of the monster, 48 minutes every night.

Tracy McGrady did more with less than did Kobe, but the latter will forever be immortalized for his accomplishments upon privilege.  The McGrady tragedy is that once the cavalry did arrive, his body had completely failed him.  His regression from the age of 25 to 30 was more painful to witness than was Hakeem’s from 32 to 37.  Once a graceful gazelle, towards the end of his tenure, McGrady could barely move.

He was one of the greatest players in Houston Rockets history, but he won’t be remembered as such.  We slothfully push to the backs of our minds what he did do—disregard the help he never had—because it’s far more convenient to ignore the past; he hasn’t done anything for us in the present.  It’s unfortunate, but so it usually goes in sports.

In landing Kevin Martin, Jordan Hill, and two future Knicks draft picks, the Houston Rockets’ GM may have cemented his place at the pantheon of sports management.

I’m still in utter disbelief.

It was a long and strange process, even surreal at times for the unyielding exposure. The sides talked, neither budging, implicitly knowing of the stakes.  This was NBA theater at its finest.

For the Knicks it was about hope, fulfillment of a plan, and the chance at refuge from perpetual mediocrity.

For Houston it was patience, with Morey preying on a premium from his predatory perch.

One could almost picture the Houston GM unmasking the poker face, smiling at his foe, and issuing the challenge Walsh had no choice but to accept.  Eternal salvation.

To have been a fly on that wall.

Talks fizzled before word broke last night of Kevin Martin’s acquisition, reinforcing the dictum that a Morey deal is never leaked.

Landry for Martin. A good deal, but for Morey, shocking – paying full has never been his cup of tea.

There seemed to be something more, something missing.  The other shoe would surely drop.

Then came the slew of tweets.  My jaw drops.  Yahoo! and ESPN, simultaneously.

Houston has received both Knicks picks.

Minutes, seemingly hours later, the correction:

The trade was not correctly reported – Jordan Hill too has been sent to the Rockets.

When it later became known that the picks were lightly protected, the significance became clear.  Morey had reshaped his franchise in one swoop, somehow avoiding trash in the process.

Yes, this was Daryl Morey’s finest hour.  His signature move.  The splash I had warned would not come.  The splash upon which our hopes had clung.

**

This deal is so beautiful that in its assessment, I am struck by disbelief.

In Landry, the team surrendered the man I had described all year as its best player.  But through his trade, it got back so much more.

Martin is the cornerstone upon whom we can build.  He has a sensible contract and an even more pleasing stroke.  [3yrs at an average annual $12mill is great value for a player of his production in the modern CBA era.]

He’s not the creator for whom I have desperately pled, but his shooting skillset fits this motion offense to a tee.  In that respect, there probably isn’t a 2-guard better suited for that role in our league.  [Martin’s career TS% of 60% is beyond jaw-dropping as explained in this piece.]

Then there is Jordan Hill.  The 8^th overall selection in last year’s draft, while a disappointment thus far, could very well one day replace Landry in this outfit known for its reclamation of power forwards maligned.

But the real coup, what made this deal special, are those picks.  So lightly protected (top 1 protection in 2011, top 5 protection in ’12), they could one day become the pieces of this team’s future foundation.

Or flipped this summer for something more.

**

Jared Jeffries was the pill.  For a thorn, one could hardly do better.

Slated next year at a gross $6.8million, he will make things difficult on the books. But just a 1 year burden, this is not a player without merit.

Taking Jeffries was the cost for this haul and it was well worth it.  You could hardly do better for an albatross than Jared Jeffries.

**

This trade was not made for today.  The team may not have even improved its cause for the year.  This deal was about value, and extract it they did.

First, on the court:

The rewards may not be immediate.  This year, Martin may only offset the loss of Carl.

That will change in ’10 when Yao receives the touches once allotted for Landry.  Martin will start next to Brooks, pushing Ariza to his more natural 3, and finally giving this lineup conventional balance.

Still, as composed, this team will not be a contender.  But that could quickly change.

On Thursday night, ESPN’s Marc Stein reported that the Houston Rockets had made a late push for Amare Stoudemire, offering Shane Battier, Luis Scola, draft picks, and Brian Cook in the 11^th hour.  ESPN’s J.A Adande later reported that it was the Rockets who backed away as Phoenix wanted to waive the requisite physical examinations.

What the report reveals is the team’s intent.  Armed with a shopping cart of assets—the picks, the expiring contracts of Battier/Jeffries, Scola (in a sign&trade), and young talent galore–Morey will likely offer a similar package to the Raptors and Suns in attempts to reopen talks for their coveted power forwards – this time for a sign&trade.

The team has obligations of roughly $58million in player salaries for next year.  If resigning its free agents and draft picks, it could be looking at close to $75million in player salaries.  While Morey said in his press conference that he has been given allowance to re-sign his own guys, a better value will be a max free agent.

And with this deal, he now has all the bait.

**

Unknown it is how this will all unfold.  The team could strike out in the summer, and New York could crown its King, dashing the dreams of Red Nation.

Still, nothing will have been lost and for the hope will we all have gained.

This is a lesson for patience, to never again doubt.

In some ways has this been poetic.  It is the divorce from an era but the dawn of a new day.  It is the close of a saga but the birth of tomorrow.

This could be the moment it was all built for the Houston Rockets.