“A lot of guys, their whole game is flopping offensively, and they’re very efficient at it,” he said. “[Martin] is one of the best floppers. Offensively he uses it to his advantage; he does a good job at it, getting to the lane, hitting people and throwing the ball up. He’s just using the game, being smart.”

Mbah a Moute’s commentary was phrased in a complimentary way, but it shouldn’t be read that way. With the playoffs in full bloom and each possession under the microscope of a basketball watching nation, flopping has quickly become the NBA’s most contentious issue. Pacers head coach Frank Vogel was fined $15,000 last week before his series against the Heat started, not for commenting on any actual officiating, but for calling Miami out as one of the league’s most advantageous group of floppers. In his first round series against the Clippers, Grizzlies head coach Lionel Hollins said “Chris Paul does a good job of flopping” in a nationally televised in-game interview.

Some believe it’s impossible to legislate, and others, like current ESPN analyst and former Rockets head coach Jeff Van Gundy, can’t understand why referees blow the whistle in obvious situations where a player’s body reacts to non-existent contact.

As a productive scorer who’s averaged over 20 points per game in five of his eight seasons, Martin’s face could become the overblown mascot shown on flopping’s figurative billboard. Foul shots are Martin’s offensive foundation. They’re what earned him an eight digit contract, and what make him an annual snub at All-Star weekend. You already knew he was one of the best at getting to the line, and that the way he did it was quirky (to say the least), but now that the winds against flopping are the harshest they’ve ever been, how does this affect players who use it to thrive? What will guys like Martin do if referees begin calling the game differently?

This past season may have served as a window into the future. Martin drew 2.1 fewer fouls per game in 2012 than he did the year before. Statistically speaking, he had no impact whatsoever, positive or negative, on the team. His sudden inability to get to the free-throw line took away the one thing he was really, really good at, and it made him an average shooting guard at best.

This serves as direct contrast to the 2011 season, when Houston’s FTA rate (free-throws attempted relative to field goals attempted) was higher with Martin was on the court, and lower than average when he was off, which is to be expected: Martin drew more fouls than Derrick Rose, LaMarcus Aldridge, Chris Paul, and Paul Pierce, all while playing fewer minutes. (In the case of Aldridge, a power forward who spends half his time near the basket, Martin played 610 less minutes and drew 14 more fouls.)

A couple days ago, with the help of Synergy, I watched every shooting foul Kevin Martin drew this season. To be honest, it was tough to watch. His body looked like a crash test dummy. First he snaps his neck back, as if he’s been jolted forward on a roller-coaster. Then there’s a yelp; a sudden cry for help directed towards the officials, or whoever will listen. Most of the plays looked eerily similar, showing consistency and an ongoing refusal from the league’s officials to acknowledge an action that isn’t a foul.

Sometimes the whistle was just, but a good percentage of the time it wasn’t, and when it’s bogus, the innocent defender turns into a child just informed that the Tooth Fairy doesn’t exist.

The five plays you are about to see are an embarrassment to the game of basketball. Speaking as someone interested in preserving both the NBA’s integrity and entertainment level, they have no place in the game. And yet, removing them is so difficult. In most cases, even the shrewdest eyes aren’t able to appropriately identify what’s a flop and what’s not in a split second’s time.

Martin’s made a career off deceiving opposing defenders. In the 40 games he started this year, we saw his value—both on the trade market and the court—take a substantial hit, all because he showed a growing powerlessness when it came to attacking his spots on the floor and ending up at the free-throw line.

Kevin Martin is a one-dimensional player who primarily gets his points from the free-throw line. He doesn’t get anybody else involved, doesn’t play defense, and his team’s don’t win—Martin’s career record in the playoffs is 2-4. (He’s sort of like a poor man’s Carmelo Anthony.) He isn’t the same player without the sound of a whistle, and looking at his flopping from an absolute worst case scenario, a drastic change in the way the game is refereed could slowly push him right out of the league.

Follow the discussion and comment here.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

A lot of these situations are born in the playoffs, where due to the enormous stage and increased importance, small sample sizes are unjustly extrapolated. One such example is former Rockets center Jordan Hill. Taken by the Knicks with the No. 8 pick in the 2009 draft, Hill has lurched through his career with the sticky “bust” label that can hang over a player until he either shakes it off or falls out of the league entirely.

In New York he was deplorable, and with Houston he wasn’t much better. In both situations the assumption was that the big bodied Hill could maintain respectability on the glass, shuffle his feet on the defensive end, and from time to time put the ball in the hoop all by himself. None of the items on that miniature-checklist were ever marked off. (Here are a few players from his draft class who’ve grabbed more total rebounds: James Harden, DeMar DeRozan, Brandon Jennings, Stephen Curry, and Jrue Holiday. All guards.)

When given a chance to shine, Jordan Hill did very little to take advantage. He had six double digit rebound performances in 32 regular season appearances with Houston this year. Then he was traded to the Lakers for practically nothing—0 minutes from Derek Fisher and a first round pick from Dallas that’s top 20 protected through 2017 (the Mavs have the 17th overall pick this year, so Houston will have to wait on the benefits of that one). At the time of the deal, Los Angeles’ main motivation for making the trade wasn’t to acquire Hill, but instead to flush Derek Fisher’s salary down the toilet and make space for Ramon Sessions, a player who could polish the rustiest part of that team.

The Lakers already had suspect garbage (Josh McRoberts and Troy Murphy) serving as backups to Andrew Bynum and Pau Gasol, so by grabbing Hill from Houston, they were quietly improving two weaknesses at once. However, due to Hill’s prior accomplishments—or lack thereof—nobody talked about his possible importance. Somehow he’s forced himself into the conversation.

Before the playoffs began, Hill appeared in seven games for the Lakers. In two of them, he grabbed 10 or more rebounds. In 39 games with both teams, he had five double-doubles. In the five games that have been played in the Lakers first round series against Denver, he’s posted two double-doubles—both Laker victories—playing about half the game in both instances. In fact, the Lakers are undefeated this year (5-0, regular and postseason) when Jordan Hill logs more than 20 minutes. This isn’t borderline irrational, it’s complete and udder insanity.

How is it that Jordan Hill is playing so well with the Lakers—in the playoffs!—when six months ago he was a regular on the end of Houston’s bench? As a fan of the Rockets, how does it make you feel? Is it a Jeremy Lin 2.0 situation or something far less significant, hardly worth a day dream? Hill is less talented than Pau Gasol and Andrew Bynum, but he’s playing harder and with more fire than them both. Why is this? I couldn’t tell you.

We see it time and time again: young players who were once viewed as limitless talents are recycled throughout the league; one team’s trash is another team’s treasure, and in no instance is this more visible than the one we’re witnessing out in L.A. It’s taken him the better half of three years, but Jordan Hill is finally showing he’s worth a roster spot.  If he’s smart, he’ll never leave.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

For Houston, and almost every other team in the league, Roy Hibbert could be that player. He’s 7’2″ from the top of his head to the bottom of his feet. But when he extends his arms and leaps for a rebound, that number grows to something like 13 feet. Coming off his first All-Star appearance last year, Hibbert is a restricted free agent this offseason, which is good news for his agency, and bad for his current team. Taking into account the money that centers made on first year deals this year—DeAndre Jordan ($10 million), Marc Gasol ($12.9 million), Tyson Chandler ($13.1 million), and Nene ($13 million)—if the Rockets were to sign Hibbert, there’s a chance, depending on how they play their hand with Kevin Martin, he’d become their highest paid player. When you take into account Motiejunas and the two first round picks (as of now), Houston’s cap space dramatically shrinks.

But maybe the price tag won’t be as high as everybody thinks. I’m no economics major, but take a look at the market right now. With the likes of JaVale McGee, Chris Kaman, Marcus Camby, Spencer Hawes, Omer Asik, Brook Lopez, and Robin Lopez all hitting free agency, there’s a decent supply of big man in this year’s free agency class that could presumably drive the inflated price down from what we saw in last year’s spending spree. But even if you’re paying him eight digits per year for the next four years, is that really such a bad thing? Hibbert has improved almost every area of his game in every season since he entered the league. Two years ago he gave up 0.91 PPP when defending the post. Last year that number was down to 0.72, a significant improvement. He’s getting to the free-throw line more, grabbing more rebounds, posting a higher true shooting percentage, committing fewer fouls, and playing more minutes. When shooting the ball from 3-9 feet this season, Hibbert’s been more accurate than Al Jefferson, Andrew Bynum, Marc Gasol, and Dwight Howard. And he takes over four shots from that range per game, so this is no small sample size.

After absorbing the fact that his continued improvement hasn’t been a coincidence, and that there’s no telling where the ceiling for a hungry/humble 7’2″ man lies, things get a little scary. This from a recent must read Grantland article on Hibbert’s development:

Hibbert pays Justin Zormelo, a private scout, to send him edited film and detailed reports on himself and the center he’s matched up against before every game. “The guys who work for the team are great, but they have to focus on the whole team,” Hibbert says. “It’s good to get something more personal.”

The bottom line about basketball is this: size matters. In recent years there have been various rule changes and strategic movements toward prioritizing use of the three-point shot, but so it goes, if you don’t have enough size, you can’t clog up the middle, intimidate penetrators, end defensive possessions with emphatic rebounds, tip out your own team’s misses for multiple opportunities on the same possession, or slow the game down with easy free-throws and post-up situations. As was previously said, Hibbert stands at 7’2″, and next to Andrew Bynum, he might be the tallest of all the tall guys who matter in the league. But Hibbert’s different from Bynum in that he doesn’t have a monstrous, all-consuming ego. Hibbert knows his sh*t stinks, and knows that despite his size and sometime dominant advantage on the offensive end, there are other ways for his team to attack an opposing defense. Sometimes his importance lies on the less glamorous end of the court, and Roy Hibbert appears to be okay with that.

Think about him as a member of the Rockets; what he could do with Kevin McHale in a full training camp. How does that not improve his game even further? After four years in the league with Indiana, the tenure of Hibbert’s next contract should be seen as the next chapter in his career. The expectations have changed. What you’re getting is a dominant center who could and should make the All-Star game every single year. A player who’s only going to get better. If you have Hibbert on your team, there’s a good chance you won’t have to worry about an opposing center throughout the life of his contract. He takes care of a very important part of every basketball game, and for that he’s invaluable.

One more thing to bring this pro-Roy Hibbert argument full circle. When we talk about improving the Rockets’ main defensive problem, this season the Indiana Pacers, Hibbert’s current team, had the fifth best interior defense in the league, giving up just 38.1 points in the paint per game. That’s the difference between making the playoffs and peeping through a window.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

But the season wasn’t a total waste of time, just as no year before it ever is. Since Christmas we learned so much about this cast of characters—one of the league’s most eclectic collection of cultural backgrounds and differing personalities. When the season began, first year coach Kevin McHale was given a roster that featured a pouting, highly paid one dimensional player who’d eventually find himself in a mini-power struggle with the All-Star caliber point guard, and a wild pack of young, underachieving athletes trying to make Houston their place of self-resuscitation. Over half the roster had either been left for dead by a past employer or had yet to find their niche in the league. To make matters worse, all of them were too young to know the first thing about  correcting a problem they didn’t know how to identify. It wasn’t a good situation, but as the year wore on they played less like a group of individuals trying to change a personal reputation, and more like a cohesive team that trusted one another, played unselfishly on every possession, and ended up being pretty good at winning basketball games.

For whatever reason, the wheels unhinged from the wagon three quarters of its way over the season’s rickety bridge, and everybody fell off the side. The playoffs just weren’t meant to be. Here are my individual awards for a memorable season. 

Most Valuable Player: Kyle Lowry. On a team that lacks any undisputed crunch time scorer or overall “best” player, it’s very difficult to pin down who most contributed to a team’s rise and then eventual fall from grace. Before he went down with a bacterial infection in his stomach, Kyle Lowry was the closest resemblance. Continuing his unexpected ascendance from last year with a 20 point, 12 assist, seven rebound performance in this season’s opening game, Lowry looked and played the part of elite point guard for much of the season’s first few months. He was everywhere on both ends of the court, knocking down threes from 28-plus feet on a regular basis, getting into the shorts of opposing point guards, conducting an efficient offense, and taking big shot after big shot for a team that desperately needed someone to step up and assume that specific role.

I realize he didn’t play the entire season, and that the team miraculously continued to win games after he went down, and that when he returned from his injury with a few weeks left in the year, that the team’s chemistry began to come undone, but sometimes it’s too easy to remember the latest and greatest. Here’s my ode to a player who put the Rockets in a position to succeed even after he went down with the only thing that was capable of stopping his brilliant play: a freak injury.

Least Valuable Player: Kevin Martin. Given the team’s flexibility and willingness to make splashy moves—their trade chips include two first round draft picks that are probably already on the market—I’d be shocked if Kevin Martin played another game for the Houston Rockets. In order to entice a possible buyer to take Martin’s contract off his hands (think Chicago or Minnesota), Daryl Morey will most likely package the shooting guard with one of those first round picks. For reasons that are either coincidental, evident, or unfair, Martin’s entire career has coincided with losing teams. His inability to play above average defense on and off the ball combined with an offensive skill set that doesn’t involve any teammates has made him a pariah, at least in my eyes. When he went down with a shoulder injury, the Rockets didn’t appear to be in any hurry to get him back on the court. Judging from how they performed with him out, this shouldn’t be news.

Most Pleasant Surprise: Chandler Parsons. I wrote about Parsons in several articles throughout the season, so my thoughts are well known; there really isn’t much more to say. His play was shockingly steady, improving with each game he played. It’s going to be incredibly fun watching Parsons’ career develop.

The “Thank God I’m An Unrestricted Free Agent” Award: Goran Dragic. When Lowry went down, the season looked to be over. His contribution appeared to be an irreplaceable one. Then Dragic came in and, well, you saw what happened. In 27 games as a starter, the 25-year-old Slovenian averaged 18.4 points, 8.3 assists, and 3.4 rebounds per game. He also was ridiculously efficient, shooting 49.6% from the field and 39.4% from deep. There’s no telling whether Dragic could keep that type of insane production up with the high expectations of a full-time starter for an entire season, but if he did he’d be an All-Star. And somebody out there is probably going to pay him like one this offseason.

The “Rodney Dangerfield Award That Lacks Respect” Award: Luis Scola. From Kevin Love stepping on his face to the fact that at 6‘9”, he was forced to thanklessly play center for 17% of the team’s total minutes this season (according to 82games.com), all anyone could say about Luis Scola’s season was that his numbers hadn’t improved from last year. Yes, they took a slight dip, but the toughness a player like Scola exudes is unquantifiable when it matriculates throughout the culture of an entire organization. Ignore his contract for just a second: Luis Scola is a man’s man.

The Would-Be Savior Who Had Too Much Asked Of Him Award: Marcus Camby. When the Rockets sent Jonny Flynn and Hasheem Thabeet—two players who arguably possess less value than a grapefruit flavored car freshener—to Portland for Marcus Camby, my initial reaction was “WHAT a brilliant move.” All season long the team’s defensive metric figures would plummet whenever Sam Dalembert headed to the bench, and with Dalembert playing less than 25 minutes per game, another rim protector was needed if this team had any chance at making noise in the postseason. Camby played well enough to not only fill the void Dalembert left whenever he wasn’t playing, he took his starting spot. Unfortunately for the Rockets, Camby is 38-years-old. The pressures extolled on him by both opposing players and his own team were simply too much for the old guy to handle. He can still be productive, just make sure it’s in a lessened role.

The Most Frustrating Arc of Development Award: Patrick Patterson. There are a few players I’d like to put here. Marcus Morris being badly outperformed by his own team’s second round pick and twin brother (who actually had a very productive rookie season in Phoenix), and Chase Budinger—who was demoted at the beginning of the season—were two that partly thwarted this team from achieving what it could have. But the far and away leader in the clubhouse for this award would have to be Patrick Patterson. Heading into this season, he hit the ground running with surgically repaired ankles and a whole bunch of expectations. Not the best combination. As his playing time increased, his offensive efficiency numbers went in the opposite direction. It’s no fun saying this, but for now our expectations for Patrick Patterson are to be tempered until further notice.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles 

For just a second, try to ignore the connection between merit and losing that exists in today’s NBA. Ignore any good that comes by virtue of tanking. Ignore draft picks, renovation, and hope. What I want to do is forget about the future, and analyze what just happened. Before their loss in New Orleans on Thursday night, I said on Twitter all week that I believed the Rockets were mortal locks to make the postseason. The idea was unpopular, but after watching almost every game this team played all year, it seemed more than likely. These guys weren’t a typical annual feel good story line; pawns straggling along in some hopeless underdog narrative. Yes, they faced tons of adversity, and defied almost every conceivable odd in doing so, but regardless this team was good. They played hard, they played together, and they played with more talent than they’ll probably ever be recognized for. 

It got me thinking about the type of things 29 fan bases collectively ponder at the end of every season. Questions like, “Why did my team have to lose?” Except in Houston’s case, what I’m interested in learning is how they managed to collapse the way they did. On an all encompassing, cerebral level, it’s a question that has no one answer and no indisputable truth. For example, the Rockets were terrible in the third quarter in almost all of those games, yet not even Kevin McHale could explain with 100% certainty why this was.

What follows can best be described as my difficult attempt at scratching the surface in explaining what the hell happened to this basketball team. We’ll start the analysis on April 2; 10 games ago. The Rockets had just come back to defeat a tough, uber-territorial Bulls squad  and were on the cusp of a sudden four game win streak that would memorably be aided three nights later by Andrew Bynum’s unmellowed attitude towards their bench.

At the time they were 29-25, and feeling good about where things were headed. Then on April 11, their playoffs before the playoffs began. Over the next week the Rockets played five games against four teams that were all fighting for three playoff spots. The situation was dense, but far from uncomfortable. Houston had been playing well despite seeing various key members of their team drop like flies throughout the season, and it appeared they were well adjusted to the personnel they had. Here are some of the most noticeable extremes that happened in those last 10 games.

1) They didn’t get to the free-throw line. With no consistent presence on the interior apart from Luis Scola (who in my opinion remains underrated), the Rockets were never confused with an elite team that gets to the free-throw line. Speedy Goran Dragic has the ability to draw contact better than almost every player in the league, but he’s human, and the toll his relatively small frame took dancing in the lane simply wasn’t sustainable. The Rockets lived and died on jump shots and threes.

They ranked 27th over the last 10 games in free-throw rate, meaning their free-throws attempted relative to their field goals attempted was flat out awful. In games like this, where possession after possession becomes more and more important, the free-throw line is THE place to live. Throughout the season this was a problem for the team (they’re currently ranked right after Dallas at 28th) and as I mentioned earlier, personnel is clearly an issue…but come on. The fact of the matter is that these games were physical battles, and if it took guys expanding upon their own comfort levels to get wins, then that’s what needed to be done. Obviously, that didn’t happen.

2) They didn’t turn the ball over: This makes explaining their losses quite difficult. The Rockets were the second best team in the entire league over the course of these last 10 games when it came to hanging onto the ball, a crucial component in deciding who wins and who loses. It was something they were below average at during the year (they now rank 17th, and that takes into account those last 10 games of super careful play), so for them to lose six straight while improving on an underlying weakness just adds insult to injury.

Of course, holding onto the ball is great, but the name of the game is putting it through the hoop, and the Rockets posted a true shooting percentage of 51.9% which placed them just above the Wizards and Nets for 22nd in the league. Also, despite their great security, they somehow managed to give up 15.3 fast break points per game; a stat that suggests some things just aren’t meant to be.

3) Their defense was awful: The offense averaged 1.03 PPP, putting them ahead of Miami, and just behind Oklahoma City and Boston in terms of efficiency, but the defense was another story. With teams who were capable of going with small lineups to keep Dalembert on the bench (i.e. Denver) the defense suffered mightily. In the 10 games they ranked 20th in points allowed per 100 possessions and were a general mess, especially in the paint, where they surrendered 45.1 points, the third highest in the league.

4) They played at their pace: The Rockets are generally one of the faster teams in the league. They have youth, speed, and no ball-dominating isolation players; restricting the first two characteristics wouldn’t make any sense. They run, they gun. Over their last 10 games, the only thing that changed was they got a little faster. This might attribute to their inability to get to the free-throw line a bit, but overall it should be seen as a positive that they didn’t deviate from their style during the season’s most important stretch of action.

So what does this all say about the team’s collapse? They either picked a really bad time to revert to who they really are, or a bad time to play below what they showed throughout the season to be their potential. Either way, bad timing is bad timing. Say what you want about draft picks, and how now we don’t have to give our first rounder to Brooklyn, but a gigantic opportunity was missed here. Making the playoffs and winning a couple games (who knows, maybe even a series, and then anything can happen) is a positive experience that lasts inside each and every player—most of these guys are young, and getting them to play together in games of upgraded significance is an unquantifiable step in the right direction.

Everyone will have their own explanation for why this Rockets team didn’t qualify for an honest to goodness up-for-grabs tournament to the championship (I didn’t even mention Marcus Camby’s health which was undeniably significant) but one thing  is for sure: in an undivided culture filled with people who’d rather look forward to a hopeful tomorrow than enjoy a fruitful today, this one really hurts.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

But being a great athlete doesn’t guarantee playing time, nor does it make you a useful basketball player. After starting this season being relegated from “starting small forward” to “occasional guy off the bench”, Budinger has struggled to find a consistent job with the team, and given his noticeable on-the-ball defensive flaws, it was pertinent he mold a specific skill set and fit himself into one of the roles that every consistently successful team has.

In his third year with Houston, Budinger realized that for him to get minutes he’d need to excel at something new, and right now he’s doing it. Instead of filling in as the well-rounded glue guy we expected him to be before the season started (a position Chandler Parsons has admirably taken), Budinger has come into his own as one of the most consistent three-point shooters in the entire league.

Here are a few statistics to show just how tightly the three ball has been braided with  Budinger’s strengths this season.

• Last season his percentage of points scored on three-pointers was 34.9%. This year it’s at 46.3%, and climbing. This number is higher than J.J. Redick, Klay Thompson, Anthony Morrow, and Mo Williams. That’s how one-dimensional Budinger’s been (which isn’t meant as an insult).
• 125 of his 168 spot up jumpers have been from behind the three-point line (where he’s shooting 43.2%).
• He’s making 47.3% of his threes from the corner. When you factor in the number of attempts, Budinger is behind only Ray Allen in terms of efficiency shooting from that spot.
• In his last 10 games he’s averaged five attempts from downtown per game, which is what the likes of Ray Allen, Kevin Durant, and Kobe Bryant have been doing all season.
• 14 of his 39 made baskets in transition have been three-pointers, and he’s shooting 48.3% from deep when Houston’s attacking defenses off a missed basket or a forced turnover.

Moving forward as a member of the second unit that could always use a scoring punch, Budinger has shot the ball well enough to deserve more specific after time-out (ATO) plays drawn up specifically to get him wide open three-pointers—misdirections and stagger screens. Think Kyle Korver or Ray Alen. Also, utilizing Budinger more off screens instead of strictly as a spot up shooter from the corner or in transition would only help the team in ways that indirectly open things up for others. The threat of shooting the three is great, but actually receiving those three points is better. Budinger stretches the floor, making the game easier and greatly increasing opportunity for various penetrators like Goran Dragic, Kyle Lowry, Chandler Parsons, and Courtney Lee.

About a month ago on ESPN’s NBA Today Podcast, David Thorpe said NBA coaches like to treat their players like chess pieces, which is to say they want consistent strengths and consistent weaknesses on a nightly basis. Without debating the merits of whether or not that’s good or bad in terms of restricting both their player’s various abilities and their team’s chances of winning, if Kevin McHale can trust Chase Budinger as his most dangerous three-point shooting option it makes game planning for opponents MUCH easier. It also cuts out some of the negative parts of Budinger’s game that might result in wasted offensive possessions. For example, from 5-9 feet this season he’s shooting 21.9%. He’s also absolutely grotesque in isolation, scoring three of an attempted 14 shots in that situation this season.

When you watch the Rockets play, don’t you expect the ball to fall through the net each time Budinger cocks the ball over his right eye and launches one of his perfectly formed shots from deep? He’s become so successful to the point where not having him on the court in both clutch and end of quarter situations could be a major restriction on Houston’s offensive production. Given the loss last night, and their general disappointing play in the past week, it’s questionable whether or not the Rockets make the playoffs. But if they do, Budinger and his game-changing shot could be the difference in whether or not they’re capable of knocking somebody off.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

This is barely the tip of the iceberg in describing how remarkable Chandler Parsons’ rookie year has been. He’s received public praise from Kobe Bryant (more on that later), assumed the role of Houston’s clutch shot-taker on more than one occasion (he’s shooting 40% from three-point line in the fourth quarter), and, in a strange, inconceivable way, might be the last player on Houston’s roster that Daryl Morey would be willing to part with.

Here’s where things get interesting. Chandler Parsons is 23-years-old. He can shoot, dribble, pass, rebound, defend, and make smart decisions with, at the very least, a B- grade. But what is his absolute limit? Can Parsons become an All-Star by following the Luol Deng, Andre Iguodala path? Is he athletic enough for that? Or because of his glue guy playing style, is what we’re seeing right now in fact as good as he can be—a player who’s a tiny bit above average in every area but free-throw shooting (which is correctable), with no real room to meaningfully improve?

Figuring out a player’s ceiling is obviously a guessing game, but with most guys, coming close to estimating how good, or bad, a player will be is entirely possible. Parsons is different. His ceiling is impossible to gauge. With a well-rounded skill set, Parsons has to ask himself which is more important: making everything a little better, or choosing to excel in one specific area and finding a niche.

According to Synergy, Parsons is one of the league’s 30 best isolation defenders, with opponents (more often than not it being the other team’s best offensive player) shooting 22.9% and scoring 0.6 PPP. By comparison, Tony Allen—widely regarded as the league’s most tenacious on-ball perimeter defender—is holding opponents to 34.9% shooting and 0.68 PPP in isolation sets. (Parsons has been placed in isolation situations 40 more times than Allen, too. Making these numbers borderline incomprehensible.) For the most part Parsons can defend four positions without a double team, and apart from Sam Dalembert and Marcus Camby, is undoubtedly the Rockets best/most important defensive player.

Here’s a performance chart of every shot Kobe Bryant’s taken this season against the Rockets with Parsons on the court. He’s split the duty with Courtney Lee,  but more often than not Parsons is the guy Kevin McHale wants on Kobe.

And here’s a chart detailing every one of Kobe’s shots that came against the Rockets with Parsons on the bench.

Look at the mid-range area specifically. At this stage in his career, this is where Bryant loves to torch his defender, but he’s been unable to do so with Parsons. As they say, a picture’s worth a thousand words.

On the offensive end it’s very, very difficult to game plan against a player like Parsons. He’s mostly utilized as a spot up shooter (for the league’s fourth most accurate jump shooting team from 16-23 feet), where he’s 40.6% from the floor and 36.2% from deep. But he’s also effective in isolation, running a pick and roll, tipping back missed shots (which is where he first made his name) and running in transition. The ways he can kill you are numerous; he defines versatility.

Last week, Kevin McHale talked about how the Rockets are having so much success without any “superstar” on the team. What he had to say was that it’s not how good the players are, but how good they make their teammates that’s important. This is probably the most impressive part of Parsons game right now. He goes out of his way to make things easier for everyone around him, which is something that can’t be taught. The Rockets score 3.21 more points per 100 possessions, and give up 2.43 fewer points on defense when Parsons is on the court, and he’s second on the team in minutes. The sample size is officially large enough to say he’s been one of the league’s most pleasant surprises, and he isn’t going anywhere.

Chandler Parsons was drafted by a team that’s yet to place too much responsibility on his shoulders, while at the same time giving him the opportunity to thrive in a comfortable setting. What the future holds for Parsons is anybody’s guess. But no matter what, it’ll be a super exciting career to follow.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

On March 30th, Sam Dalembert went down with the flu, forcing a wrinkled version of  Camby into the starting lineup for a feisty Rockets squad. Since? At the risk of total hyperbole, he’s been a revelation. Here are the basic statistical averages in his last three games: 34 minutes, 52% shooting, 9.7 points, 12 rebounds (3.3 of them offensive), 2.3 steals, and 3.3 blocks. The other night in a comeback win against Chicago, Camby expanded his role from above average rim protector to someone who’s of actual use on offense, spacing the floor and forcing the Bulls’ tight defense to spread a bit further than they would’ve liked.

What Camby now lacks in athleticism, he makes up for in reputation and old man savvy. As a 38-year-old center going up against someone who’s likely at least 10 years his junior each night, he has to pick his spots. Four days ago in a game against the Pacers, Roy Hibbert faced Camby in the post 10 times. The Rockets didn’t send help on one of those defensive possessions, and Hibbert scored only three field goals. This performance was great news, but what’s more important about Camby’s play in the post is his inability to foul. He fights for position. He pushes back. He doesn’t fall for head fakes. He doesn’t foul. This is huge.

On the offensive end he’s always around the basket, showing amazing productivity on the offensive glass via tips and the occasional dunk. He’s shown he can step outside and knock down an open jumper (money for the Rockets drive and kick based offense), but almost a third of his points have come on making something out of nothing by cleaning up his teammate’s missed shots.

In a recent game against the Grizzlies, Dalembert and Camby played beside one another for 10 minutes. They scored seven points, blocked three shots, and posted such insanely good rates that it wouldn’t even make sense to write them down, as they came in such a microscopic sample size. Pairing them together was a smart move by Kevin McHale for two reasons. First of all, I know they’re in a playoff race where every win matters, but it’s better to test out some different lineup combinations now than in the playoffs, when some of the Western Conference’s best teams can throw huge size-based mismatches at you for quarter stretches at a time.

The Grizzlies have Marc Gasol and Zach Randolph. The Lakers have Andrew Bynum and Pau Gasol. The Spurs can go the other way with a lethal three guard combination that might require multiple rim protectors. The point here is that with Camby and Dalembert both playing at the same time, the Rockets may be able to turn what was at one point a MAJOR defensive liability into a quasi-dominant force.

The second reason this move was so smart touches a bit on ego, and how a team like Houston needs everybody who contributes to know and understand the role they play and where they fit. A week ago, Dalembert was the starting center. For the most part, he knew who he’d be playing with every night, how many minutes and in what situations he’d be on the court, and what his responsibilities were on both ends to best help Houston win basketball games. Now he’s on the bench, getting irregular minutes, lacking confidence, and looking clueless when he’s out there. Dalembert and McHale’s staff have about three weeks to figure out how he can excel in his new, limited job. With a roster that’s short on talent, the season is counting on it.

(Although he might be physically capable of carrying out the duty if it were an absolute necessity, if all of a sudden the Rockets decided to put Patrick Patterson into the starting lineup he’d be lost. The team would ask him to replicate Luis Scola’s numbers and he wouldn’t know how. The situation is reversed, but this is what Dalembert might be going through. It’s also something Chase Budinger did go through, and he’s still struggling.)

Five months ago the Rockets had NO answer at the center position. When Dalembert came aboard on somewhat of a desperation signing (on no planet is he worth $7 million per year) he was greeted as a relative hero. But hey, desperate times call for desperate measures. The Rockets needed a legitimate center and Dalembert needed to feel welcome in a new environment. Now, the situation has dramatically shifted.

This year the Rockets give up 1.017 PPP when Dalembert is on the court, which conveniently enough fits them between the Grizzlies and Lakers as one of the ten best defensive teams in the league. Camby has been great on both ends of the court in these last few games, but if the Rockets are unable to draw all they possibly can from Dalembert in these next couple of weeks, they can’t expect Camby to keep up the spectacular play by himself, especially in a grueling playoff series. What they need is for the two to work together in a two-headed monster type of capacity. Whether that be at the same time, or in a consistent replacement pattern. If they can somehow combine the two seven-footers for 48 minutes of defensive intensity, gone will be the days of Patterson or Scola at the five.

Over a decade later, Camby may once again be thrust into the starting lineup of an eighth seeded playoff team in a lockout shortened season. If he can coexist with Dalembert, it could be the difference between a first round exit, and the Rockets existing as the Western Conference’s true sleeper.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

Only three players in the league have made more corner threes with a higher percentage than Courtney Lee: Nick Young, Ryan Anderson, and Ray Allen. He’s connected on more, with greater efficiency, than Kyle Korver, Shane Battier, and Daequan Cook (who Lee shoots 11% better than, on just a few more attempts). Of the six players mentioned here, all are well-reputed marksman, but just one (Young) is known for having more complexity to his offensive game. By taking all these corner threes, Lee is tempering his own athletic ability in a semi-sacrificial way, complimenting wonderful playmakers like Kyle Lowry and Goran Dragic by standing idle in the corner and doing right by his team.

Every shooting guard in the NBA can hit a wide open three-pointer from the corner. An argument can be made that because of its relative ease and high value, this particular shot is the smartest one in basketball. (Eight of the 10 teams that boast the highest percentage on corner three-pointers are either a lock to make the playoffs or right on the border—Houston ranks second.) Shooting for three points from this spot on the court offers a reward that so greatly outweighs any actual risk, that you wouldn’t be a smart team if you didn’t find a way to get more than a couple open looks per game. (No surprise here: Charlotte ranks last in attempts.)

For years defenses have been geared to prevent the ball from entering the paint. It was, and still is, the number one priority. But in the post-Bruce Brown world we currently live—where jerseys are retired for sacrifice, adding intelligence to your hustle, and being able to knock down the wide open corner three when it’s thrown in your lap—the importance of stopping three-pointers, particularly easier ones from the corner, is becoming more and more consequential.

Despite its importance, being asked to stand in the corner to take a shot that’s created by someone else is a bit of a backhanded compliment. You aren’t quite good enough to produce on your own, and much like a field goal kicker lining up for a straight away 40-yard attempt, the job is borderline thankless. People expect you to make it. While someone else has already humbled the defense and made everything happen, all you have to do is bend your knees, jump, and let one go; more times than not with no defensive interference. If you have a player who’s comfortable in the corner—who takes his family camping there on weekends when it’s raining—then you’re presented with a serious advantage. The Rockets have that guy, but this season he’s shown he can do so much more.

Courtesy of NBA.com, here’s a distribution chart of all Courtney Lee’s unassisted shots this season.

Lee’s unquantifiable personality traits are what make him so helpful—similar to Jason Terry in the way he doesn’t back down and is totally fearless no matter who he’s facing. Any intelligent, skilled player can hit shots, rotate on defense, and make the extra pass. But what Lee brings is a toughness and attitude that attaches itself to teammates. Right now he’s raising confidence in the locker room and bringing a “refuse to lose” mentality with him to the floor.

The Rockets have more than one player on their roster who has us dreaming about limitless potential. Because of their youth and the incredible improvements they continue to make in such short stretches of time, Kyle Lowry, Goran Dragic, Patrick Patterson, and Chandler Parsons all qualify as having the type of future nobody can put an appropriate ceiling on.

The car Lee drives is a bit more subtle than the one those four teammates are currently riding in, but he’s neck and neck on the same road. Four years ago, in his rookie season, he was one layup away from being a regular backcourt contributor for a champion. Unfortunately, the alley-oop rolled off the rim, and Lee was sold to the Nets as a younger, less dynamic, cheaper version of Vince Carter. What once looked like the brightest of illimitable futures was now being snuffed out by the cold, gray New Jersey sky.

Over the last few games Lee’s shooting numbers have gone down a bit, but perhaps that can be explained by the ridiculous increase in minutes. Lee plays so hard on both ends, he just needs to pace himself a little better.  But looking at what he’s done on a larger scale this season, Lee is in a contract year, setting himself up for the big deal Orlando would’ve been more than happy to have on their books. His blossoming can’t be ignored. Unfortunately for the Rockets, it probably isn’t.

(According to John Hollinger’s most recent Power Rankings, the Rockets have the ninth highest probability of making the postseason, placing them on the outside looking in.) But doesn’t it feel like if they can just get there anything could happen? With multiple shock waves from the infamous “Veto” and lingering lockout still reverberating throughout the league, some absolutely insane, totally unpredictable outcomes could be brewing in the months ahead. Veterans are wearing down, key players who have moved are shifting tides, and some franchises appear to have already set their sights on next season.

If you make the playoffs this season, especially in the Western Conference, the NBA’s current circumstances will give you a great chance to not only make a little noise, but force your neighbors to call the cops.

Hollinger’s current Playoff Odds give them a 0.2% chance at winning the title, but what would it mean if the Houston Rockets actually did it? What would it say about the way most organizations currently prioritize the allocation of their revenue, and would it have any impact whatsoever on the widely accepted fact that building a champion and acquiring the “best” players are one in the same thing?

Daryl Morey has gone on record as saying his team-building strategy revolves around acquiring a superstar, whether that be through the draft, making a run at a highly valued free agent with carefully carved cap space, or conducting a classic “multiple assets for transcendental impact player” blockbuster trade (the best example being the Celtics and Kevin Garnett). Year after year those first two options look a lot like that scene from “Deep Impact” where everybody from the East Coast is using the same highway to get as far from the Atlantic Ocean as possible. All these people are scrambling to do the same thing at the exact same time, and the result is one SERIOUS traffic jam. Once the asteroid hits Earth, pretty much everyone who thought taking the highway was a good idea gets obliterated. Using this analogy with team building, everyone who doesn’t have a top-10 player (all but about five teams) is either shedding cap space, or positioning themselves to rebuild through the lottery. The result is a major increase in demand with a seriously limited supply.

Looking at it from a marketing perspective, right now the Rockets are zigging while almost everyone else in their industry is zagging. Free agency and the draft are two scenarios where luck plays a substantial role, more so than any general manager would like. In the third option, the future is a bit more controllable. By acquiring young players with upside (in any of the methods described above) team executives have the flexibility to either cash in on a low cost, high reward asset, or keep the cycle moving and flip him for something of more value. This is the less traveled road Houston’s currently riding down. It’s a basic fact of life that nothing is free. In order to receive something you want, you must give up something of value you already have.

Only a few teams are successfully employing the same strategy as the Rockets, but none have publicly stated a desire to deal their assets for that elusive superstar. When done correctly, it’s an easier strategy that gives them financial flexibility to compete—which this season is synonymous with contend. At the trade deadline we saw the Rockets trade three busts from the 2009 draft class for a possible first round pick and a big man with playoff experience who strengthens the team’s largest weakness. The moves were brilliant in that nothing was sacrificed while something was gained; it’s indisputable that the team is closer to a championship today than it was one week ago.

If in the first round Houston faces off against Oklahoma City, a team that was constructed almost entirely through the draft, it won’t just be a seven game series pitting two basketball teams against one another. It’ll be more. This will be the great clashing of two separate ideological structures, two different means towards the same elusive end. If they make the playoffs, the Rockets can match-up well with every single team in the West, and right now their only real weakness is the lack of a universally recognized “superstar”.

The odds may be large right now, but if this team can just get one foot in the post-season’s door, the way we look at team-building strategies on a league-wide scale could undergo a dramatic modification. That is, if 0.2% can become a reality.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

Inspecting it on a micro level, in the context of a single game, the win means very little. It’s one notch in the standings for a team that as of this moment probably has less than a 50% chance at making the postseason. But on the macro level, this win tells Daryl Morey (and, equally important, other general managers across the league) a bit about who this basketball team is right now. (For example: guys like Goran Dragic, Courtney Lee, and Chandler Parsons are capable of competing in big minutes, in big spots, against big-time competition. Not to say they were terrible before, but this game was a different substance.)

Taking into account Houston’s recent past, their innovative and adventurous GM, whispers from national NBA reporters, and the general wide open field standing in their way, it’s more than likely that this team strikes a deal before the arrival of today’s trade deadline. And looking at the roster, it’d appear the Rockets are in a wonderful position to do so. Their depth is truly outstanding; even the players they don’t play could be viewed by a rival executive as having upside if brought to a new environment. All it takes is one believer. Daryl Morey has plenty of options. Let’s investigate why.

Courtney Lee/Kevin Martin: Whenever I think of Courtney Lee, the first thing that pops into my head is the fourth quarter eight-second violation he forced on Paul Pierce earlier this month. Giving up two or three inches and a career’s worth of end-game heroics to Boston’s future Hall of Famer, Lee was an underdog with unrelenting tenaciousness. For lack of a more descriptive word, the play was awesome.

Because this is already his third team, Lee’s four years in the league feel more like eight. He’s 26-years-old and has experience competing in the NBA Finals as a rookie. He doesn’t get nervous, he’s still improving, and whether there’s five minutes left in the second quarter or 15 seconds left in the fourth, he plays with the same attitude—all are precious qualities. Based on his rotation patterns, in the eyes of Kevin McHale—and other contenders who’ve been inquiring about Lee’s status—maybe he’s more valuable to this team than Kevin Martin. Heading into this season, Martin was Houston’s closest thing to an All-Star, but what is his value right now? If you place Kevin Martin on the table, what is it you’re getting back? The $13 million he’s owed next year is a bit gross, even though it’s expiring. I don’t see any team in the league willing to give up anything substantial for a one-dimensional, inconsistent shooting guard who’s spent his entire career in losing situation after losing situation. Maybe the Bulls would take a chance if they got desperate, but it’s too hard to see them sacrificing their defensive identity for a secondary scoring option before 3 pm to sacrifice their defensive identity. (Also, they don’t want Martin, they want Lee.)

Goran Dragic/Kyle Lowry: I love everything about Goran Dragic. EVERYTHING. He’s a physical, savvy, fearless point guard who attacks the basket, sets up teammates, and defends on each play as if an explosive device would detonate in his shoe if he were to stop moving for two seconds. If he played 35 minutes a night, there’s a good chance he’d be one of the 15 best point guards in the league. (I’d take him over Darren Collison, D.J. Augustin, Jameer Nelson, Devin Harris, Jason Kidd, Jeff Teague, and Mario Chalmers, to name a few.)

Having a talent like Dragic on the roster lessens the pain that’d come with moving Kyle Lowry (the team’s most valuable player/asset)—if they happened to do this, signing resigning Dragic would be a priority—and allows the team flexibility to grab a serious piece like Dwight Howard or Pau Gasol. For the record, as much as I like both Lowry and his contract, this would totally be worth it. If they were to acquire Howard, the path moving forward would obviously be to do as well as possible for the rest of this season, get into the playoffs, make some serious noise, and then do their best to convince Howard that Houston is a perfect place to spend his prime.

If Morey were to keep Lowry in the face of renting Howard, it wouldn’t make much sense. The entire point of going after young players with sexy upside is to get the general managers who possess superstars to bite. Morey has done an admirable job filling his roster with attractive assets, and when it’s time to strike he can’t afford to miss the opportunity. Lowry is dynamic and a walking triple double, but he’ll never be the “franchise player” Howard is. If they were to give up Lowry for Howard, only to watch him walk at the end of the season, the team’s future wouldn’t be as awful as it sounds. Houston would go through one or two difficult seasons (with serious cap space after using their amnesty on Scola or Martin) and have young international prospects like Sergio Llull and Donatas Motiejunas (more on them later) to play around with, along with a couple lottery picks, hopefully. The team will have bottomed out without losing any fans; people will blame Dwight Howard for choosing to leave, not Houston’s management for being unable to keep him. In this situation, the Rockets could place themselves in position to rebuild along a different strategy: through the draft with in-house player development.

(If by the time this column is published, Howard decides to go back on his word one more time, insert Deron Williams wherever it says Dwight Howard.)

Hasheem Thabeet/Chase Budinger/Terrence Williams/Jonny Flynn: All four of these guys are more “asset” than critical piece for the future. One has proven he can start on a pretty good team, adapt his game to fit with any system, and exist as a dependable rotation player (Chase Budinger), two guys have physical traits that other teams could try to take advantage of (Terrence Williams and Hasheem Thabeet), and one guy who’s yet to find any semblance of success, yet is reportedly drawing interest from both San Antonio and Cleveland (Jonny Flynn). Overall, Budinger is the one guy here you’d like to see stay put, but he’s also the only one who could bring something back in return. If any of the others can be flipped in a package that brings back real-life production or a useful draft pick, it’d be a minor miracle.

Luis Scola/Patrick Patterson/Marcus Morris: For all the people who speak negatively about Luis Scola’s game, and how it seems to have fallen off a cliff, please take a deep breath. Nobody does more with less. Nobody. If money were not an issue, I’d still take Scola’s tough, crafty skill set over most power forwards in the league, but alas, this is the real world, and money is in fact a big deal. We’ve talked all year about Patrick Patterson, and how his basic value lies not only in his youth and stocky build, but in his ability to hopefully one day replicate (or come close to replicating) Scola’s production at a much cheaper cost. Just like Dragic with Lowry and Lee with Martin, Patterson symbolizes protection for Houston should they choose to deal one of their core three players. As for Marcus Morris, out of all the players on this team who possess potential, this guy is the most promising, in my opinion.

Donatas Motiejunas/Sergio Llull: The two combine for 0 minutes of total NBA experience, yet they’re the aces in Daryl Morey’s pocket—whether he projects them to contribute in the future or believes he can sell high on an unknown product. Motiejunas and Llull aren’t on Houston’s roster at the moment, but they exist as two mysterious entities—a couple of safety blankets—both at this trade deadline and next year’s as well.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

Now, a quick disclaimer before we dive deep into what I’ve found that could be helpful to the Rockets moving forward: Just because cutting-edge data says probabilities increase within the vacuum of a given situation does not mean anything is guaranteed or promised. It must be kept in mind that these numbers were berthed when thousands of players participated in hundreds of thousands of possessions, and that everything moving forward is technically separated from everything that happened in the past. The purpose of analytics isn’t to find absolute answers—sports is an entity ultimately decided by human error—but to make the long road to a championship a bit less foggy.

Here are a few interesting Rockets related points I walked away from the conference with:

• The ongoing problem team executives have with figuring out who fits well with who, and how that relates to turning a group of individuals into a well-functioning team, was a running theme in each of the basketball related research papers that were presented. The outcome of a basketball game is typically decided by the thousands of decisions players are forced to make in less than a second of time. It’s a sport dictated by constant actions and reactions, with the quickest thinkers holding a slight advantage over those who need to collect their thoughts before making a move. This makes non-verbal communication crucial. Reading another person’s mind is impossible, yet to be consistently successful on the court, basketball teammates are basically asked to do so. The more you play alongside another player, the better a feel you have for what he likes and doesn’t like to do, and the easier it is for you to make a personal decision. If the Rockets choose to stand pat at the trade deadline and hold onto regular contributors like Kevin Martin, Luis Scola, and Courtney Lee, everything I just wrote should help comfort the fan base. The roster right now is far from perfect, but the guys in place are familiar with one another. They know each other’s tendencies, where they’re going to be, where they like the ball, what makes them comfortable/uncomfortable, and when they’re absolutely feeling it. This applies to the coaching staff as well, and how Kevin McHale has done a masterful job at game-planning with the group he has. Two nights ago against the Celtics, Houston went with a three guard lineup for a majority of the fourth quarter and all of overtime (with Courtney Lee playing small forward). It wasn’t the first time he’s done it this year; with a lack of multiple interior defenders to work with, McHale highlights his team’s strength instead of dwelling on its weakness. If the roster changes, so do strategies. Talking about the importance of experience in terms of a five man unit staying together, let’s look at the Oklahoma City Thunder for a second. Yes, they have two transcendental talents, but after making their deal for Kendrick Perkins (which, in a way also gave them James Harden), the Thunder have stood pat in their movement of players. They locked up Russell Westbrook despite the public’s outcry that he couldn’t co-exist in that environment. The Rockets are in an interesting situation in that while they’re in a likely position to make a move before the deadline, now that they have a growing star (Lowry) in their midst, and are exceeding expectations with the crew they have, maybe a monster shake up isn’t the best mode of action. Maybe they keep the starting five together for next season too, and keep accumulating young players who show great upside. Should they hypothetically acquire Pau Gasol, the shift that’ll take place regarding shot selection and both offensive and defensive style, would dramatically change, and there’s no promise it’d be for the better.
• One of the more interesting points to emerge from the conference was the future importance of psychologically studying players. (One league executive went so far as to say it’s “the next frontier” in player evaluation.) In “Effort vs. Concentration: The Asymmetric Impact of Pressure on NBA Performance”, the argument was made that in-game pressure situations have the power to “distract, motivate, and generate too much self-focus” for a player, which can have a negative effect on performance. In their findings, the researchers found that when it comes to offensive rebounding, players at home tend to find more success than those on the road because their fan’s support makes them hustle more. With free-throws, they found that away players have an easier time at the line because there’s no pressure of letting the home crowd down with a miss. In watching Sunday night’s game against the Clippers, the Los Angeles announcers made an interesting point about the probability of Luis Scola hitting two crucial free-throws. They took his past—playing in World Championships and European League title games—into account in deciding whether the pressure of the moment would get to him. (Scola made both free-throws.) The point intrigued me in relation to the paper on concentration because measuring how nervous a player is could someday be of great value in determining whether bringing him aboard is the right decision. Some guys won’t let big moments affect their play, but others might. Figuring out a player’s “mental toughness” might be just as important as judging his ability to hit two free-throws in the first place.
• Re-visiting the team-building theme from before, a paper titled “Big 2′s and Big 3′s: Analyzing How A Team’s Best Player’s Complement Each Other”, made a few intriguing points; most of them we may have already assumed but had never before had the available data to confirm. The Rockets currently have one major piece of the puzzle in place: a high-scoring, high-usage point guard. While it may appear as an obvious point, should the team acquire Dwight Howard via free agency or a trade (that doesn’t surrender Lowry), they’ll have acquired a second key figure, the high-scoring, high-rebounding center. (For those still not over Pau Gasol, he would certainly apply here as well.) However, the best two-player combination doesn’t involve the effective point guard (apparently he’s the third component), but instead, a versatile, three-point shooting wing. These are your Paul Pierce’s, Andre Iguodala’s, and LeBron James’ of the world. In other words, the rarest of the rare. They’re guys who can play defense on the perimeter, rebound the ball, pass, and knock down triples. The Spurs, with Tim Duncan, Manu Ginobili, and Tony Parker, are the quintessential example, and it’s no coincidence that they’ve been one of the league’s most consistent organizations in recent years. In the case of Howard, Orlando saw its best days when Jameer Nelson (high-usage point guard) and Hedo Turkoglu (versatile wing player) were humming. For the Rockets, it may be that getting a player of Howard or Gasol’s caliber is unlikely, in which case they may best be suited to target the versatile wing threat. Obviously, this isn’t easy either, but neither is building a champion. Luck is an undeniable factor in the process, and without it, all the data in the world won’t do much.
• It’s important to have players who buy into what the coach is saying, or else the whole point in using advanced analytics is useless. To find players who’re intelligent and willing to “buy in” and sacrifice for the sake of a well thought out game plan is critical. As a participant on the Coaching Analytics panel, former Rockets head coach Jeff Van Gundy spoke a little bit about two different players: Tracy McGrady and Shane Battier. Mentioning a specific game from the past, where Houston held a three point lead with under 10 seconds to go, Van Gundy told his players to foul and put the opponent on the line. McGrady chose not to, and his man knocked down a game-tying three-pointer. Houston lost the game in overtime. In the heat of the battle, McGrady failed to execute a fairly simple coaching instruction based on analytical data by Van Gundy and his staff. There’s no doubting his limitless abilities as a basketball player, but this story makes you wonder if that had anything to do with his failure to succeed once the postseason came around; when each possession’s importance is doubled. Just like the serendipitous good fortune I mentioned in the last bullet, all the analytics in the world won’t save you if your players don’t listen.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

Last Thursday night, on the eve of the 6th annual Sloan Sports Analytics Conference, snow finally began to fall throughout the city and its neighboring suburbs. 

As approximately 2,200 men and women descended upon Boston’s Hynes Convention Center to participate in the most interesting, worthwhile, and innovative experience a fan of sports—and information pertaining to understanding all things athletics—can possibly endure, the snow was relegated to a conquered annoyance; dull elevator music. People appeared—despite the unpredictability of pesky Nimbostratus clouds—from all over the world, propelled by the small hope in the back of their head that by Sunday morning their life could be changed for the better. When a grand prize of knowledge and opportunity are presented as one, a near infinite amount of sheer will exists in people to go get them. It’s powerful stuff.

After directly investing about 25 hours beneath the SSAC’s literal roof, I offer this reaction with full confidence: When you combine a rare collection of brilliance with a single-minded yearning to learn, and let it permeate throughout halls and classrooms for two straight days, what you have is a one of a kind actuality. There’s nothing on Earth quite like this conference.

From the moment I stepped through the door, an indescribable excitement jolted through my bones. Everyone within eye sight was obsessed with sports. Everyone around me craved knowledge to help them better understand the very events that, in many ways, consume their lives. What this intuitive feeling told me was that in terms of guided interest and lust for total understanding, everyone was like me. The feeling was a little like college, except “sports” as its own being was the sole topic, and for me, that ambience was never before felt.

After registering and settling in, everyone was directed into the humongous ballroom, like an army of jovial zombies. The atmosphere had a quiet surreality about it, with people fidgeting in their seats, looking around the room with wide eyes that said “nobody pinch me.” From the opening panel to Mark Cuban’s delightful closing interview, the weekend was a whirlwind of innovative people delivering cutting-edge information. The best part? Top decision makers in almost every professional sports league you can think of were visibly transformed into students—including Rockets general manager Daryl Morey, a co-chairman and overall face of the event.

During a research paper presentation on Friday afternoon, I scoured the room for familiar faces. With the always important trade deadline on the horizon, I saw three NBA general managers who weren’t buried in their phones or whispering in their neighbor’s ear. No. Instead they were focused, clinging to the words of unknown teachers who’ve gone above and beyond in attempting to understand the ever complicated game of basketball.

(For the record, nine employees of the Houston Rockets were in attendance, not including Morey.)

Throughout the conference, several basketball related presentations were made. All were fantastic, but some had the hundreds of observers in attendance sitting quietly like school children, with hands on their laps and mouths wide open. They were special.

I sat with my notebook out through everything, jotting down more notes than I have since college. Simple sentences displayed on various power point presentations gave berth to thousands of little ideas throughout the room, and the dozens that trickled into my skull gave it the feeling of an over packed suitcase.

This was PhD graduates sitting beside high school students, with both of them sharing a common love and a genuine desire. Everyone was mutated into the role of student, and by Saturday evening we met the brisk New England air with a feeling that even though this pioneering conference had come to an end, the furthering of each first-rate idea had just begun.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

One of those players happened to be Houston forward Patrick Patterson, a well-coordinated cinder block of muscle, currently chugging through his second season. Before the season started, the decision to include Patterson was slightly out of left field. Thorpe reasoned his selection on the grounds that Patterson’s playing time would intensify due to the shortened season and its affect on Luis Scola’s aging legs.

Houston’s first round draft pick last year has enough promise to make him the team’s most intriguing player, and a serious X-factor moving forward. Should he manage to earn Kevin McHale’s trust to the tune of a serious increase in efficiency and minutes, the domino effect could be huge. Patterson’s emergence would allow Luis Scola and his not-so-team-friendly contract to be shopped at a quicker rate than ever before. The two are built with a similar structure, but Patterson has youth, strength, and athleticism on his side.

(Exchanging Scola for the ever clichéd combination of “young pieces and draft picks” would be nice, but I’d be happy if they could just fill an area of immediate need, like an athletic perimeter defender who can shoot a decent three-ball, for example.)

The former Kentucky Wildcat most definitely will not be in the running for sixth man of the year, as some predicted. He began the shortened season with a foot injury, which forced him to ease into his new coach’s rotation at a pace that was frustrating to some fans. In the first part of the season, his playing time was inconsistent, and his play was unspectacular (he wasn’t sexy enough to make the Rookie/Sophomore game), but there’s promise in the way he approaches the sport, and the no-nonsense style he imparts.

Patterson is both unique and valuable in the modern game. He’s just as capable at knocking down mid-range jumpers as he is maneuvering his broad shoulders in the post. According to basketball-reference.com, this season he’s shooting 50.8% on shots between 16-23 feet, which is a higher percentage than what he’s doing from 3-9 feet (on just four more attempts).

For an old school power forward, he’s so active on the offensive end, regularly setting screens off the ball and on the ball on the same possession, rolling to the hoop or releasing for a jumper. He’s constantly moving and shows a great understanding as to what his role is playing for a team that lacks a truly dominant offensive weapon. He shoots when he’s open and he passes when he isn’t.

In between setting all those screens, his feet move like a salsa instructor dancing across hot coals. But once he’s arrived at his destination Patterson goes stiff, transforming his body into a wide-legged statue. There’s no moving him, and getting around takes a little burst of energy that by the fourth quarter has weighed a bit on an opposing guard’s energy.

After the screen is set, Patterson’s knowledge of what space needs to be filled is nearly flawless. He adjusts to how defenses are playing his guard and almost always goes to the right spot. According to Synergy, he’s one of the 40 most efficient players in the league scoring 0.96 PPP as the roll man. This is what you might call a strength. What isn’t, however, is his work as an independent entity.

According to Synergy, Patterson has attempted two shots in isolation situations this season, and made them both. The first was a typical pick and pop that ended with Patterson being left so open, he looked around as if the referees had stopped play with a whistle, took one awkward dribble to the right, and knocked down an uncontested jumper from just above the free-throw line.

Once he gains position down low, Patterson isn’t scared of facing up or lofting a soft hook shot off the glass. Here’s where he can really end  up being a solid offensive weapon for Houston, especially in the postseason, when games slow down and defenses hone in Lowry.

On defense his numbers aren’t great. From the post he gives up 1.09 PPP and when isolated it’s 1.08 PPP. But after looking at the actual plays from which these numbers are based, I found the 6’9″ forward regularly playing out of position, defending guys two, three inches taller than him with wider wingspans. In the post, he has good fundamental technique and he’s powerful, but at this point it’s a bit of a mismatch.

Patrick Patterson is an improving player, who may someday soon grow to become a credible force warranting focus from opposing coaches. Will he ever become an All-Star? Probably not, as his game is more suited to compliment than shine. But watching him get better as the season goes along is part of what makes this game such an exciting one to watch. It’s why we follow teams and observe them grow together, from one season to the next. Patterson may not have had the season more than a few intelligent evaluators thought he would, but there’s no doubting he’s on the right track.

In our current unprecedented time, a few familiar terms from the NBA’s lexicon have been altered. What exactly is a “contender” right now? Is it a team with Kevin Durant, LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, Kobe Bryant, Dirk Nowitzki, Chris Paul, or Derrick Rose? Or is it simply anyone that makes the postseason? According to John Hollinger’s most recent Power Rankings, the Rockets have played the 11th most difficult schedule in the league. Despite that, if the regular season ended today they would face the defending champion Dallas Mavericks in the first round of the playoffs.

Houston’s expectations have increased with their unanticipated play, but to what point? Are they capable of winning a series? Two? A championship?

Here’s a deeper look at how the Rockets have sustained their success, and whether or not they’ll be able to keep it up the rest of this season. (Also, a reflective look back to dole out a few mid-season awards.)

Compared to last year’s dreadful defensive play, things have drastically improved in their ability to force turnovers. According to Basketball-Prospectus’ Bradford Doolittle, the Rockets were last in forced turnover percentage a year ago, but are above average right now.

The one elite thing Houston has done on the defensive end this season is guard the three-point line (third best in the league). In the last two seasons only four teams who’ve finished in the top half of the league in defensive three-point percentage have not made the playoffs, and while nothing’s guaranteed by success in a marginal statistic, it’d be surprising to see the Rockets fall out of the race.

Despite an inability to get to the free-throw line (Houston is DEAD last in the league in free-throw rate!), what makes their offense an above average one is the value they’ve placed on holding onto the basketball (top 15 in turnover rate) and consistently grabbing offensive rebounds (top 10 in offensive rebound rate). These two factors are huge when discussing wins and losses. Their attack is set up by the long ball and Kyle Lowry’s penetration, but they’ve been hurt by both Patrick Patterson’s inability to establish himself as the low post bully he can be, and Luis Scola’s regression in the paint—he’s attempting fewer shots at the rim now than at any point in his career.

So where does all this leave the team? A tactful offense that has room for improvement and a defense that’s reliant on one of the league’s best shot blockers in the back, and one of its most ferocious ball hawks at the front. When the opposing team has an elite one on one scorer who stands 6’5″ or taller the Rockets seriously struggle covering him (this is exactly the situation they’ll see facing almost every opponent in the playoffs, and a young Shane Battier is exactly the type of player they should be after at the trade deadline). Chandler Parsons understands how to play defense at the NBA level, but he has yet to make intuitive knowledge translate to productive action for an entire game.

Now, onto the awards:

The Most Pleasant Surprise

A) Chandler Parsons. He’s a rookie second round draft pick who’s fourth on the team in minutes played, rebounds, and assists. He’s second in steals and third in blocks. The contributions have been so out of nowhere, it’s a wonder why this category hasn’t already been re-named “Who’s Acting Like Chandler Parsons?”

B) Kevin McHale and his staff. Who expected any of this from McHale? The unorthodox lineup configurations. The willingness to ride hot hands. The confidence he’s given guys like Dalembert, Lowry, and Parsons. The guy has been so much more than a congenial personality. McHale knows what he has with his roster and he maximizes every last drop from the players who’re worth playing. He instantly recognized Terrence Williams’ inability to exist within his offense and resisted the temptation to give Hasheem Thabeet an opportunity when the season started slow. Another hat tip to the job Houston’s new coach has done: The Rockets have outscored opponents 65-47 using a Dragic, Lowry, Lee, Patterson, and Parsons lineup this year. That’s awesome.

C) The Bench. Houston’s base secondary unit of Dragic, Lee, Budinger, Patterson, and Hill average 1.07 PPP while giving up a miniscule 0.89 PPP. On an individual level each one has played relatively well up to this point (apart from Hill), and the team remains a threat in the west primarily because of the depth Daryl Morey’s created.

Winner: Kevin McHale

Most Improved Player

A) Kyle Lowry

B) Samuel Dalembert

It’s tough to designate a “Most Improved Player” without defining a given timeframe, so for this award we’ll be discussing how a player’s improved from last year to this one. Lowry was a legitimate All-Star snub. Dalembert’s added sudden touch around the basket to his already above average defensive play.

Winner: Kyle Lowry

Bench Phenom

A) Goran Dragic

B) Patrick Patterson

C) Courtney Lee

It’s a tough pack to choose from. My personal favorite is Dragic, a fearless floor general who infects his teammates with intensity every time he scores on a fast break. Patterson got off to a slightly disappointing start as he dealt with a foot injury, and Courtney Lee’s been the ever-serviceable backup two guard we’ve known all along.

Winner: Goran Dragic

Most Disappointing Player

A) Kevin Martin. Being traded never stopped stinging. The ongoing transaction speculation weighs heavy on his shoulders. He’s struggled adjusting to being a secondary scoring option alongside the increasingly ravenous Kyle Lowry. His game hasn’t adjusted to the league’s subtle shift towards allowing a bit more leniency to hard-nosed perimeter defenders. One of  these, and maybe even all of them, can explain the up and down season Kevin Martin’s currently mired in. Yes, he’s leading the team in scoring, but at five fewer points per game than last year. His usage rate has dropped five percentage points and his PER has dropped three, too. But at the core of Martin’s inconsistency are the free-throw attempts. Formerly his bread and butter, Martin’s averaging exactly half as many attempts at the free-throw line this year as opposed to last. Something’s up with Kevin Martin. I wonder how much of the problem’s in his head.

B) Chase Budinger. From a purely statistical standpoint Budinger hasn’t dropped off at all, in any major category. In his usual 20 minutes a game he’s shooting the deep ball better than ever to go along with a career best PER and TS%. But that isn’t the point here, is it? Apart from his participation in the dunk contest, the big storyline surrounding Budinger’s season was his demotion from the starting lineup just a week into the season. It’s almost like the Rockets were a boy in high school and Budinger was a cute girl. A week into the school year, a new, slightly prettier girl (Parsons) caught the boy’s eye. Old, cute girl’s number was thrown away and a switcheroo was instantly made. On top of that, in the bigger picture of Budinger’s career, didn’t you expect to see more than marginal improvement this year? It’s his third season and he’s getting his starting job taken away by a rookie who can’t shoot free-throws? That can’t be the development Morey is looking for.

C) Luis Scola. As previously mentioned, Scola is taking fewer shots at the rim than ever before, yet his usage rate is up from last year. As surprisingly pleasant as the Rockets have been, this number may be what’s holding them back the most. Thanks to his age, Scola’s game is moving further and further from the basket, and the results have been fewer rebounds and more turnovers. On some levels this had to of been expected. Scola may have entered the league a mere five seasons ago, but he was playing professional ball a long time before that. Last year his statistics took a meteoric rise and it made very little sense. Now he’s coming back to Earth and our expectations here on out should be tempered.

Winner: Kevin Martin

Least Valuable Player

A) Terrence Williams

B) Jonny Flynn

C) Hasheem Thabeet

The nominees here are plenty, with Terrence Williams, Jonny Flynn, and Hasheem Thabeet all holding more value as “assets” than as “players”. Not a good thing when you aren’t even 25-years-old.

Loser: All three

Most Valuable Player

A) Kyle Lowry

B) Luis Scola

C) Samuel Dalembert

This is a no-brainer.

Winner: Kyle Lowry

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

As a fan of this league in its broad entirety, lists like this always interest me. Anybody can make a prediction lacking evidence and merit; it’s boring and easy. But this list—with its well researched information broken down into several key categories—is an absolute must read. After glancing at the top and bottom five teams, gauging who was deemed the future’s haves and have-nots, I set out for the middle, in search of the Rockets.

From an optimist’s point of view, Houston’s plight is also their great fortune. Year in and year out, the team is a well-layered group of guys who compete on a nightly basis. It’s fair to say they aren’t elite, but they’re not top heavy either. The playoffs seem to always be on the horizon, and as someone who buys into the organization that’s certainly enough to keep you relatively satisfied.

If you’re looking at this team through a prism made from the glass of “real life”, then you must be a frustrated individual. With the type of franchise altering injuries only Portland’s faithful can truly relate to, in recent times the Rockets have been too proud to entertain a blue chip lottery pick and too inept to win the whole thing. The strategic course they set out on in their attempt to acquire one of the 10 best basketball players alive has been a curvy one. Just when you think their bus is about to roll off the edge, a seemingly minor one-year Sam Dalembert signing or unexpected All-Star caliber surge of someone like Kyle Lowry steadies the wheel and sets it upright.

Where they stand right now can be viewed from many different angles. Hopeful, hopeless, exciting, tedious. The fact is, when we’re talking about the never ending variable that is a professional basketball player, nothing is a sure thing because everything is predicated on the abilities and health of a mere mortal. Nobody knows what’s going to happen this year, or the next, or the one after that.

For those who don’t have an Insider account, the Rockets were slotted in 10th place; a bit higher than I thought they’d be, sandwiched between San Antonio and Boston—two participants in six of the past 13 NBA Finals. Think about that for a second. In a league with seven superstars playing for six teams (Kobe Bryant, LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, Chris Paul, Dwight Howard, Kevin Durant, and Derrick Rose), the All-Star-less Rockets are projected to have a brighter immediate future than 2/3 of the league. That’s good news.

Their management team gives them an intellectual advantage over some and is reputed by basketball’s community as being both aggressive and intelligent (Hollinger/Ford ranked them 8th under the category of “Management”). The city of Houston—the nation’s fourth largest; home to the second most Fortune 500 companies in the country, and featuring more citizens per-capita who’ve memorized We Can’t Be Stopped than any other place in the world—is viewed as the 9th most appealing market for possible free agents. If you’re a fan looking ahead, both of these are wonderful factors to have in your back pocket. But ultimately, management and market mean very little unless you have the means to properly deploy the former and capitalize on the latter. The means which I speak of, of course, is money. Without it nothing is possible and all is for naught. The smartest GM can do nothing without it, and a gigantic market (Los Angeles pre its Lob Angeles days) doesn’t necessarily translate to courting the most prized free agents.

When in the business of purchasing valued commodities which are constantly threatening wear and tear, with the ever-looming possibility to permanently break down at any moment, the more safety net funds you have to spend, the better. According to Hollinger and Ford, in the field known as “Money” (projected salary-cap situation; ability and willingness to exceed cap and pay luxury tax) only the New Jersey Nets rank higher.

To have an unabashed willingness to flex your financial muscles is something that lasts far longer than a superstar’s prime, and its importance can’t be overstated.

In a most subtle form, here’s a recent example. June 23, 2011. Draft night. The Rockets select Chandler Parsons with the 38th overall selection and then immediately package him to Minnesota for the likes of Jonny Flynn, Donatas Motiejunas, and a second round pick. Before the night’s over, Morey gets on the phone with Kahn and says, “You know what, we actually like this Parsons kid. How about I offer you this sack of money with a specially embroidered dollar sign on the front and we call it a day?”
The end result is Houston essentially buying one of their starters from another team. Not a bad luxury to have.

If you’re reading this as a fan of the Houston Rockets, then I assume you’re aware of their recent television deal with Comcast. The Rockets will be going in on an 80% ownership share with MLB’s Houston Astros, and starting next season all games will be shown on Comcast SportsNet Houston. While I wasn’t able to find any specific financial figures, Regional Sport Networks are reputed to be one of the most profitable earners for professional sports organizations in the county, and the implications of the deal are expected to be glorious if you like the Rockets and/or increased revenue.

Also, if you’re a casual fan of the NBA then you’re probably aware of the league’s recent decision to have Houston host All-Star weekend in 2013. For just a moment imagine you’re an investor trying to convince a few wealthy colleagues to get behind an idea you foresee as one that could make you all quite a bit of money. Now imagine you’re able to pitch the idea in your home, on your terms, with all capable resources of persuasion at your fingertips. This is what hosting All-Star weekend can be like for the entertaining organization. It is THE weekend of good times for NBA workers. A time when small yet memorable seeds of joy can be planted in the back of player’s brain. It’s an opportunity to sell the city and community as a favorable destination in the immediate future.

While the Rockets fight night in and night out—with a cast of characters who’re easy to root for, emphasize with, and relate to—it’s a great feeling to know that in the ever changing landscape that is professional basketball, Houston has set themselves up to be major players for the foreseeable time ahead. Superstars be damned, the Rockets have placed themselves in a situation of serious envy.

If since the early days of January you’ve found yourself arguing in favor of Kyle Lowry’s worth as a legitimate All-Star candidate, let me say, first and foremost, that you’re absolutely correct. Whether it be as a guard or a wild card, Lowry deserves one of the Western Conferences seven available spots. Here are four reasons why:

Defense: To observe the number of points per possession Lowry is surrendering when offensive players choose to take him one on one in isolation, you may need to use a microscope. Right now he’s 13th best in the entire league, with a ridiculously low 0.56 PPP. With only 23 isolation plays to look at, Lowry is like a shut down cornerback with opposing point guards/coaches choosing to go the safer route and avoid him altogether.

He alerts teammates when a screen is being set on him, as opposed to the other way around. Only a few guys across the league are this vocal up front in instructing their big men how to play the pick and roll in particular situations.

He isn’t afraid to exert himself by helping a teammate and straying down on opponents working in the low post when the situation calls for it. This may be his biggest fault, but more often than not he’s able to recover in time.

According to BasketballValue.com, when Kyle Lowry is on the court, Houston is holding opponents to 0.9925 PPP. When he’s off the court, that number goes to 1.0799. He’s very, very important to what the Rockets do defensively.

Rebounding: Lowry is a slightly tall person compared to all men his age walking around in modern day society, but relative to the NBA’s labor force he’s an ant. Here are a few players who’ve fewer rebounds than Lowry so far this season (keep in mind he’s barely six-feet tall): Kendrick Perkins, Jermaine O’Neal, Hedo Turkoglu, Dirk Nowitzki, Joel Anthony, and teammate Jordan Hill.

In what’s probably the most impressive part about his nightly flirtation with a triple double, Lowry averages six rebounds per game. More than Kobe Bryant, Dwyane Wade, and every single guard in the league.

Decision Making: Lowry is the 15th most efficient player in basketball (averaging 0.96 PPP) when it comes to handling the pick and roll, which is quite important when discussing the criteria that makes up a quality point guard in today’s NBA. According to Synergy, this is where 30% of Lowry’s offense comes from (up from approximately 20%, 0.87 PPP last year, which was good for 47th best in the league), and it’s a welcomed development.

Lowry runs the pick and roll with bad habits, or so it seems; a true testament to his overall skill set. Instead of reading and reacting to how the defense chooses to play him, Lowry looks as if he’s already decided what he’s going to do long before his screen arrives. He goes full speed at it, either pulling up for a quick three, driving hard to the basket, or settling in the mid-range. Of course, this isn’t what’s actually going on, but his ability to analyze all the moving parts and respond before the defense initiates its execution is a true testament to one of the smarter point guards we have in the league right now. It’s his stubborn gift.

If you still don’t believe Lowry is capable of making good decisions, here’s a fun little fact. According to 82games.com, he makes 4.1 assists per bad pass. Steve Nash logs a respectable 3.5.

Shooting: Lowry began the season on the type of offensive tear that’s nearly impossible to sustain. To punish him—a point guard—because of a shooting slump doesn’t make too much sense to me. For the record, here’s how he’s doing right now: He holds a better shooting percentage than James Harden and Wesley Matthews on three-pointers while all three are attempting the same attempts per game.

According to NBA.com’s Statscube, Lowry’s “clutch” numbers (the last five minutes of games where the scoring margin is within five points) are abnormally ridiculous. His usage rate jumps from 23.7% to 36%, he’s 100% on free-throws, and—make sure you’re sitting down for this—he’s knocking down 71% of his three-pointers. I can’t even begin to analyze that last number, but in regards to the usage rate Lowry is clearly depended on at times where the game is getting serious. He has the ball in his hands when things matter most. He’s the team’s offensive leader. He’s their All-Star…

Not everybody can make the team. I understand and accept this as a truth. But when you capture the overall body of work Kyle Lowry has molded together this season, you come to appreciate the unseen contributions someone with such a large amount of responsibility is forced to make. It’s a sink or swim league, and right now the Houston Rockets’ lone All-Star is the biggest reason why nobody’s drowning.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

Goran Dragic is one of those players who forces you to like him. He always plays hard, with a fearlessness signaling his want to compete as a starter in this league, and a mental inability to take plays off on either end. He initiates action as good as anybody at his position (which right now is about as high a compliment as can be said), all the while holding a crusty “underdog” sign high above his head.

Almost every single player who makes it to the NBA has more desire than the equally skilled counterpart who never makes it. Once the lucky few who arrive are judged against one another on a relative scale, words like “assassin” and “lazy oaf” are thrown around, with some guys taking plays off and others taking literal days off their life through sheer effort. If at any point in his career you’ve watched Dragic play for an extensive period of time, you’d agree placing him in the league’s top five percentile of “guys who really want it” is an accurate description.

When I think of him on the court, the first thing that springs to mind is the childish glee he unsuccessfully tries to mask when he’s running with the ball in his hands, only one backpedaling defender standing between him and the basket. It’s like a starving dog, slobbering his way through a field on his way towards a long lost sandwich. Just as that hungry dog craves his food, Dragic wants his basket.

Here are a few stats that validate Dragic’s nature to let loose on the break. Brace yourself, they may shock you.

• At 1.45 PPP, Dragic is the league’s 12th most efficient player in transition. When he’s out and running, Dragic shoots 74.3% from the floor.

• He’s is one of the best point guards in the league at finishing around the rim. He attempts just over two shots a game there, and makes just under two, for an insane 75% average.

• One out of every five of his shots at the rim come by way of an assist. He’s a lonesome assassin who takes over single possessions at a time.

• Dragic draws a shooting foul twice as often as he turns it over. Even more impressive, he’s turned it over just twice this entire season when running a one man fast break. That’s uncanny.

After re-watching every transition basket Dragic has scored this season, I’ve identified four key ways in which he manages to wreak all that havoc.

1) Jumping a passing lane and going the other way in pick six fashion. This is half instinct, and half hustle. Dragic rarely gambles, instead he bides his time, waiting for an opportunistic moment to take advantage of an opponent’s mistake.

2) After a turnover, leaking out behind the defense to receive a lengthy pass. This method of producing in transition is one his coaches probably aren’t too fond of, (he’s usually left his man and is heading the other way before the Rockets have definitive possession) but they always lead to unguarded bunnies at the rim.

3) Making himself available by streaking down a lane and receiving a pass after crossing half court. If Dragic isn’t dribbling in transition, Kyle Lowry is. The Rockets’ starting point guard has been phenomenal this season at making the right decision out there in the open court, and when Dragic is flanking his side the results are usually positive.

4) Capitalizing off a steal, one on one with a single opponent between him and the basket. When there’s one defender in his way Dragic will NEVER slow his pace. With most basketball players this can lead to a reputation of wild play, but Dragic remarkably manages to keep his body under control in the few instances where he can’t blow by his man, absorbing contact and acting as if he were all alone.

With a mid-range game and three-point shot that appear as the tomalley to his close range lobster meat, Dragic is far from perfect as an offensive player. But when he’s flying in transition, forcing reaction and then doing what he wants anyway, placing delicate spin or dainty touch shots that for most others would qualify as a miracle, you know it’s unique, and you recognize it as special.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

Minnesota Timberwolves

120

Final Recap | Box Score

108

Houston Rockets

	Luis Scola, PF 20 MIN | 2-8 FG | 4-6 FT | 1 REB | 3 AST | 8 PTS | -8 His second matchup with Kevin Love in a single week was a nightmare. The two are so blatantly headed in different directions, it’s a sad sight to see.
	Chandler Parsons, F 33 MIN | 4-10 FG | 0-2 FT | 1 REB | 2 AST | 9 PTS | -14 The normally active Parsons was a shell of himself tonight. Possibly due to his task of defending Beasley on an island for extended stretches of time. Also, he can’t make free-throws.
	Samuel Dalembert, C 28 MIN | 2-5 FG | 2-2 FT | 8 REB | 1 AST | 6 PTS | -19 However Sammy Dalembert plays defense dictates ultimately dictates how the Houston Rockets play defense, and tonight the barometer was tapped out. He IS the weak side help on most possessions, and tonight it simply never came.
	Kevin Martin, SG 34 MIN | 9-15 FG | 7-11 FT | 2 REB | 1 AST | 29 PTS | -16 29 points in 34 minutes is marvelous. Martin did his job yet again, and played some tough defense to boot.
	Kyle Lowry, PG 26 MIN | 5-10 FG | 1-1 FT | 4 REB | 3 AST | 11 PTS | -14 The slump continues. I’m now at the point where I’ve got to ask if he’s seriously hurt because the combination of almost no fourth quarter minutes with a constant tentativeness to attack the basket is just so out of character. Judging it relative to this past week, Lowry went from the second best point guard in the Western Conference to the second best point guard on his own team.
	Courtney Lee, SG 22 MIN | 3-7 FG | 2-2 FT | 2 REB | 1 AST | 9 PTS | +2 Lee was a bit undersized in his matchup with Michael Beasley, but still, he allowed him to go left on several occasions. Left and straight to the basket.
	Goran Dragic, PG 24 MIN | 2-10 FG | 3-4 FT | 2 REB | 9 AST | 7 PTS | 0 With Lowry struggling to make plays, Dragic continues to thrive as a consistent spark plug. He penetrated at will, and had several drop off passes leading to simple layups for teammates.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

Here’s the question: Rating each player purely on their value in the here and now, in today’s NBA—excluding salary restrictions, contract longevity, and age (as difficult as that may be) as possible factors—would you trade Kyle Lowry for Pau Gasol?

There are several things one can conclude based on whether the response is yes or no. If you say yes—replacing Lowry with Gasol will make Houston a better basketball team—then clearly you value the traditional winning metrics of size and “superstar” power as a prerequisite to contending relevance. The importance of deploying a towering Haitian/Spanish monster on opponents is far more serious of a weapon than the league’s most destructive 6-footer.

On the contrary (and this is ignoring the obvious in believing Kyle Lowry is superior to Pau Gasol), by saying no you probably recognize one of the following two things as fact: 1) Lowry is either on the cusp of “superstar” status or has already been baptized as one. He’s far and away the best rebounder at his position; makes opposing point guards hysterical with his defense; conducts the offense with brilliant decisions; bangs the three with unlimited range; and gets everyone involved with elusive passes that would make a cat burglar blush. It should be a foregone conclusion that come February he’ll make his first All-Star team.

2) You believe the league’s ever-shifting tendency to favor those who initiate the action over those who finish it has an increasing role regarding wins and losses. Lowry’s value as someone who enables those around him is insanely high right now, and his absolute limitations as a basketball player have yet to be realized. Watching him improve by the possession is like playing tether ball with an immeasurable amount of rope—who knows when he’ll max out?

When this question is looked at on a macro-level, what this supposed deal also discusses is how you define the word “superstar” in today’s NBA.

Here’s what I believe to be the simplest measurement: ask yourself, “Can Player X be the leading performer on a legitimate championship contender?” This is Dwight Howard, Kevin Durant, Chris Paul, Kobe Bryant, Derrick Rose, LeBron James, Dirk Nowitzki, and possibly LaMarcus Aldridge. (There are two “sidekicks” who also qualify as “superstars”: Dwyane Wade and Russell Westbrook.)

Is Gasol a superstar right now? And for what it’s worth, is Lowry?
Can either take a group of lesser parts and make each and every one of them come together to form purpose-filled unit, just by existing on the court? Right now it’s tough to say either has that ability, but Lowry is certainly closer.

Comparing their stats would be silly and out of context, but who cares, let’s go for it anyway. (We won’t compare assists because that’d make things EXTRA ridiculous, but for the record Lowry sits fourth in the entire league with 8.7 per game.)

Kyle Lowry: 16.5 PPG, 56.4 TS%, 22.1 PER, 22.5 USG%, 10.6 TRB%, 3.7 shots attempted at the rim (SAATR)

Pau Gasol: 15.8 PPG, 55.1 TS%, 19.4 PER, 20.0 USG%, 13.9 TRB%, 3.3 SAATR

I mean, this data is scary. Kyle Lowry is nearly a foot shorter than Pau Gasol, yet he takes more shots at the rim, is nearly rebounding the ball at the same rate, and has a higher true shooting percentage.

In the original deal involving Kevin Martin, Luis Scola, and Goran Dragic, the Rockets would’ve had Gasol and Lowry at their disposal. There was no debate as to whether or not it was a smart deal to make. This hypothetical one for one swap, however, is a different beast. It’s size for speed; an operator of decisions against the machine who acts them out. Maybe it’s a little unfair to pose this question while one player is scorching the league and the other appears to be undergoing natural regression, but the principles still apply.

Who’s it going to be? Kyle Lowry or Pau Gasol?

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles

In the moments after one occurs, seeds of unparalleled embarrassment are planted deep in the victim’s brain, while the dunker’s energy extends like sharp tentacles—from the other nine guys on the court, to the lonely man sitting in section 403 who just removed his pants and is madly waving them over his head.

For a split second, the move impacts the game greater than a 16-foot jump shot ever could. It causes a crowd to either enter brief pandemonium or sit on its collective hands like a reprimanded kindergarten class. It’s an opportune hustle play, not done for personal glory or individual accolades, and when it’s complete everyone is affected.

The put back dunk takes timing, intuitiveness, and, obviously, incredible leaping ability. Some players who possess all three go entire careers without tasting one. Its existence is their white whale (or Robert Redford’s Demi Moore). Others have felt the great feeling, and will someday relay the one-of-a-kind euphoria to their grandchildren.

Through his very first handful of games, Chandler Parsons has nearly half a dozen of them, each one inspiring greater awe than its predecessor. It’s become as unexplainable as it is amazing; the nightly put back dunks are somehow overshadowing what has become the league’s most pleasant, and consistent, surprise.

Parsons isn’t just a rookie, he’s a second round throw in on a draft night deal designed to shed a little salary space. Houston sent Brad Miller, Nikola Mirotic and a future 1st round draft pick to Minnesota for Jonny Flynn (booo), Donatas Motiejunas, and a future 2nd round draft pick. Later that night, Parsons was traded yet again, this time from Minnesota back to Houston for cold hard cash.

That doesn’t sound like the type of player who’s truly valued as a possible starter, now does it? Parsons is this year’s Landry Fields, only more athletic and far less vulnerable. He’s locking down John Wall and glaring at Blake Griffin. If opposing NBA teams don’t start boxing him out when Houston’s shot goes up, we may have a serious cult following on our hands. Add to this he’s locked down for the next four seasons at a ridiculously small salary, and what we have is pure gold.

Before placing most of his dunks in this post and exploding your internet connection, here are a few quotes Parsons—along with his teammates and coaches—has had to say in reference to what everyone else is already talking about.

Parsons, on if he’s surprised: “I really am. I’m not gonna lie and say I’m not. Because I had a lot in college, but, like, to keep doing this consecutively, it could be luck, getting lucky bounces off the rim. But I’m just going to keep going hard until somebody stops me.”

Kevin McHale, on possible reasons for Parsons’ success: “He just does things,” Rockets coach Kevin McHale said. “He makes plays on the ball.”

Patrick Patterson via SB Nation: “He’s got a knack for getting to the rim. He seeks it out every single game, you know, he will get one.”

And now, some uninterrupted goodies:

Aaaaand, exhale.

Twitter: @ShakyAnkles